OBAGAB

Thursday, 18 August 2016

SKOTO CALIPHATE

SOKOTO CALIPHATE
The Sokoto Caliphate was an independent Islamic Caliphate, in West Africa. Founded during the jihad of the Fulani War in 1809 by Usman dan Fodio,[1] it was abolished when the British defeated the caliph in 1903 and put the area under the Northern Nigeria Protectorate.
Developed in the context of multiple, independent Hausa kingdoms, at its height the Caliphate linked over 30 different emirates and over 10 million people in the most powerful state in its region and one of the most significant empires in Africa in the nineteenth century. The caliphate was a loose confederation of emirates that recognized the suzerainty of the "commander of the faithful", the sultan or caliph.[2] The caliphate brought decades of economic growth throughout the region. An estimated one to 2.5 million non-Muslim slaves were captured during jihad.[3] They provided labor for plantations and were provided an opportunity to become Muslims.[4]
Though the British abolished the political authority of the Caliph the title of Sultan was retained, and remains an important religious position for Muslims in the region to the current day.[5] Usman dan Fodio's jihad provided the inspiration for a series of related jihads in other parts of the savanna and Sahel far beyond Nigeria's borders that led to the foundation of Islamic states in Senegal, Mali, Ivory Coast, Chad, Central African Republic, and Sudan.[2]

Contents [hide]
1 Founding and expansion (1804-1903) 1.1 Background
1.2 Jihad movement
1.3 Growth of the Caliphate
1.4 Administrative structure
1.5 Economy
1.6 Scholarship
2 Decline and fall
3 References

Founding and expansion (1804-1903)[edit]
Background[edit]
The major power in the region in the 17th and 18th centuries had been the Bornu Empire. However, revolutions and the rise of new powers decreased the power of the Bornu empire and by 1759, its rulers had lost control over the oasis town of Bilma and access to the Trans-Saharan trade.[6] Vassal cities of the empire gradually became autonomous, and the result by 1780 was a political array of different, independent states in the region.[6]
The Fall of the Songhai Empire in the 1500s had also freed much of the central Bilad as-Sudan, and a number of Hausa Sultanates led by different Hausa aristocracies had grown to fill the void. Three of the most significant to develop were the Sultanates of Gobir, Kebbi (both in the Rima River valley), and Zamfara, all in present-day Nigeria.[6][7] These kingdoms engaged in regular warfare against each other, especially conducting slave raids, and in order to pay for the constant warfare levied high taxation on their citizens.[8]

The Sokoto-Rima river system
The region between the Niger River and Lake Chad was largely populated with the Hausa, the Fulani, and other ethnic groups that had immigrated to the area. Much of the Hausa population had settled in the cities throughout the region. The Fulani, in contrast, had largely remained a pastoral community, herding cattle, goats and sheep, and populating grasslands between the towns throughout the region. With increasing trade, a good number of Fulani settled in towns, forming a distinct minority.[6][8]
Much of the population had converted to Islam in the centuries before; however, nationalist and pagan beliefs persisted in many areas.[7] In the end of the 1700s, an increase in Islamic preaching occurred throughout the Hausa Kingdoms. A number of the preachers were linked in a shared Tariqa of Islamic study.[6]
Jihad movement[edit]
Main article: Fulani War
Usman dan Fodio, an Islamic scholar and an urbanized Fulani, had been actively educating and preaching in the city of Gobir with the approval and support of the Hausa leadership of the city. However, when Yunfa, a former student of dan Fodio, became the Sultan of Gobir he restricted dan Fodio's activities, forcing him into exile in Gudu.[6] A large number of peoples left Gobir to join dan Fodio and as a response on February 21, 1804, Yunfa declared war on dan Fodio.
Despite some early losses at the Battle of Tsuntua and elsewhere, the forces of dan Fodio began taking over some of the key cities starting in 1805. The war lasted from 1804 until 1808 and the forces of dan Fodio were able to capture the states of Katsina and Daura, and the important kingdom of Kano (in 1807) and Gobir in 1808.[6]
The Caliphate was founded in February 1804 at Gudu when Dan-Fodio was proclaimed Amir al-Mu'minin, defender of the faithful. Usman dan Fodio then declared a number of flag bearers amongst those following him, creating an early political structure of the empire.[6] In 1809, Muhammed Bello, the son of dan Fodio, founded the city of Sokoto, which became the capital of the Sokoto Caliphate.[8]
The jihads had created "a new slaving frontier on the basis of rejuvenated Islam."[3] By 1900 the Sokoto caliphate had "at least 1 million and perhaps as many as 2.5 million slaves", second only to the American South (which had four million in 1860) in size among all modern slave societies.[3]
Growth of the Caliphate[edit]
From 1808 until the mid-1830s, the Sokoto Caliphate expanded, gradually annexing the plains to the west and key parts of Yorubaland. It became one of the largest states in Africa, stretching from modern-day Burkina Faso to Cameroon and including most of Northern Nigeria and Niger Republic. At its height, the Sokoto Caliphate included over 30 different emirates under its political structure.[5]
The political structure of the Caliphate was organized with the Sultan of Sokoto ruling from the city of Sokoto (and for a brief period under Muhammad Bello from Wurno). The leader of each emirate was appointed by the Sultan as the flag bearer for that city but was given wide independence and autonomy.[9]
Much of the growth of the Caliphate occurred through the establishment of an extensive system of ribats as part of the consolidation policy of Muhammed Bello, the second Sultan.[10] Ribats were established founding a number of new cities with walled fortresses, schools, markets, and other buildings. These proved crucial in expanding the Caliphate by developing new cities, settling the pastoral Fulani people, and supporting the growth of plantations which were crucial to the economy.[4]
By 1837, the Sokoto Caliphate had a population around 10 million people.[5]
Administrative structure[edit]
The Sokoto Caliphate was largely organized around a number of largely independent emirates pledging allegiance to the Sultan of Sokoto. The administration was initially built to follow those of Muhammad during his time in Medina but also the theories of Al-Mawardi in "The Ordinances of Government".[9] The Hausa kingdoms prior to the caliphate had been run largely through hereditary succession for leadership.
The early rulers of the Sokoto Caliphate, dan Fodio and Bello, abolished systems of hereditary succession and preferred if leaders were appointed by virtue of their Islamic scholarship and moral standing.[8] Emirs were appointed by the Sultan; they traveled yearly to deliver allegiance and taxes, in the form of crops, cowry shells, and slaves.[5] When a Sultan died or retired from the office, an appointment council made up of the Emirs would select a replacement.[9] Direct lines of succession were largely not followed for Sultan, although each Sultan claims direct descent from dan Fodio.
The major administrative division was between the Sokoto Caliphate and the Gwandu Emirate. In 1815, Usman dan Fodio retired from the administrative business of the Caliphate and divided the area taken over during the Fulani War with his brother Abdullahi dan Fodio ruling in the west with the Gwandu Emirate and his son Muhammed Bello taking over administration of the Sokoto Caliphate. The Emir at Gwandu retained allegiance to the Sokoto Caliphate and spiritual guidance from the Sultan, but the Emir managed the separate emirates under his supervision independently from the Sultan.[9]
The administrative structure of loose allegiances of the emirates to the Sultan did not always function smoothly. There was a series of revolutions by Hausa aristocracy in 1816-1817 during the reign of Muhammed Bello, but the Sultan ended these by granting those members title to land.[4] There were multiple crises that arose during the century between the Sokoto Caliphate and many of the emirates: notably, the Adamawa Emirate and the Kano Emirate.[11]
The Sufi community throughout the region proved crucial in the administration of the caliphate. The Tariqa brotherhoods, notably the Qadiriyya to which every successive Sultan of Sokoto was an adherent,[12] provided a group linking the distinct emirates to the authority of the Sultan. Scholars Burnham and Last claim that this Islamic scholarship community provided an "embryonic bureaucracy" which linked the cities throughout the Caliphate.[9]
Economy[edit]
After the establishment of the Caliphate, there were decades of economic growth throughout the region, particularly after a wave of revolts in 1816-1817.[4] They had significant trade over the trans-Saharan routes.[4]
After the Fulani War, all land in the empire was declared waqf or owned by the entire community. However, the Sultan allocated land to individuals or families, as could an emir. Such land could be inherited by family members but could not be sold.[7] Exchange was based largely on monetized currency involving cowries or gold and silver coins.[4] Major crops produced included cotton, indigo, kola and shea nuts, grain, rice, tobacco, and onion.[4]
Slavery remained a large part of the economy, although its operation had changed fundamentally with the end of the legal Atlantic slave trade imposed by Great Britain and the United States. Slaves were gained only through raiding and not through a market as had operated earlier in West Africa.[4] The founder of the Caliphate allowed slavery only for non-Muslims; slavery was viewed as a process to bring such peoples into the Muslim community.[8] The expansion of agricultural plantations under the Caliphate was dependent on slave labor. These plantations were established around the ribats, developing large areas of agricultural production around the cities of the empire.[4] The institution of slavery was mediated by the lack of a racial barrier among the peoples, and the potential for slaves to convert and become members of the Islamic community.[4] There are historical records of slaves reaching high levels of government and administration in the Sokoto Caliphate.[13] Its commercial prosperity was also based on market integration, internal peace and an extensive export-trade network.[14]
Scholarship[edit]
Islamic scholarship was a crucial aspect of the Caliphate from its founding. Sultan Usman dan Fodio, Sultan Muhammed Bello, Emir Abdullahi dan Fodio, Sultan Abu Bakr Atiku, and Nana Asma’u devoted significant time to chronicling histories, writing poetry, and Islamic studies. A number of manuscripts are available and they provide crucial historical information and important spiritual texts.[5] This role did diminish after the reign of Bello and Atiku.
Decline and fall[edit]

Photo of residents of Sokoto 1900
European attention had been focusing on the region for colonial expansion for much of the last part of the 19th century. The French and British both sent multiple exploratory missions to the area to assess colonial opportunities.
French explorer Parfait-Louis Monteil visited Sokoto in 1891 and noted that the Caliph was at war with the Emir of Argungu, defeating Argungu the next year. Monteil claimed that Fulani power was tottering because of the war and the ascension of the unpopular Caliph Abderrahman dan Abi Bakar.[15]
However, the British had expanded into Southern Nigeria and by 1902 had begun plans to move into the Sokoto Caliphate. British General Frederick Lugard used rivalries between many of the emirs in the south and the central Sokoto administration to prevent any defense as he worked toward the capital.[16] As the British approached the city of Sokoto, the new Sultan Muhammadu Attahiru I organized a quick defense of the city and fought the advancing British-led forces. The British force quickly won, sending Attahiru I and thousands of followers on a Mahdist hijra.[17]
On the 13th of March 1903 at the grand market square of Sokoto, the last Vizier of the Caliphate officially conceded to British Rule. The British appointed Muhammadu Attahiru II as the new Caliph.[17] Lugard abolished the Caliphate, but retained the title Sultan as a symbolic position in the newly organized Northern Nigeria Protectorate.[5] In June 1903, the British defeated the remaining forces of Attahiru I and killed him; by 1906 resistance to British rule had ended.
References[edit]
1.Jump up ^ McKay, Hill, Buckler, Ebrey, Beck, Crowston, Weisner-Hanks. A History of World Societies. 8th edition. Volume C - From 1775 to the Present. 2009 by Bedford/St. Martin's. ISBN 978-0-312-68298-9. "The most important of these revivalist states, the enormous Sokoto caliphate, illustrates the general pattern. It was founded by Usuman dan Fodio (1754-1817), an inspiring Muslim teacher who first won zealous followers among both the Fulani herders and Hausa peasants in the Muslim state of Gobir in the northern Sudan." p. 736.
2.^ Jump up to: a b Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. (1991). "Usman dan Fodio and the Sokoto Caliphate". Nigeria: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Retrieved 2 September 2015.
3.^ Jump up to: a b c McKay, John P.; Hill,, Bennett D. (2011). A History of World Societies, Volume 2: Since 1450, Volume 2. Macmillan. p. 755.
4.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i j Lovejoy, Paul E. (1978). "Plantations in the Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate". The Journal of African History. 19 (3): 341–368. doi:10.1017/s0021853700016200.
5.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f Falola, Toyin (2009). Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press.
6.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h Maishanu, Hamza Muhammad; Isa Muhammad Maishanu (1999). "The Jihad and the Formation of the Sokoto Caliphate". Islamic Studies. 38 (1): 119–131.
7.^ Jump up to: a b c Swindell, Kenneth (1986). "Population and Agriculture in the Sokoto-Rima Basin of North-West Nigeria: A Study of Political Intervention, Adaptation and Change, 1800-1980". Cahiers d'Études Africaines. 26: 75–111. doi:10.3406/cea.1986.2167.
8.^ Jump up to: a b c d e Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman (1994). "Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination". Paideuma. 40: 99–109.
9.^ Jump up to: a b c d e Burnham, Peter; Murray Last (1994). "From Pastoralist to Politician: The Problem of a Fulbe "Aristocracy"". Cahiers d'Études Africaines. 34: 313–357. doi:10.3406/cea.1994.2055.
10.Jump up ^ Salau, Mohammed Bashir (2006). "Ribats and the Development of Plantations in the Sokoto Caliphate: A Case Study of Fanisau". African Economic History. 34: 23–43. doi:10.2307/25427025.
11.Jump up ^ Njeuma, Martin Z. (2012). Fulani Hegemony in Yola (Old Adamawa) 1809-1902. Cameroon: Langa.
12.Jump up ^ Hiskett, M. The Sword of Truth; the Life and times of the Shehu Usuman Dan Fodio. New York: Oxford UP, 1973. Print.
13.Jump up ^ Stilwell, Sean (2000). "Power, Honour and Shame: The Ideology of Royal Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate". Africa: Journal of the International African Institute. 70 (3): 394–421. doi:10.3366/afr.2000.70.3.394.
14.Jump up ^ Baten, Jörg (2016). A History of the Global Economy. From 1500 to the Present. Cambridge University Press. p. 323. ISBN 9781107507180.
15.Jump up ^ Claire Hirshfield (1979). The diplomacy of partition: Britain, France, and the creation of Nigeria, 1890-1898. Springer. p. 37ff. ISBN 90-247-2099-0. Retrieved 2010-10-10.
16.Jump up ^ The Cambridge History of Africa: 1870-1905. London: Cambridge University Press. 1985. p. 276.
17.^ Jump up to: a b Falola, Toyin (2009). Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

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Sahelian kingdoms

SOKOTO CALIPHATE

OYO EMPIRE

Oyo Empire
Ilú-ọba Ọ̀yọ́
Protectorate of the British Empire (1888-1896)
c. 1400–1896 →

Oyo Empire at its furthest extent

Capital Oyo-Ile
Languages Yoruba
Religion Yoruba religion
Government Monarchy
Alaafin
• c. 1400 Oranyan
• 1888–1905 Adeyemi I Alowolodu
Legislature Oyo Mesi and Ogboni
Historical era Middle Ages
• Established c. 1400
• Disestablished 1896
Area
• 1680[1] 150,000 km² (57,915 sq mi)
Today part of Nigeria
Benin

The Oyo Empire was a Yoruba empire of what is today Western and North central Nigeria, and Eastern Benin. Established in the 15th century, the Oyo Empire grew to become one of the largest West African states. It rose through the outstanding organizational skills of the Yoruba, wealth gained from trade and its powerful cavalry. The Oyo Empire was the most politically important state in the region from the mid-17th to the late 18th century,[citation needed] holding sway not only over most of the other kingdoms in Yorubaland, but also over nearby African states, notably the Fon Kingdom of Dahomey in the modern Republic of Benin to the west.

Contents [hide]
1 Mythical origins
2 Early period (14th century–1535) 2.1 Oyo-Ile
2.2 The Nupe occupation
3 Imperial period (1608–1800) 3.1 Reconquest and expansion
3.2 Organization
3.3 Political structure 3.3.1 The Alaafin of Oyo 3.3.1.1 Selection of the Alaafin
3.3.1.2 The Ilari
3.3.2 The Councils 3.3.2.1 The Ogboni
3.3.3 Removing an Alaafin of Oyo
3.4 Military 3.4.1 Cavalry
3.4.2 Infantry
3.4.3 Structure 3.4.3.1 The Eso
3.4.3.2 Metropolitan Army
3.4.3.3 Tributary Army

3.5 Commerce 3.5.1 Slave trade
3.6 Zenith
4 Decline 4.1 Loss of the Egbado Corridor
4.2 The Dahomey Revolt
4.3 The Fulani Jihad
4.4 Ago d'Oyo
4.5 Final demise
5 See also
6 Notes
7 References
8 External links

Mythical origins[edit]
The mythical origins of the Oyo Empire lie with Oranyan (also known as Oranmiyan), the second prince of the Yoruba Kingdom of Ile-Ife (Ife). Oranyan made an agreement with his brother to launch a punitive raid on their northern neighbors for insulting their father Oba (King) Oduduwa, the first Ooni of Ife. On the way to the battle, the brothers quarreled and the army split up.[2] Oranyan's force was too small to make a successful attack, so he wandered the southern shore until reaching Bussa. There the local chief entertained him and provided a large snake with a magic charm attached to its throat.
The chief instructed Oranyan to follow the snake until it stopped somewhere for seven days and disappeared into the ground. Oranyan followed the advice and founded Oyo where the serpent stopped. The site is remembered as Ajaka. Oranyan made Oyo his new kingdom and became the first "oba" (meaning 'king' or 'ruler' in the Yoruba language) with the title of "Alaafin of Oyo" (Alaafin means 'owner of the palace' in Yoruba). He left all his treasures in Ife and allowed another king named Adimu to rule there.[3]
Early period (14th century–1535)[edit]

A Survey of Old Oyo Palace Compound
Oranyan, the first oba (king) of Oyo, was succeeded by Oba Ajaka, Alaafin of Oyo. Ajaka was deposed, because he lacked Yoruba military virtue and allowed his sub-chiefs too much independence. Leadership was then conferred upon Ajaka's brother, Shango, who was later deified as the deity of thunder and lightning. Ajaka was restored after Shango's death. Ajaka returned to the throne thoroughly more warlike and oppressive. His successor, Kori, managed to conquer the rest of what later historians would refer to as metropolitan Oyo.[3]
Oyo-Ile[edit]
The heart of metropolitan Oyo was its capital at Oyo-Ile, (also known as Katunga or Old Oyo or Oyo-oro).[4] The two most important structures in Oyo-Ile was the 'afin,' or palace of the Oba, and his market. The palace was at the center of the city close to the Oba's market called 'Oja-oba'. Around the capital was a tall earthen wall for defense with 17 gates. The importance of the two large structures (the palace and the Oja Oba) signified the importance of the king in Oyo.
The Nupe occupation[edit]
Oyo had grown into a formidable inland power by the end of the 14th century. For over a century, the Yoruba state had expanded at the expense of its neighbors. During the reign of Onigbogi, Oyo suffered military defeats at the hands of the Nupe led by Tsoede.[5] Sometime around 1535, the Nupe occupied Oyo and forced its ruling dynasty to take refuge in the kingdom of Borgu.[6] The Nupe sacked the capital, destroying Oyo as a regional power until the early 17th century.[7]
Imperial period (1608–1800)[edit]
The Yoruba of Oyo went through an interregnum of 80 years as an exiled dynasty after its defeat by the Nupe. They re-established Oyo as more centralized and expansive than ever. The people created a government that established its power over a vast empire.[6] During the 17th century, Oyo began a long stretch of growth, becoming a major empire.[7] Oyo never encompassed all Yoruba-speaking people, but it was the most populous kingdom in Yoruba history.[8]
Reconquest and expansion[edit]

Oyo Empire and surrounding states, c. 1625.
The key to Yoruba rebuilding of Oyo was a stronger military and a more centralized government. Taking a cue from their Nupe enemies (whom they called "Tapa"), the Yoruba rearmed with armor and cavalry.[6] Oba Ofinran, Alaafin of Oyo, succeeded in regaining Oyo's original territory from the Nupe.[5] A new capital, Oyo-Igboho, was constructed, and the original became known as Old Oyo.[5] The next oba, Eguguojo, conquered nearly all of Yorubaland.[5] After this, Oba Orompoto led attacks to obliterate the Nupe to ensure Oyo was never threatened by them again.[5] During the reign of Oba, Ajiboyede, he held the first Bere festival, an event to celebrate peace in the kingdom. Celebrated regularly, it would retain much significance among the Yoruba long after the fall of Oyo.[5]
Under his successor, Abipa, the Yoruba repopulated Oyo-Ile and rebuilt the original capital.[5] Despite a failed attempt to conquer the Benin Empire sometime between 1578 and 1608,[5] Oyo continued to expand. The Yoruba allowed autonomy to the southeast of metropolitan Oyo, where the non-Yoruba areas could act as a buffer between Oyo and Imperial Benin.[9] By the end of the 16th century, the Ewe and Aja states of modern Benin were paying tribute to Oyo.[10]
Dahomey Wars
The reinvigorated Oyo Empire began raiding southward as early as 1682.[11] By the end of its military expansion, Oyo's borders would reach to the coast some 200 miles southwest of its capital.[12] It met little serious opposition until the early 18th century. In 1728, the Oyo Empire invaded the Kingdom of Dahomey in a major campaign of its cavalry.[11][13] Dahomey warriors, on the other hand, had no cavalry but many firearms. Their gunshots scared the Oyo cavalry horses and prevented their charging.[14] Dahomey's army also built fortifications such as trenches, which forced the Oyo army to fight as infantry.[15] The battle lasted four days, but the Yoruba were eventually victorious after reinforcements arrived.[15] Dahomey was forced to pay tribute to Oyo. The Yoruba invaded Dahomey seven times before finally subjugating the small kingdom in 1748.[16]
Later conquest
With its cavalry, Oyo campaigned successfully in conquest and suppression over great distances. The Oyo army was able to attack defensive fortifications, but it was harder to supply an army, and they withdrew when supplies ran out.[17] The Oyo did not use guns in its major conquests. The military waited until the 19th century to adopt them.[17] In 1764, a joint Akan(Akyem)-Dahomey-Oyo[18] force defeated an Asante army.[11] The alliance victory defined borders between the neighboring states.[11] Oyo led a successful campaign into Mahi territory north of Dahomey in the late 18th century.[11] The Yoruba also used the forces of their tributaries; for instance, they accomplished a 1784 naval blockade of Badagri with an Oyo-Dahomey-Lagos force.[19]
Organization[edit]
At the beginning, the people were concentrated in metropolitan Oyo. With imperial expansion, Oyo reorganized to better manage its vast holdings within and outside of Yorubaland. It was divided into four layers defined by relation to the core of the empire.[20] These layers were Metropolitan Oyo, southern Yorubaland, the Egbado Corridor and Ajaland.
Metropolitan Oyo
Metropolitan Oyo corresponded, more or less, to the Oyo state prior to the Nupe invasion.[20] This was the hub of the empire, where the Yoruba spoke the Oyo dialect.[9] Metropolitan Oyo was divided into six provinces, with three on the west side of the Ogun River and three to the river's east.[9] Each province was supervised by a governor appointed directly by the Alaafin of Oyo.[21]
Yorubaland
The second layer of the empire was composed of the towns closest to Oyo-Ile, which were recognized as brothers.[20] This area was south of metropolitan Oyo, and its Yoruba inhabitants spoke different dialects from that of Oyo.[9] These tributary states were led by their own rulers, titled Obas,[21] who were confirmed by the Alaafin of Oyo.[21]
Egbado Corridor
The empire's third layer was the Egbado Corridor southwest of Yorubaland. This area was inhabited by the Egba and Egbado, and guaranteed Oyo's trade with the coast. The Egba and Egbado tributaries were allowed, like their Yoruba counterparts, to rule themselves. They were, however, supervised by Ajele.[20] These were agents appointed by the Alaafin of Oyo to oversee his interest and monitor commerce. The lead representative of Oyo in the corridor was the Olu, ruler of the town of Ilaro.[12]
Ajaland
Ajaland was the last layer added to the empire. It was the most restive and distant, and kept in line with threats of expeditions against it.[20] This territory extended from the non-Yoruba areas west of the Egbado Corridor far into Ewe controlled territory in modern Togo.[9] This area, like all tributary states, was allowed a fair degree of autonomy as along as taxes were paid, the orders from Oyo were strictly followed, and access to local markets was provided to Oyo merchants.[10] The Oyo often demanded tribute in slaves. The tributary sometimes made war on other peoples to capture slaves for this.[22] Oyo punished disobedience by wholesale slaughter of the community, as it accomplished in Allada in 1698.[10]
Political structure[edit]
The Oyo Empire developed a highly sophisticated political structure to govern its territorial domains. Scholars have not determined how much of this structure existed prior to the Nupe invasion. Some of Oyo's institutions are clearly derivative of early accomplishments in Ife. After reemerging from exile in the early 17th century, Oyo took on a noticeably more militant character. The influence of an aggressive Yoruba culture is exemplified in the standards placed on the oba (king) and the roles of his council.
The Alaafin of Oyo[edit]
The oba (meaning 'king' in the Yoruba language) at Oyo, who was referred to as the Alaafin of Oyo, (Alaafin means 'owner of the palace' in Yoruba), was the head of the empire and supreme overlord of the people.[23] He was responsible for keeping tributaries safe from attack, settling internal quarrels between sub-rulers, and mediating between those sub-rulers and their people.[23] The Alaafin of Oyo was also expected to give his subordinates honors and presents.[23] In return, all sub-rulers had to pay homage to the Oba and renew their allegiance at annual ceremonies.[21] The most important of these was the Bere festival, marking the acclamation of successful rule by the Alaffin.[21] After the Bere festival, peace in Yorubaland was supposed to last for three years.[21]
Selection of the Alaafin[edit]
The Oyo Empire was not a hereditary monarchy, nor an absolute one.[23] The Oyo Mesi selected the Alaafin. He was not always directly related to his predecessor, although he did have to be descended from Oranyan (also known as Oranmiyan), a son of Oduduwa (also known as Odudua, Odua ) and to hail from the Ona Isokun ward (which is one of the three royal wards).[23] At the beginning of the Oyo Empire, usually the Alaafin's oldest son succeeded his father to the throne. But, this sometimes led to the oldest son, i.e. the first-born prince, the Aremo, hastening the death of his father. Independently of the possible succession, the Aremo was quite powerful in his own right. For instance, by custom the Alaafin abstained from leaving the palace, except during the important festivals, which in practice curtailed his power. By contrast, the Aremo often left the palace. This led noted historian S. Johnson to observe: "The father is the king of the palace, and the son the King for the general public".[24] The two councils which checked the Alaafin had a tendency to select a weak Alaafin after the reign of a strong one to keep the office from becoming too powerful.[25]
The Ilari[edit]
The Alaafin of Oyo appointed certain religious and government officials, who were usually eunuchs.[26] These officials were known as the ilari or half-heads, because of the custom of shaving half of their heads and applying what was believed to be a magical substance into it.[27] The hundreds of Ilari were divided evenly among the sexes.[27] Junior members of the Ilari did menial tasks, while seniors acted as guards or sometimes messengers to the other world via sacrifice.[27] Their titles related to the king, such as oba l'olu ("the king is supreme") or madarikan ("do not oppose him").[27] They carried red and green fans as credentials of their status.[27]
All sub-courts of Oyo had Ilari who acted as both spies and taxmen.[21] Oyo appointed these to visit and sometimes reside in Dahomey and the Egbado Corridor to collect taxes and spy on Dahomey's military successes, so that the Alaafin of Oyo could get his cut.[28] Similar officials had existed in Ife, as attested by terracotta art depicting them.[28]
The Councils[edit]
While the Alaafin of Oyo was supreme overlord of the people, he was not without checks on his power. The Oyo Mesi and the Yoruba Earth cult known as Ogboni kept the Oba's power in check.[26] The Oyo Mesi spoke for the politicians while The Ogboni spoke for the people backed by the power of religion.[25] The power of the Alaafin of Oyo in relation to the Oyo Mesi and Ogboni depended on his personal character and political shrewdness.
Oyo Mesi

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The Oyo Mesi were seven principal councilors of the state. They constituted the Electoral Council and possessed legislative powers, similar to today's United States Congress. The Bashorun, Agbaakin, Samu, Alapini, Laguna, Akiniku and an Ashipa are the seven members of this council. They represented the voice of the nation and had the chief responsibility of protecting the interests of the empire. The Alaafin was required to take counsel with them whenever any important matter affecting the state occurs. Each man had a state duty to perform at court every morning and afternoon. Each mesi had a deputy whom they would send to the Alaafin if his absence was unavoidable.
The head of the council of Oyo Mesi, the Bashorun, consulted the Ifa oracle for approval from the gods. New alaafins of Oyo were seen as appointed by the gods. They were regarded as Ekeji Orisa, meaning "companion of the gods." The Bashorun was a sort of prime minister. He had the final say on the nomination of the new Alaafin. The Oyo Mesi developed as a check on the Alaafin's power. The Bashorun's power rivaled that of the Alaafin. For example, the Bashorun orchestrated many religious festivals; in addition to being commander-in-chief of the army, this gave him considerable independent religious authority.
The Ogboni[edit]
The Oyo Mesi does not enjoy an absolute power or influence, and while the Oyo Mesi may wield political influence, the Ogboni represented the popular opinion backed by the authority of religion, and therefore the view of the Oyo Mesi could be moderated by the Ogboni. And most interestingly, there are checks and balances on the power of the Alafin and the Oyo Mesi and thus no one is arrogated absolute power. The Ogboni was a very powerful secret society composed of freemen noted for their age, wisdom and importance in religious and political affairs.[26] Its members enjoyed immense power over the common people due to their religious station. A testament to how widespread the institution was is the fact that there were Ogboni councils at nearly all sub-courts within Yorubaland.[26] Aside from their duties in respect to the worship of the earth, they were responsible for judging any case dealing with the spilling of blood.[26] The leader of the Ogboni, the Oluwo, had the unqualified right of direct access to the Alaafin of Oyo on any matter.[26]
Removing an Alaafin of Oyo[edit]
Chief among the responsibilities of the Bashorun was the all important festival of Orun. This religious divination, held every year, was to determine if the members of the Mesi still held favor with the Alafin. If the council decided on the disapproval of the Alafin, the Bashorun presented the Alafin with an empty calabash, or parrot's egg as a sign that he must commit suicide. This was the only way to remove the Alafin because he could not be legally deposed. Once given the parrot's egg, the Bashorun would proclaim, "the gods reject you, the people reject you, the earth rejects you." The Alafin, his eldest son, and the Samu, his personal counselor and a member of the Oyo Mesi all had to commit suicide in order to renew the government all together. The process and suicide ceremony took place during the Orun festival.
Military[edit]
There was a high degree of professionalism in the army of the Oyo Empire.[29] Its military success was due in large part to its cavalry as well as the leadership and courage of Oyo officers and warriors.[29] Because its main geographic focus was north of the forest, Oyo enjoyed easier farming and thus a steady growth in population.[29] This contributed to Oyo's ability to consistently field a large force. There was also an entrenched military culture in Oyo where victory was obligatory and defeat carried the duty of committing suicide.[25] This do-or-die policy no doubt contributed to the military aggressiveness of Oyo's generals.[25]
Cavalry[edit]
The Oyo Empire was the only Yoruba state to adopt cavalry; it did so because most of its territory was in the northern savannah.[13] The origin of the cavalry is disputed; however, the Nupe, Borgu and Hausa in neighboring territories also used cavalry and may have had the same historical source.[30] Oyo was able to purchase horses from the north and maintain them in metropolitan Oyo because of partial freedom from the tsetse fly.[31] Cavalry was the long arm of the Oyo Empire. Late 16th and 17th century expeditions were composed entirely of cavalry.[13] There were drawbacks to this. Oyo could not maintain its cavalry army in the south but could raid at will.[11][32]
Cavalry in highly developed societies such as Oyo was divided into light and heavy.[13] Heavy cavalry on larger imported horses was armed with heavy thrusting lances or spears and also with swords.[13] Light cavalry on smaller indigenous ponies was armed with throwing spears or bows.[33] Oyo's cavalry forces included not only nobles, the norm in West African warfare, but foreign slaves from the Hausa, Nupe and Bornu states.[34]
Infantry[edit]
Infantry in the region around the Oyo Empire was uniform in both armor and armament. All infantry in the region carried shields, swords and lances of one type or another.[11] Shields were four feet tall and two feet wide and made of elephant or ox hide.[35] A 3-foot-long (0.91 m) heavy sword was the main armament for close combat.[35] The Yoruba and their neighbors used triple barbed javelins which could be thrown accurately from about 30 paces.[11]
Structure[edit]
The Oyo Empire, like many empires before it, used both local and tributary forces to expand its domains. The structure of the Oyo military prior to its imperial period was simple and closer aligned to the central government in metropolitan Oyo. This may have been fine in the 15th century when Oyo controlled only its heartland. But to make and maintain farther conquest, the structure underwent several changes.
The Eso[edit]
Oyo maintained a semi-standing army of specialist cavalry soldiers called the Eso or Esho.[36] These were 70 junior war chiefs who were nominated by the Oyo Mesi and confirmed by the Alaafin of Oyo.[36] The Eso were appointed for their military skill without regard to heritage and were led by the Are-Ona-Kakanfo.[25]
After Oyo's return from exile, the post of Are-Ona-Kakanfo was established as the supreme military commander.[37] He was required to live in a frontier province of great importance to keep an eye on the enemy and to keep him from usurping the government.[25] During Oyo's imperial period, the Are-Ona-Kakanfo personally commanded the army in the field on all campaigns.[25]
Metropolitan Army[edit]
Since the Are-Ona-Kakanfo could not reside near the capital, arrangements had to be made for the latter's protection in case of emergency. Forces inside metropolitan Oyo were commanded by the Bashorun, leading member of the Oyo Mesi.[37] As stated earlier, Metropolitan Oyo was divided into six provinces divided evenly by a river. Provincial forces were thus grouped into two armies, under the Onikoyi and the Okere for the east and west side of the river respectively.[37] Lesser war chiefs were known as Balogun, a title carried on by the soldiers of Oyo's successor state, Ibadan.[38]
Tributary Army[edit]
Tributary leaders and provincial governors were responsible for collecting tribute and contributing troops under local generalship to the imperial army in times of emergency.[9] Occasionally, tributary leaders would be ordered to attack neighbors even without the backing of the main imperial army.[9] These forces were often utilized in Oyo's distant campaigns on the coast or against other states.
Commerce[edit]
Oyo became the southern emporium of the Trans-Saharan trade. Exchanges were made in salt, leather, horses, kola nuts, ivory, cloth and slaves.[31] The Yoruba of metropolitan Oyo were also highly skilled in craft making and iron work.[31] Aside from taxes on trade products coming in and out of the empire, Oyo also became wealthy off the taxes imposed on its tributaries. Taxes on the kingdom of Dahomey alone brought in an amount estimated at 638 thousand dollars a year.[29]
Slave trade[edit]
Oyo's imperial success made Yoruba a lingua franca almost to the shores of the Volta.[31] Toward the end of the 18th century, the Oyo army was neglected as there was less need to conquer.[20] Instead, Oyo directed more effort towards trading and acted as middlemen for both the Trans-Saharan and Trans-Atlantic slave trade.[20] Europeans bringing salt arrived in Oyo during the reign of King Obalokun.[5] Thanks to its domination of the coast, Oyo merchants were able to trade with Europeans at Porto Novo and Whydah.[10] Here the Oyo Empire's captives and criminals were sold to Dutch and Portuguese buyers.[39]
Zenith[edit]

Oyo Empire and surrounding states c. 1700.
By 1680, the Oyo Empire spanned over 150,000 square kilometers.[1] It reached the height of its power in the 18th century.[10] And despite its violent creation, it was held together by mutual self-interest.[23] The government was able to provide unity for a vast area through a combination of local autonomy and imperial authority.[29]
Unlike the great savannah empires, of which Oyo may not be called a successor since it was a successor of Ife, there was little if any Muslim influence in the empire.[20] It is known that at least some Muslim officials were kept in Metropolitan Oyo,[40] and men capable of writing and calculating in Arabic were reported by French traders in 1787.[40]
Decline[edit]
Many believe the decline of the Oyo empire had started as early as 1754 with the dynastic intrigues and palace coups sponsored by the Oyo Prime Minister Bashorun Gaha. Gaha, in his quest for absolute power, conspired with the Oyo Mesi and probably to some extent the Ogboni to force four successive Alaafins to commit ritual suicide after they had been presented with the symbolic parrot's egg. Between June and October of 1754 alone, two Alaafins had been forced to commit suicide by Gaha.[41] Because of this, Alaafin Awonbijou spent 130 days on the throne, while Alaafin Labisi only spent 17 days on the throne.[42] Gaha's treachery was not ended until 1774 during the reign of Alaafin Abiodun, the fifth Alaafin he served with. Gaha was subsequently executed by Abiodun but the instability that had been brought about by these intrigues had further weakened and impoverished Oyo.
Alaafin Abiodun during his reign had also conducted failed campaigns against Borgu in 1783[43] and Nupe in 1789,[44] losing the equivalent of 11 and 13 Generals and their men respectively. Abiodun was subsequently murdered by his own son Awole who subsequently ascended his father's throne.
The events that led to the secession of Ilorin began in 1793. Ilorin was a war camp headed by the Are-Ona Kakanfo Afonja, it had a large population of Hausa, Borgu and Nupe slaves who were principally in charge of the king's horses and cavalry. Afonja took cause with Awole when the latter had commanded him to attack Alaafin Abiodun's maternal home, Iwere-ile. Afonja being bound by an oath and also desirous not to fall under a curse from a previous Alaafin made to the effect that any Aare Ona Kakanfo who attacked Iwere-Ile (his paternal home) was to die miserably; this order Afonja ignored. Further cause was also given in 1795 when Awole again asked Afonja to attack the market town of Apomu which was a part of Ile-Ife. All Alaafins due to the Yoruba belief that Ife was the spiritual home of the Yorubas were made to swear an oath never to attack Ife.[45] Afonja carried out Awole's order and sacked Apomu but on the return of the army from Apomu Afonja marched on the capital Oyo-Ile (which was a taboo), and demanded that Awole abdicate.[46] Awole eventually committed ritual suicide.[45]
After the death of Awole there was a scramble for the throne by numerous contenders; some were reported to have spent less than six months on the throne; there was also a period of interregnum of almost twenty years where the various factions could not agree on a candidate for the throne.[45] This period of vacuum led to the rise of powerful military and regional commanders like Adegun, the Onikoyi and others like the Otun to the Are-Ona Kakanfo, called Solagberu, and also Shehu Alimi, who was the leader of a growing Muslim population in Oyo. These new powers had lost regard for the office of the Alaafin due to the various political wranglings and the lack of a central authority at the time; this situation eventually led up to Afonja seceding Ilorin from Oyo in 1817 with the help of Oyo Muslims. In 1823, after Afonja had been killed by his allies, Shehu Alimi and Solagberu (Solagberu was also later killed by Alimi's son), Ilorin became part of the Sokoto Caliphate.[47] By the time Captain Hugh Clapperton visited Oyo-Ile in 1825 during the reign of Alaafin Majotu, the empire was already in a state of decline. Clapperton's party recorded passing numerous Oyo villages burned by the Fulani (Ilorin) while Majotu had also sought the help of the English king and the Oba of Benin in putting down the Ilorin rebellion. Clapperton also noticed a shortage of horses, even though the Oyo were renowned as a great cavalry force; this might have something to do with the fact that most of the empire's soldiers and hence cavalry were stationed at Ilorin under the command of Afonja and later on Alimi's successors.[47]
Ilorin then besieged Offa and started raiding, burning and pillaging villages in Oyo, eventually destroying the capital Oyo-Ile in 1835.[45]
Loss of the Egbado Corridor[edit]
As Oyo tore itself apart via political intrigue, its vassals began taking advantage of the situation to press for independence. The Egba, under the leadership of Lishabi, massacred the Ilari stationed in their area and drove off an Oyo punitive force.[9]
The Dahomey Revolt[edit]
In 1823 Dahomey was reported to have raided villages that were under the protection of Oyo for slaves due to the high demand for them. Oyo immediately demanded a huge tribute from King Gezo for the unauthorized incursion, to which Gezo dispatched his Brazilian agent, Francisco Félix de Sousa, to the Alaafin at Oyo to make peace. The peace talks eventually broke down and Oyo attacked Dahomey.[48] The Oyo army was decisively defeated, ending Oyo's hegemony over Dahomey.[49] After gaining its independence, Dahomey began raiding the corridor.[12]
The Fulani Jihad[edit]
After Awole's rejection, Afonja, now master of Illorin, invited an itinerant Fulani scholar of Islam called Alim al-Salih into his ranks. By doing this, he hoped to secure the support of Yoruba Muslims (mainly slaves taking care of the Empire's horses) and volunteers from the Hausa-Fulani north in keeping Ilorin independent. Torn by internal struggle, Oyo could not defend itself against the Fulani.[50] Oyo-Ile was razed by the Fulani Empire in 1835 and the Oyo Empire collapsed in 1836.[51] To this day, the Illorin traditional ruler is an emir, whereas in the rest of Yoruba towns the kings are called oba or baale (Baale or Baba Onile meaning "father of the land" or "lord of the land").
Ago d'Oyo[edit]
After the destruction of Oyo-Ile, the capital was moved further south, to Ago d'Oyo. Oba Atiba sought to preserve what remained of Oyo by placing on Ibadan the duty of protecting the capital from the Ilorin in the north and northeast.[52] He also attempted to get the Ijaye to protect Oyo from the west against the Dahomeans.[52] The center of Yoruba power moved further south to Ibadan, a Yoruba war camp settled by Oyo commanders in 1830.[13]
Final demise[edit]

Alaafin Oyo circa 1910
Atiba's gambit failed, and Oyo never regained its prominence in the region. It became a protectorate of Great Britain in 1888 before further fragmenting into warring factions. The Oyo state ceased to exist as any sort of power in 1896.[50] Oba Atiba otherwise called Atiba Atobatele died in 1859; His son Adeyemi I and the 3rd Alaafin to rule in the present Oyo died in 1905. See List of rulers of the Yoruba state of Oyo. During the colonial period, the Yorubas were one of the most urbanized (living in city-like areas) groups in Africa. About 22% of the population lived in large areas with population exceeding 100,000 and over 50% lived in cities made up of 25,000 or more people. The index of urbanization in 1950 was close to that of the United States, excluding Ilorin. The Yoruba continue to be the most urbanised African ethnic group today. Old Oyo linked cities such as Ibadan, Osogbo, and Ogbomoso, which were some of the major cities that flourished after the collapse.[53]
See also[edit]
Oyotunji African Village
Rulers of the Yoruba state of Oyo
History of Nigeria
Notes[edit]
1.^ Jump up to: a b Thornton 1998, p. 104.
2.Jump up ^ Stride & Ifeka 1971 p. 290
3.^ Jump up to: a b Stride & Ifeka 1971, p. 291
4.Jump up ^ Goddard 1971, pp. 207–211.
5.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i Stride & Ifeka p. 292
6.^ Jump up to: a b c Oliver & Atmore 2001, p. 89.
7.^ Jump up to: a b Thornton 1999, p. 77.
8.Jump up ^ Alpern 1998, p. 37.
9.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h Stride & Ifeka 1971, p. 296.
10.^ Jump up to: a b c d e Stride & Ifeka 1971, p. 293.
11.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h Thornton 1999, p. 79.
12.^ Jump up to: a b c Smith 1989, p. 122.
13.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f Smith 1989, p. 48.
14.Jump up ^ Thornton 1999, p. 82.
15.^ Jump up to: a b Thornton 1999, p. 86.
16.Jump up ^ Alpern 1998, p. 165.
17.^ Jump up to: a b Thornton 1999, p. 97.
18.Jump up ^ http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Institue%20of%20African%20Studies%20Research%20Review/1973v9n1/asrv009001004.pdf
19.Jump up ^ Thornton 1999, p. 88.
20.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h Oliver & Atmore 2001, p. 95.
21.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g Stride & Ifeka 1971, p. 297.
22.Jump up ^ Alpern 1998, p. 34.
23.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f Stride & Ifeka 1971, p. 298.
24.Jump up ^ Church Missionary Society, G.31 A.2/1888-9, Letter of S. Johnson to the Rev. J.B. Wood, 8 November 1887, as cited by Law R., The Oyo Empire c. 1600-c. 1836, p. 71 (1977)
25.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g Stride & Ifeka 1971, p. 300.
26.^ Jump up to: a b c d e f Stride & Ifeka 1971, p. 299.
27.^ Jump up to: a b c d e Smith 1989, p. 12.
28.^ Jump up to: a b Smith 1989, p. 10.
29.^ Jump up to: a b c d e Stride & Ifeka 1971, p. 301.
30.Jump up ^ Law 1975, pp. 1–15.
31.^ Jump up to: a b c d Stride & Ifeka 1971, p. 302.
32.Jump up ^ Why Nations Fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty. p. 254. Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. 2012. ISBN 9780307719218
33.Jump up ^ Smith 1989, p. 50.
34.Jump up ^ Smith 1989, p. 43.
35.^ Jump up to: a b Thornton 1999, p. 80.
36.^ Jump up to: a b Smith 1989, p. 56.
37.^ Jump up to: a b c Smith 1989, p. 53.
38.Jump up ^ Smith 1989, p. 57.
39.Jump up ^ Smith 1989, p. 31.
40.^ Jump up to: a b Smith 1989, p. 20.
41.Jump up ^ (PRO:T.70/1523)."Extract of letter of W. Devaynes, Governor of the English fort at Whydah, 22 Oct. 1754, quoted in letter of T. Melvil, Cape Coast Castle, 30 Nov. 1754". Public Records Office, London
42.Jump up ^ Johnson, Samuel. "The History of the Yorubas: From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate". Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.178
43.Jump up ^ (PRO: T.70/1545). "Letter of Lionel Abson, Governor of the English fort at Whydah, 26 Sept. 1783" Public Records Office, London
44.Jump up ^ Dalzel, Archibald. "The History of Dahomy, An Inland Kingdom of Africa" London,1793,p.229
45.^ Jump up to: a b c d Akinjogbin, Adeagbo (1998). War and Peace in Yorubaland 1793-1893. ISBN 9781294973.
46.Jump up ^ Bowdich, Edward (1966). Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee (1819). ISBN 0714617946.
47.^ Jump up to: a b Clapperton, Hugh (1829). Journal of a second expedition into the interior of Africa: from the bight of Benin to Soccatoo.
48.Jump up ^ ."Royal Gold Coast Gazette and Commercial Intelligencer" Cape coast, 1822-3
49.Jump up ^ Alpern 1998, p. 166.
50.^ Jump up to: a b Stride & Ifeka 1971, p. 303.
51.Jump up ^ Alpern 1998, p. 196.
52.^ Jump up to: a b Smith 1989, p. 123.
53.Jump up ^ Bascom 1962, pp. 699-709.
References[edit]
Alpern, Stanley B. (1998). Amazons of Black Sparta: The Women Warriors of Dahomey. New York University Press. ISBN 0-8147-0678-9.
Bowdich, Thomas Edward (1819). Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee, with a statistical account of that kingdom, and geographical notices of other parts of the interior of Africa. London: J. Murray.
Bascom, William (Aug 1962). "Some Aspects of Yoruba Urbanism". American Anthropologist. 64 (4): 699–709. doi:10.1525/aa.1962.64.4.02a00010. JSTOR 667787.
Goddard, Stephen (Jun 1971). "Ago That became Oyo: An Essay in Yoruba Historical Geography". The Geographical Journal. Blackwell Publishing. 137 (2): 207–211. doi:10.2307/1796741. JSTOR 1796741.
Law, Robin (1975). "A West African Cavalry State: The Kingdom of Oyo". The Journal of African History. 16 (1): 1–15. doi:10.1017/S0021853700014079. ISSN 0021-8537. JSTOR 181095.
Oliver, Roland (1975). The Cambridge History of Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-20981-1.
Oliver, Roland & Anthony Atmore (2001). Medieval Africa 1250-1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-79372-6.
Smith, Robert S. (1989). Warfare & Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa Second Edition. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 0-299-12334-0.
Stride, G.T. & C. Ifeka (1971). Peoples and Empires of West Africa: West Africa in History 1000-1800. Edinburgh: Nelson. ISBN 0-17-511448-X.
Thornton, John K. (1999). Warfare in Atlantic Africa 1500-1800. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 1-85728-393-7.
Thornton, John (1998). Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800 (Second Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 340 Pages. ISBN 0-521-62724-9.
Easley, Dr. Larry. "The Four Forest States of Africa." Oyo Empire. Southeast Missouri State University, Cape Girardeau. 2 Mar. 2009.
Kehnide Salami, Yunusa Ph.D. "The Democratic Structure of Yoruba Political-Cultural Heritage." Department of Philosophy Obafemi Awolowo University Ile-Ife. 29 Apr. 2009.
Shillington, Kevin. History of Africa. 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan Limited, 1995

KANEM-BONU EMPIRE

Kanem–Bornu Empire

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It has been suggested that Kanem Empire be merged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since April 2016.
The Kanem–Bornu Empire was an empire that existed in modern Chad and Nigeria. It was known to the Arabian geographers as the Kanem Empire from the 9th century AD onward and lasted as the independent kingdom of Bornu until 1900. At its height it encompassed an area covering not only much of Chad, but also parts of modern southern Libya, eastern Niger, northeastern Nigeria and northern Cameroon. The history of the Empire in the longue durée is mainly known from the Royal Chronicle or Girgam discovered in 1851 by the German traveller Heinrich Barth.[1]

Contents [hide]
1 Theories on the origin of Kanem 1.1 Founding by immigrants c. 600 BC
1.2 Founding by local Kanembu (Dugua) c. 700 AD
2 Islamization c. 1068 AD 2.1 Rise of the Sayfawa dynasty
2.2 Foundation of the new capital Njimi
3 Expansion to Bornu 3.1 Mai Dunama Dabbalemi
3.2 Shift of the Sayfuwa court from Kanem to Bornu
4 Decline of the Bornu Empire
5 See also
6 References
7 Bibliography
8 External links

Theories on the origin of Kanem[edit]
Kanem was located at the southern end of the trans-Saharan trade route between Tripoli and the region of Lake Chad. Besides its urban elite it included a confederation of nomadic peoples who spoke languages of the Teda–Daza (Toubou) group.
Founding by immigrants c. 600 BC[edit]
The origins of Kanem Empire are very unclear. Until today, historiographical debates oppose the followers of a foundation of Kanem-Bornu by populations from the ancient Near East and followers of a more local development. Some researches try to connect the creation of Kanem-Bornu with exodus from the collapsed Assyrian Empire c. 600 BC to the northeast of Lake Chad.[2] The intensity of scholar discussions around this theory proves that the question hasn't been solved yet, and we must be very cautious concerning early formation of Kanem-Bornu.[3]
Founding by local Kanembu (Dugua) c. 700 AD[edit]
According to a more accepted theory, the empire of Kanem began forming around 700 AD under the nomadic Tebu-speaking Kanembu. The Kanembu were supposedly forced southwest towards the fertile lands around Lake Chad by political pressure and desiccation in their former range. The area already possessed independent, walled city-states belonging to the Sao culture. Under the leadership of the Duguwa dynasty, the Kanembu would eventually dominate the Sao, but not before adopting many of their customs.[4] War between the two continued up to the late 16th century.
Islamization c. 1068 AD[edit]
Rise of the Sayfawa dynasty[edit]
The major factor that influenced the later history of the state of Kanem was the early penetration of Islam. North African traders, Berbers and Arabs, brought the new religion. Towards 1068, Hummay, a member of the Sayfawa establishment, who was already a Muslim, discarded the last Duguwa King Selma from power and thus established the new dynasty of the Sayfawa. Islam offered the Sayfawa rulers the advantage of new ideas from Arabia and the Mediterranean world, as well as literacy in administration. But many people resisted the new religion favouring traditional beliefs and practices. When Hummay had assumed power on the basis of his strong Islamic following, for example, it is believed that the Duguwa/Kanembu began some kind of internal opposition. This pattern of conflict and compromise with Islam occurs repeatedly in Chadian history.
Foundation of the new capital Njimi[edit]
When the ruling dynasty changed, the royal establishment abandoned its capital of Manan and settled in the new capital Njimi further south of Kanem (the word for "south" in the Teda language). By the 13th century, Kanem's rule expanded. At the same time, the Kanembu people drew closer to the new rulers and increased the growing population in the new capital of Njimi. Even though the Kanembu became the main power-base of the Sayfuwa, Kanem's rulers continued to travel frequently throughout the kingdom and especially towards Bornu, west of lake Chad. Herders and farmers alike recognized the government's power and acknowledged their allegiance by paying tribute.
Expansion to Bornu[edit]
Mai Dunama Dabbalemi[edit]
Kanem's expansion peaked during the long and energetic reign of Mai Dunama Dabbalemi (ca. 1203–1242), also of the Sayfawa dynasty. Dabbalemi initiated diplomatic exchanges with sultans in North Africa and apparently arranged for the establishment of a special hostel in Cairo to facilitate pilgrimages to Mecca. During his reign, he declared jihad against the surrounding tribes and initiated an extended period of conquest. After consolidating their territory around Lake Chad the Fezzan region (in present-day Libya) fell under Kanem's authority, and the empire's influence extended westward to Kano (in present-day Nigeria) and thus included Bornu, eastward to Ouaddaï, and southward to the Adamawa grasslands (in present-day Cameroon). Portraying these boundaries on maps can be misleading, however, because the degree of control extended in ever-weakening gradations from the core of the empire around Njimi to remote peripheries, from which allegiance and tribute were usually only symbolic. Moreover, cartographic lines are static and misrepresent the mobility inherent in nomadism and migration, which were common. The loyalty of peoples and their leaders was more important in governance than the physical control of territory.
Dabbalemi devised a system to reward military commanders with authority over the people they conquered. This system, however, tempted military officers to pass their positions to their sons, thus transforming the office from one based on achievement and loyalty to the mai into one based on hereditary nobility. Dabbalemi was able to suppress this tendency, but after his death, dissension among his sons weakened the Sayfawa Dynasty. Dynastic feuds degenerated into civil war, and Kanem's outlying peoples soon ceased paying tribute.
Shift of the Sayfuwa court from Kanem to Bornu[edit]
By the end of the 14th century, internal struggles and external attacks had torn Kanem apart. Between 1359 and 1383, seven mais reigned, but Bulala invaders (from the area around Lake Fitri to the east) killed five of them. This proliferation of mais resulted in numerous claimants to the throne and led to a series of internecine wars. Finally, around 1380 the Bulala forced Mai Umar Idrismi to abandon Njimi and move the Kanembu people to Bornu on the western edge of Lake Chad.[5] Over time, the intermarriage of the Kanembu and Bornu peoples created a new people and language, the Kanuri.
But even in Bornu, the Sayfawa Dynasty's troubles persisted. During the first three-quarters of the 15th century, for example, fifteen mais occupied the throne. Then, around 1460 Mai Ali Dunamami defeated his rivals and began the consolidation of Bornu. He built a fortified capital at Ngazargamu, to the west of Lake Chad (in present-day Niger), the first permanent home a Sayfawa mai had enjoyed in a century. So successful was the Sayfawa rejuvenation that by the early 16th century Mai Idris Katakarmabe (1487–1509) was able to defeat the Bulala and retake Njimi, the former capital. The empire's leaders, however, remained at Ngazargamu because its lands were more productive agriculturally and better suited to the raising of cattle.
Kanem-Bornu peaked during the reign of the outstanding statesman Mai Idris Aluma (c. 1564–1596). Aluma is remembered for his military skills, administrative reforms, and Islamic piety. His main adversaries were the Hausa to the west, the Tuareg and Toubou to the north, and the Bulala to the east. One epic poem extols his victories in 330 wars and more than 1,000 battles. His innovations included the employment of fixed military camps (with walls); permanent sieges and "scorched earth" tactics, where soldiers burned everything in their path; armored horses and riders; and the use of Berber camelry, Kotoko boatmen, and iron-helmeted musketeers trained by Turkish military advisers. His active diplomacy featured relations with Tripoli, Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire, which sent a 200-member ambassadorial party across the desert to Aluma's court at Ngazargamu. Aluma also signed what was probably the first written treaty or cease-fire in Chadian history.
Aluma introduced a number of legal and administrative reforms based on his religious beliefs and Islamic law (sharia). He sponsored the construction of numerous mosques and made a pilgrimage to Mecca, where he arranged for the establishment of a hostel to be used by pilgrims from his empire. As with other dynamic politicians, Aluma's reformist goals led him to seek loyal and competent advisers and allies, and he frequently relied on slaves who had been educated in noble homes. Aluma regularly sought advice from a council composed of heads of the most important clans. He required major political figures to live at the court, and he reinforced political alliances through appropriate marriages (Aluma himself was the son of a Kanuri father and a Bulala mother).
Kanem-Bornu under Aluma was strong and wealthy. Government revenue came from tribute (or booty, if the recalcitrant people had to be conquered), sales of slaves, and duties on and participation in trans-Saharan trade. Unlike West Africa, the Chadian region did not have gold. Still, it was central to one of the most convenient trans-Saharan routes. Between Lake Chad and Fezzan lay a sequence of well-spaced wells and oases, and from Fezzan there were easy connections to North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. Many products were sent north, including natron (sodium carbonate), cotton, kola nuts, ivory, ostrich feathers, perfume, wax, and hides, but the most important of all were slaves. Imports included salt, horses, silks, glass, muskets, and copper.
Aluma took a keen interest in trade and other economic matters. He is credited with having the roads cleared, designing better boats for Lake Chad, introducing standard units of measure for grain, and moving farmers into new lands. In addition, he improved the ease and security of transit through the empire with the goal of making it so safe that "a lone woman clad in gold might walk with none to fear but God."
Decline of the Bornu Empire[edit]
The administrative reforms and military brilliance of Aluma sustained the empire until the mid-17th century, when its power began to fade. By the late 18th century, Bornu rule extended only westward, into the land of the Hausa. Around that time, Fulani people, invading from the west, were able to make major inroads into Bornu. By the early 19th century, Kanem-Bornu was clearly an empire in decline, and in 1808 Fulani warriors conquered Ngazargamu. Usman dan Fodio led the Fulani thrust and proclaimed a jihad (holy war) on the irreligious Muslims of the area. His campaign eventually affected Kanem-Bornu and inspired a trend toward Islamic orthodoxy. But Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi contested the Fulani advance. Kanem was a Muslim scholar and non-Sayfawa warlord who had put together an alliance of Shuwa Arabs, Kanembu, and other seminomadic peoples. He eventually built in 1814 a capital at Kukawa (in present-day Nigeria). Sayfawa mais remained titular monarchs until 1846. In that year, the last mai, in league with Ouaddai tribesmen, precipitated a civil war. It was at that point that Kanem's son, Umar, became king, thus ending one of the longest dynastic reigns in regional history.[6]
Although the dynasty ended, the kingdom of Kanem-Bornu survived. But Umar, who eschewed the title mai for the simpler designation shehu (from the Arabic shaykh), could not match his father's vitality and gradually allowed the kingdom to be ruled by advisers (wazirs). Bornu began to decline, as a result of administrative disorganization, regional particularism, and attacks by the militant Ouaddai Empire to the east. The decline continued under Umar's sons, and in 1893 Rabih az-Zubayr, leading an invading army from eastern Sudan, conquered Bornu. He was defeated by French soldiers in 1900.[7]
See also[edit]
Sayfawa dynasty
Chronology of the Sayfawa (Kanem-Bornu)
Dīwān (Girgam)
Ibn Furṭū (Ibn Furtuwa)
Kanem Empire
Bornu Empire
References[edit]
1.Jump up ^ Barth, Travels, II, 16–17.
2.Jump up ^ Lange, Founding of Kanem, 31–38.
3.Jump up ^ An overview of these discussions are gathered in the web page of the German scholar Dierk Lange, author of this theory: Reviews of Dierk Lange – Ancient Kingdoms of West Africa
4.Jump up ^ Urvoy, Empire, 3–35; Trimingham, History, 104–111.
5.Jump up ^ Smith, "Early states", 179; Lange, "Kingdoms and peoples", 238; Barkindo, "Early states", 245-6.
6.Jump up ^ Brenner, Shehus, 64–66.
7.Jump up ^ Hallam, Life, 257–275.
Bibliography[edit]
Barkindo, Bawuro: "The early states of the Central Sudan: Kanem, Borno and some of their neighbours to c. 1500 AD.", in: J. Ajayi und M. Crowder (ed.), History of West Africa, Bd. I, 3rd ed. Harlow 1985, 225–254.
Barth, Heinrich: Travel and Discoveries in North and Central Africa, vol. II, New York, 1858, 15–29, 581–602.
Brenner, Louis, The Shehus of Kukawa, Oxford 1973.
Hallam, W.: The life and Times of Rabih Fadl Allah, Devon 1977.
Lange, Dierk: Le Dīwān des sultans du Kanem-Bornu, Wiesbaden 1977.
--: "The kingdoms and peoples of Chad", in: D. T. Niane (ed.), General History of Africa, vol. IV, UNESCO, London 1984, p. 238–265.
--: "An introduction to the history of Kanem-Borno: The prologue of the Dīwān", Borno Museum Society Newsletter 76–84 (2010), 79–103.
--: The Founding of Kanem by Assyrian Refugees ca. 600 BCE: Documentary, Linguistic, and Archaeological Evidence, Boston 2011.
Levtzion, Nehemia, and John Hopkins: Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History, Cambridge 1981.
Smith, Abdullahi: The early states of the Central Sudan, in: J. Ajayi and M. Crowder (ed.), History of West Africa, vol. I, 1st ed., London, 1971, 158–183.
Urvoy, Yves: L'empire du Bornou, Paris 1949.
Trimingham, Spencer: A History of Islam in West Africa, Oxford 1962.
Urvoy, Yves: L'empire du Bornou, Paris 1949.
Van de Mieroop, Marc: A History of the Ancient Near East, 2nd ed., Oxford 2007.
Zeltner, Jean-Claude : Pages d'histoire du Kanem, pays tchadien, Paris 1980.

IRONY OF DEMOCRACY 2 BY THOMAS DYE

IRONY OF DEMOCRACY

The Irony of Democracy is a book that explores the American government in a light that not many people see it in. In this book, Thomas Dye sights many examples while proving the point that our government is not one that is run by the people. Dye states that the United States of America is a nation that is run by a handful of “elite” individuals. These people generally gain power not by influencing the masses with popular ideas, but by using their money. This is evident even in the earliest years of the country in that the founders were upper-class, white males. They did not represent the majority of people in the new country. Dye also makes the point that every branch of our government is controlled by the elite. He is especially skeptical of the judicial branch because the nine judges are not elected, yet they have the power to overrule the elected officials of congress and the house. I see these issues in the same way that Dye sees them and I agree with most of his points.
One aspect of The Irony of Democracy that jumped out to me was the miniscule about of power that each individual citizen has. Dye covers this in great detail in chapter one. Even with just a small amount of research, one can find that the framers were highly skeptical of a direct democracy. Madison states in Federalist 10, “it may be concluded that a pure democracy… can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction” (Madison, Fed #10). Madison saw factions as a great threat to the existence of a stable government so it can be assumed that he was against a pure democracy. The reality of this situation is that without a true democracy, the individual citizen has no power.
Another section of the book that I felt strongly about was when Dye discusses what having political parties does. The truth is that political parties don’t help anything. One reason that parties are ineffective is because there truly aren’t many differences between the two major parties in the USA. All the differences come in small, abstract matters of opinion that truly have no effect on the majority of the population’s lives. This is bad because it causes people to vote for a candidate based on small things such as gay marriage and not bases on how he would handle foreign affairs and the military. Also, parties are ironic because there is still an internal system in each party that directly reflects that of our country as a whole. There are elites ruling masses even within parties. In 2004, there were 62,040,610 votes cast for George Bush. Logically, most of these votes were cast by republicans. Honestly, will Bush hear the voice of one common man out of 62,040,610? There is no power in the individual.
One of the most powerful ideas in The Irony of Democracy was the thought that the judicial branch is run by elites. This is a true statement because all of the Supreme Court judges are appointed. In order to be appointed, you must have some ties to the President. Knowing that George Bush isn’t friends with too many poor people, a conclusion can be drawn that only the upper-class and well educated can become Supreme Court judges. Perhaps the most disturbing thing is that non-elected judges can strike down bills that are made by officials that are elected by the masses.
In conclusion, The Irony of Democracy makes many good points about why the government is not truly one by the people and for the people. The combination of the framers not wanting a direct democracy, parties that try to group a mass of people into one belief system, and an elitist judicial branch leave the individual citizen without a voice. Dye’s book is an eye opener than show the true inner workings of American politics.
Sources:
"United States Presidential Election: 2004." Wikipedia.Org. 20 Feb. 2007 .
Madison, James. "The Federalist No. 10." www.constitution.org. 21 Feb. 2007 .
posted by Drue at 4:49 PM 0 comments


Chapter Summaries

Chapter 1- The Irony of Democracy
This chapter describes the meaning of elitism and the meaning of democracy and shows that they cannot truly coexist in the purest form of each system. Dye shows that the irony of democracy is that the elite must make the decisions that the rest of the people have to follow. He states that, “The masses do not lead, they follow.” (Dye, 1). Also discussed in this chapter are certain threats that can hurt democracy. Two of these threats are terrorism and civil unrest based on scandals or court rulings. These two things can whip the masses into mobs and cloud judgment. The chapter concludes by joining the ideas of elitism and democracy stating that every government must be ruled by the elite, even democracies.
Chapter 2- Founding Fathers: The Nation’s First Elite
This chapter opens by explaining that the fifty five men who founded the US constitution were very elite. They were born from good families, were white, Christian, educated and rich. Dye also notes that these qualities of being wealthy and educated were not the norm for the average person in America at the time. This being said, the vast majority of people in did not have any say in the creation and drafting of the constitution. Dye states that had the people of the USA known what the constitution said and could they have voted on it, they probably would’ve rejected it. This chapter also describes how the founders strongly disagreed with pure democracy. They thought that if everyone had power, the lower class would try to level with the upper class. They felt that this was a violation of a person’s right to land.
Chapter 3- The Evolution of American Elites
Chapter three deals with the evolution of the elites in the USA. Dye states that there were no great and sudden changes in the ideas of the American elites even when power shifted from one party to the other because they all had the same common interests. He also explains how there were more and more types of elite as the time went on. This is because there were more manners in which people could become rich as more land was taken for the USA. These people were unusually Jacksonians. They thought that people with new money should have as much influence as those with old money. Even with the arrival of new influences, the elite stayed rigid in their belief that not everyone should have an equal say in the government activities. Dye goes on to site examples in the Civil War and World War II. After and during World War II, it was seen in the enemy that the elite should be responsible for the well being of the general population.

Chapter 4- Elites in America
Chapter four deals with the modern elites in America. Dye makes several points regarding how the elites of our nation don’t truly represent the democracy that we are supposed to have in place. The corporate upper-class is put under a microscope and analyzed in this chapter. Data suggests that a small percent of industrial companies control the majority of the industrial assets in the USA. This is the same case with banks controlling banking assets. This is ironic because, like the government, a small percent of top companies practically run the rest of the smaller companies.
Also talked about in chapter four is the role of CEOs and other high ranking executives in the corporate world today. A stunning statistic shows the overall greed that runs deep in corporate boardrooms. The average CEO makes 209 times more pay than a low level employee. Once again, an upper-class, usually white, well educated man is making decisions for the masses without fully consulting them. This is converse to the ideal American democracy.
Chapter 5- Masses in America
Chapter five explains many things about how the masses function in our system of government. Dye says that the overall earnings of the average American worker has steeply lessened in the last few decades. This is largely because international trade has exploded in the past 25-30 years. Instead of having American workers making goods with a minimum wage and limited work hours, it is cheaper to import goods from overseas. Other countries have cheap labor so it is easier to turn a profit by selling the foreign products. With this new method of procuring products to sell comes a broader gap between the elite and working classes. The CEOs are making more money from cheap labor and the American workers are getting laid off. This also leads to skepticism from the masses about how fair the government actually is. Fortunately for the government, the masses are dependent on the upper-class to provide a stable economy, which they have been successful in doing. This helps prevent activism by the masses that could lead to uninformed riots and extremism.
Chapter 6- Elite- Mass Communication
Chapter 6 describes the manner and process in which the elite and the masses communicate with each other. There is such a large gap between the rich and working class people that communication sometimes becomes a problem. Obviously, the easiest way to communicate ideas to the masses is to put them on TV. The mass media has almost endless power. Media outlets can control what the masses talk about, what they care about, and even what the think about. The media can pick and choose what stories it wants to air. For example, Fox News is notoriously republican. They are less likely to air stories that make Bush look bad than some other media outlets.
Chapter 7- American Political Parties: A System in Decay
Chapter 7 discusses the system of political parties that is in place in the USA today. Dye puts a negative connotation on the idea that parties rule everything because he feels that parties make its impossible for the USA to truly be a democracy. He also points out that both major parties share the same views on most important issues. They only differ on small things that don’t greatly affect the lifestyle of the majority of Americans. He also points out that even though most Americans belong to a political party, very few people actually have an effect one what decisions are made within the party. Dye shows that small interest groups have more power than the rest of the population because they collect money which can buy time to speak with party leaders.
Chapter 9- Organized Interests: Defenders of the Status Quo
Chapter 9 deals with interest groups and if they protect of destroy the idea of democracy. With interest groups comes the political theory of pluralism, which says that the government should be run by small interest groups. Dye says that most effective interest groups draw members from the upper and middle classes instead of the lower class. This is bad because the lower class population is the people that actually need help and need their voices heard. He also points out that the most successful groups are those that have small, but elite bases. Groups that are based on the masses have little success. To sum everything up, Dye thinks that a pure democracy cannot coexist with pluralism.
Chapter 13- Courts: Elites in Black Robes
Chapter 13 talks about the signs of elitism in the judicial system. To start off, the Supreme Court is a nine judge panel that is the highest court. None of these judges are elected even though the are the most powerful judges in the country. Dye points out that the only way that you can get appointed to the Supreme Court is by knowing the President, and the only way that you can know the President is by being an elite. The problem that can be seen here is that the Supreme Court can overrule decisions that are made by elected officials. Another problem with the Supreme Court is that most of the judges were upper-class before they even became elected. This can be seen in the colleges that they attended, mostly Ivy League.
posted by Drue at 1:51 PM 1 comments


Thesis of "The Irony of Democracy"

The thesis of “The Irony of Democracy” is the idea that despite calling ourselves a democracy, the United States is not run by the masses. We are instead govern by a handful of “elites” that are usually rich, white men. Dye bluntly states this thesis in the first sentence of the book, “Elites— not masses – govern the United States.” ( Dye, 1)
posted by Drue at 11:50 AM 0 comments


Thomas Dye Backround

http://www.thomasrdye.com/
Thomas R. Dye is renowned author, scholar, and professor. He was born in Pennsylvania and was the son of James Dye and Marguerite Dye. After he graduated high school, he attended college at Penn State University. He studied mostly politics and history at Penn State and he graduated with a Masters Degree for political science. He then attended grad school at The University of Pennsylvania where he obtained his PH.D. Dye then went into writing books that analyze politics. His first published book was “American Public Policy: “Documents and Essays” in 1969. Since then, Dye has published over fifty books that involve the discussion of politics. Dye is also an accomplished professor, most notably at The Florida State University. He is currently retired and living in Delray Beach, Florida.

IRONY OF DEMOCRACY

IRONY OF DEMOCRACY.
Democracy implies that every single citizen gets a "voice" and/or a vote, however due to the large population it would be impossible for everyone to have a voice for every single issue (this would simply slow down the voting process and little would ever get done), instead democracy is more of a republic with people being "represented" by those who share their same ideals.

Also, as "irony" means that the result is opposite to what the original expressed idea explicitly stated, not only is the fact that the United States was specifically NOT designed as a pure democracy (but, rather as a representative republic), but also the fact that virtually all democracies are explicitly designed to prevent absolute majority rule, which is what a true democracy means. That is, as a true democracy means the rule of the majority of citizens, all modern democratic political systems instead have designed-in limitations preventing the majority from having absolute power. The irony here is that small numbers of people (e.g. the US Supreme Court) can block attempts by the majority (even a vast majority) of citizens to take certain actions (in particular, modern democracies protect the rights of minorities from the actions of majorities). This is a Good Thing, though ironic.

In the case of the United States, the original Constitution (including the Bill of Rights) has several ironies (i.e. places where the design of the government contradicts the idea of a pure or representative democracy):
•Leaving aside the fact that it is NOT a pure democracy, but rather a representative democracy, the original Constitution only allows for direct election of members of the House of Representatives. The US Senate was appointed, and very much designed to be similar to the UK's aristocratic House of Lords. Also, the US President was not be to directly elected (and, still isn't), rather the Electoral College was used as an indirect method, one which was only marginally obligated to follow voter's desires.
•Almost 75% of the total population was excluded from voting: Native Americans, non-whites (specifically, slaves, but in practice, many non-white free men), women, and everyone under at least 21 (plus, many states had landholding or wealth requirements).
•Immigrants were explicitly excluded from attaining the highest office (US President). Only original citizens were allowed to be President, not naturalized ones. This stricture remains to this day.
•Large chunks of the Executive and Judicial branches were designed in a manner which insulates or removes them from direct voter approval, and much from even indirect voter approval.
•No mechanism for leaving the United States exists, which, presumably for a Federation of individual sovereign states, should exist in a real democracy

Wednesday, 17 August 2016

SEVEN CHARGING MISTAKE THAT KILL YOUR PHONE BATTERY

Seven charging mistakes that kill your iPhones

August 2, 2016
OJO OBAGAB
Old iPhones stop working sooner than the owners expected because charging habits slowly damage their batteries. Here are seven charging habits that are killing your iPhone:
Charging to 100 per cent
You don’t have to charge your battery as soon as it drops below 90 per cent. Maintaining a full charge is not the most efficient way to keep your phone battery strong. According to https://www.thrillist.com, experts suggest leaving your phone battery at between 30 and 80 per cent full adding that it is most comfortable and will run most efficiently at that level.

Letting the phone die
Lithium ion batteries become volatile when they drop down to low power. Every full discharge slightly wears down the phone battery. However, Apple and other experts suggest you letting the phone fully run out of battery every one to two months to “calibrate” the battery gauge.
Overheating the battery
Although this may not be a charging issue, it is still very important. You may notice that your phone sometimes becomes sluggish after it has been exposed to the sun for a while. That’s because iPhone batteries hate extreme temperatures, and have to work extra hard when the temperature is too cold or too hot. According to Apple, the ideal temperature for iPhones (as well as iPads, iPods, and Apple Watches) is between 32 and 95 degrees.
Using your wireless charger too much
Mophie storage and protective cases for iPhone batteries can work with wireless chargers and they are useful when you are going out of the house. Unfortunately for your iPhone, both your battery and the case itself emit heat during charging, which can do long-term damage to your device. To avoid overheating, try a portable power source that doesn’t attach to your phone.
Leaving your case on while you charge
Put off the Mophie storage case while the phone is charging. If your phone feels too hot when it’s plugged in, it’s possible the Mophie storage case might be trapping in the heat that’s produced while charging.
Not charging your backup phone
If you have another iPhone that you are using as a backup, make sure it is kept in a cool place and is roughly half-charged. According to Apple, if you leave the battery completely depleted, it will fall into what is known as a “deep discharge state,” which will make it drain out battery fast in future. Conversely, if you store it fully charged for an extended period, it may lose some capacity as well.
Using the wrong charger
Your Apple-issued charger is designed to cut power when the battery hits 100 per cent, but those cheap unauthorised third-party USB cords are not, and may do some damage to the battery.