SHOULD HUMAN RIGHTS BE UNIVERSAL 2
The growing consensus in the West that human rights are universal has been fiercely opposed by critics in other parts of the world. At the very least, the idea may well pose as many questions as it answers. Beyond the more general, philosophical question of whether anything in our pluri-cultural, multipolar world is truly universal, the issue of whether human rights is an essentially Western conceptŽignoring the very different cultural, economic, and political realities of the other parts of the worldŽcannot simply be dismissed. Can the values of the consumer society be applied to societies that have nothing to consume? Isn't talking about universal rights rather like saying that the rich and the poor both have the same right to fly first class and to sleep under bridges? Don't human rights as laid out in the international covenants ignore the traditions, the religions, and the socio-cultural patterns of what used to be called the Third World? And at the risk of sounding frivolous, when you stop a man in traditional dress from beating his wife, are you upholding her human rights or violating his?
This is anything but an abstract debate. To the contrary, ours is an era in which wars have been waged in the name of human rights, and in which many of the major developments in international law have presupposed the universality of the concept. By the same token, the perception that human rights as a universal discourse is increasingly serving as a flag of convenience for other, far more questionable political agendas, accounts for the degree to which the very idea of human rights is being questioned and resisted by both intellectuals and states. These objections need to be taken very seriously.
The philosophical objection asserts essentially that nothing can be universal; that all rights and values are defined and limited by cultural perceptions. If there is no universal culture, there can be no universal human rights. In fact, some philosophers have objected that the concept of human rights is founded on an anthropocentric, that is, a human-centered, view of the world, predicated upon an individualistic view of man as an autonomous being whose greatest need is to be free from interference by the stateŽfree to enjoy what one Western writer summed up as the óright to private property, the right to freedom of contract, and the right to be left alone.Ç But this view would seem to clash with the communitarian one propounded by other ideologies and cultures where society is conceived of as far more than the sum of its individual members.
Who Defines Human Rights?
Implicit in this is a series of broad, culturally grounded objections. Historically, in a number of non-Western cultures, individuals are not accorded rights in the same way as they are in the West. Critics of the universal idea of human rights contend that in the Confucian or Vedic traditions, duties are considered more important than rights, while in Africa it is the community that protects and nurtures the individual. One African writer summed up the African philosophy of existence as: óI am because we are, and because we are therefore I am.Ç Some Africans have argued that they have a complex structure of communal entitlements and obligations grouped around what one might call four ór'sÇ: not órights,Ç but respect, restraint, responsibility, and reciprocity. They argue that in most African societies group rights have always taken precedence over individual rights, and political decisions have been made through group consensus, not through individual assertions of rights.
These cultural differences, to the extent that they are real, have practical implications. Many in developing countries argue that some human rights are simply not relevant to their societiesŽthe right, for instance, to political pluralism, the right to paid vacations (always good for a laugh in the sweatshops of the Third World), and, inevitably, the rights of women. It is not just that some societies claim they are simply unable to provide certain rights to all their citizens, but rather that they see the óuniversalÇ conception of human rights as little more than an attempt to impose alien Western values on them.
Rights promoting the equality of the sexes are a contentious case in point. How, critics demand, can women's rights be universal in the face of widespread divergences of cultural practice, when in many societies, for example, marriage is not seen as a contract between two individuals but as an alliance between lineages, and when the permissible behavior of womenfolk is central to the society's perception of its honor?
And, inseparable from the issues of tradition, is the issue of religion. For religious critics of the universalist definition of human rights, nothing can be universal that is not founded on transcendent values, symbolized by God, and sanctioned by the guardians of the various faiths. They point out that the cardinal document of the contemporary human rights movement, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, can claim no such heritage.
Recently, the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration was celebrated with much fanfare. But critics from countries that were still colonies in 1948 suggest that its provisions reflect the ethnocentric bias of the time. They go on to argue that the concept of human rights is really a cover for Western interventionism in the affairs of the developing world, and that óhuman rightsÇ are merely an instrument of Western political neocolonialism. One critic in the 1970s wrote of his fear that óHuman Rights might turn out to be a Trojan horse, surreptitiously introduced into other civilizations, which will then be obliged to accept those ways of living, thinking and feeling for which Human Rights is the proper solution in cases of conflict.Ç
In practice, this argument tends to be as much about development as about civilizational integrity. Critics argue that the developing countries often cannot afford human rights, since the tasks of nation building, economic development, and the consolidation of the state structure to these ends are still unfinished. Authoritarianism, they argue, is more efficient in promoting development and economic growth. This is the premise behind the so-called Asian values case, which attributes the economic growth of Southeast Asia to the Confucian virtues of obedience, order, and respect for authority. The argument is even a little more subtle than that, because the suspension or limiting of human rights is also portrayed as the sacrifice of the few for the benefit of the many. The human rights concept is understood, applied, and argued over only, critics say, by a small Westernized minority in developing countries. Universality in these circumstances would be the universality of the privileged. Human rights is for the few who have the concerns of Westerners; it does not extend to the lowest rungs of the ladder.
The Case for the Defense
That is the case for the prosecutionŽthe indictment of the assumption of the universality of human rights. There is, of course, a case for the defense. The philosophical objection is, perhaps surprisingly, the easiest to counter. After all, concepts of justice and law, the legitimacy of government, the dignity of the individual, protection from oppressive or arbitrary rule, and participation in the affairs of the community are found in every society on the face of this earth. Far from being difficult to identify, the number of philosophical common denominators between different cultures and political traditions makes universalism anything but a distortion of reality.
Historically, a number of developing countriesŽnotably India, China, Chile, Cuba, Lebanon, and PanamaŽplayed an active and highly influential part in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the case of the human rights covenants, in the 1960s the developing world actually made the decisive contribution; it was the ónew majorityÇ of the Third World states emerging from colonialismŽparticularly Ghana and NigeriaŽthat broke the logjam, ending the East-West stalemate that had held up adoption of the covenants for nearly two decades. The principles of human rights have been widely adopted, imitated, and ratified by developing countries; the fact that therefore they were devised by less than a third of the states now in existence is really irrelevant.
In reality, many of the current objections to the universality of human rights reflect a false opposition between the primacy of the individual and the paramountcy of society. Many of the civil and political rights protect groups, while many of the social and economic rights protect individuals. Thus, crucially, the two sets of rights, and the two covenants that codify them, are like Siamese twinsŽinseparable and interdependent, sustaining and nourishing each other.
Still, while the conflict between group rights and individual rights may not be inevitable, it would be naïve to pretend that conflict would never occur. But while groups may collectively exercise rights, the individuals within them should also be permitted the exercise of their rights within the group, rights that the group may not infringe upon.
A Hidden Agenda?
Those who champion the view that human rights are not universal frequently insist that their adversaries have hidden agendas. In fairness, the same accusation can be leveled against at least some of those who cite culture as a defense against human rights. Authoritarian regimes who appeal to their own cultural traditions are cheerfully willing to crush culture domestically when it suits them to do so. Also, the ótraditional cultureÇ that is sometimes advanced to justify the nonobservance of human rights, including in Africa, in practice no longer exists in a pure form at the national level anywhere. The societies of developing countries have not remained in a pristine, pre-Western state; all have been subject to change and distortion by external influence, both as a result of colonialism in many cases and through participation in modern interstate relations.
You cannot impose the model of a ómodernÇ nation-state cutting across tribal boundaries and conventions on your country, appoint a president and an ambassador to the United Nations, and then argue that tribal traditions should be applied to judge the human rights conduct of the resulting modern state.
In any case, there should be nothing sacrosanct about culture. Culture is constantly evolving in any living society, responding to both internal and external stimuli, and there is much in every culture that societies quite naturally outgrow and reject. Am I, as an Indian, obliged to defend, in the name of my culture, the practice of suttee, which was banned 160 years ago, of obliging widows to immolate themselves on their husbands' funeral pyres? The fact that slavery was acceptable across the world for at least 2,000 years does not make it acceptable to us now; the deep historical roots of anti-Semitism in European culture cannot justify discrimination against Jews today.
The problem with the culture argument is that it subsumes all members of a society under a cultural framework that may in fact be inimical to them. It is one thing to advocate the cultural argument with an escape clauseŽthat is, one that does not seek to coerce the dissenters but permits individuals to opt out and to assert their individual rights. Those who freely choose to live by and to be treated according to their traditional cultures are welcome to do so, provided others who wish to be free are not oppressed in the name of a culture they prefer to disavow.
A controversial but pertinent example of an approach that seeks to strengthen both cultural integrity and individual freedom is India's Muslim Women (Protection of Rights upon Divorce) Act. This piece of legislation was enacted following the famous Shah Banu case, in which the Supreme Court upheld the right of a divorced Muslim woman to alimony, prompting howls of outrage from Muslim traditionalists who claimed this violated their religious beliefs that divorced women were only entitled to the return of the bride price paid upon marriage. The Indian parliament then passed a law to override the court's judgment, under which Muslim women married under Muslim law would be obliged to accept the return of the bride price as the only payment of alimony, but that the official Muslim charity, the Waqf Board, would assist them.
Many Muslim women and feminists were outraged by this. But the interesting point is that if a Muslim woman does not want to be subject to the provisions of the act, she can marry under the civil code; if she marries under Muslim personal law, she will be subject to its provisions. That may be the kind of balance that can be struck between the rights of Muslims as a group to protect their traditional practices and the right of a particular Muslim woman, who may not choose to be subject to that particular law, to exempt herself from it.
It needs to be emphasized that the objections that are voiced to specific (allegedly Western) rights very frequently involve the rights of women, and are usually vociferously argued by men. Even conceding, for argument's sake, that child marriage, widow inheritance, female circumcision, and the like are not found reprehensible by many societies, how do the victims of these practices feel about them? How many teenage girls who have had their genitalia mutilated would have agreed to undergo circumcision if they had the human right to refuse to permit it? For me, the standard is simple: where coercion exists, rights are violated, and these violations must be condemned whatever the traditional justification. So it is not culture that is the test, it is coercion.
Not with Faith, But with the Faithful
Nor can religion be deployed to sanction the status quo. Every religion seeks to embody certain verities that are applicable to all mankindŽjustice, truth, mercy, compassionŽthough the details of their interpretation vary according to the historical and geographical context in which the religion originated. As U.N. secretary general Kofi Annan has often said, the problem is usually not with the faith, but with the faithful. In any case, freedom is not a value found only in Western faiths: it is highly prized in Buddhism and in different aspects of Hinduism and Islam.
If religion cannot be fairly used to sanction oppression, it should be equally obvious that authoritarianism promotes repression, not development. Development is about change, but repression prevents change. The Nobel Prizeáwinning economist Amartya Sen has pointed out in a number of interesting pieces that there is now a generally agreed-upon list of policies that are helpful to economic developmentŽóopenness to competition, the use of international markets, a high level of literacy and school education, successful land reforms, and public provision of incentives for investment, export and industrializationǎnone of which requires authoritarianism; none is incompatible with human rights. Indeed, it is the availability of political and civil rights that gives people the opportunity to draw attention to their needs and to demand action from the government. Sen's work has established, for example, that no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press. That is striking; though there may be cases where authoritarian societies have had success in achieving economic growth, a country like Botswana, an exemplar of democracy in Africa, has grown faster than most authoritarian states.
In any case, when one hears of the unsuitability or inapplicability or ethnocentrism of human rights, it is important to ask what the unstated assumptions of this view really are. What exactly are these human rights that it is so unreasonable to promote? If one picks up the more contentious covenantŽthe one on civil and political rightsŽand looks through the list, what can one find that someone in a developing country can easily do without? Not the right to life, one trusts. Freedom from torture? The right not to be enslaved, not to be physically assaulted, not to be arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned, executed? No one actually advocates in so many words the abridgement of any of these rights. As Kofi Annan asked at a speech in Tehran University in 1997: óWhen have you heard a free voice demand an end to freedom? Where have you heard a slave argue for slavery? When have you heard a victim of torture endorse the ways of the torturer? Where have you heard the tolerant cry out for intolerance?Ç
Tolerance and mercy have always, and in all cultures, been ideals of government rule and human behavior. If we do not unequivocally assert the universality of the rights that oppressive governments abuse, and if we admit that these rights can be diluted and changed, ultimately we risk giving oppressive governments an intellectual justification for the morally indefensible. Objections to the applicability of international human rights standards have all too frequently been voiced by authoritarian rulers and power elites to rationalize their violations of human rightsŽviolations that serve primarily, if not solely, to sustain them in power. Just as the Devil can quote scripture for his purpose, Third World communitarianism can be the slogan of a deracinated tyrant trained, as in the case of Pol Pot, at the Sorbonne. The authentic voices of the Third World know how to cry out in pain. It is time to heed them.
The óRight to DevelopmentÇ
At the same time, particularly in a world in which market capitalism is triumphant, it is important to stress that the right to development is also a universal human right. The very concept of development evolved in tune with the concept of human rights; decolonization and self-determination advanced side by side with a consciousness of the need to improve the standards of living of subject peoples. The idea that human rights could be ensured merely by the state not interfering with individual freedom cannot survive confrontation with a billion hungry, deprived, illiterate, and jobless human beings around the globe. Human rights, in one memorable phrase, start with breakfast.
For the sake of the deprived, the notion of human rights has to be a positive, active one: not just protection from the state but also the protection of the state, to permit these human beings to fulfill the basic aspirations of growth and development that are frustrated by poverty and scarce resources. We have to accept that social deprivation and economic exploitation are just as evil as political oppression or racial persecution. This calls for a more profound approach to both human rights and to development. Without development, human rights could not be truly universal, since universality must be predicated upon the most underprivileged in developing countries achieving empowerment. We can not exclude the poorest of the poor from the universality of the rich.
After all, do some societies have the right to deny human beings the opportunity to fulfill their aspirations for growth and fulfillment legally and in freedom, while other societies organize themselves in such a way as to permit and encourage human beings freely to fulfill the same needs? On what basis can we accept a double standard that says that an Australian's need to develop his own potential is a right, while an Angolan's or an Albanian's is a luxury?
Universality, Not Uniformity
But it is essential to recognize that universality does not presuppose uniformity. To assert the universality of human rights is not to suggest that our views of human rights transcend all possible philosophical, cultural, or religious differences or represent a magical aggregation of the world's ethical and philosophical systems. Rather, it is enough that they do not fundamentally contradict the ideals and aspirations of any society, and that they reflect our common universal humanity, from which no human being must be excluded.
Most basically, human rights derive from the mere fact of being human; they are not the gift of a particular government or legal code. But the standards being proclaimed internationally can become reality only when applied by countries within their own legal systems. The challenge is to work towards the óindigenizationÇ of human rights, and their assertion within each country's traditions and history. If different approaches are welcomed within the established frameworkŽif, in other words, eclecticism can be encouraged as part of the consensus and not be seen as a threat to itŽthis flexibility can guarantee universality, enrich the intellectual and philosophical debate, and so complement, rather than undermine, the concept of worldwide human rights. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is a universal idea of human rights that can in fact help make the world safe for diversity
AM INTO PUBLISHING
Sunday, 28 August 2016
SHOULD HUMAN RIGHTS BE UNIVERSAL?
SHOULD HUMAN RIGHTS BE UNIVERSAL?
In recent decades, a widely contested debate over the universality of human rights has emerged. Rights are certainly not universally-applied today, with oppression, torture and various atrocities committed in many parts of the world. This paper will focus on the notion that both in the Third-World and the West, states have used human rights discussion as a political tool, which has weakened arguments for its universality. This perspective will be utilised to break down arguments made against universal human rights before presenting alternative conceptions of universal human rights and identifying developments which may ensure they can be universally applied and respected.
It is important to first define the theoretical basis of ‘universal’ human rights. Universal conceptions argue human rights are inalienable, self-evident and applicable to all human beings (Donnelly, 2003, 10). These arguments are often linked to origins in Western philosophy and natural law, developed from philosophers such as John Locke (Langlois, 2009, 12). Many scholars maintain that human rights are ‘pre-political’, thus unchangeable and unaffected by cultural or political variation. Donnelly identifies the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the basis in establishing the “contemporary consensus on internationally recognised human rights” (2003, 22). Human rights hold universal values which should be adopted by states worldwide.
A common challenge to this view is the concept of cultural relativism. What the West may consider universal norms in human rights are not applicable in other cultures. Human rights are argued to have developed from Western culture and thus they are inappropriate in application to other cultures (Langlois, 2009, 19). It has been argued that only Western philosophy places such importance on the individual (O’Byrne, 2003, 42). Claims based on universal human rights are therefore at risk of being a “weapon of cultural hegemony” (Ibid). The most clear embodiment of this challenge are Asian values, where following the incredible economic success of a number of East/South-East Asian states, leaders and academics pointed to an alternative, more authoritative standard of rights, stemming from Asian conservative cultural values (Freeman, 2008, 363). Western origins of human rights and the incompatibility of its imposition are argued to prove human rights should not and cannot be universally applicable.
There are arguments that economic development must precede human rights, believing that human rights are too expensive and too risky for poor countries (Freeman, 2008, 359). In poor states – particularly with ethnic divisions – human rights can “subvert social order and thus hinder development” (Ibid). Advocates of this view again cite Asian ‘Tiger’ economies where strong economic growth is credited to authoritative rule (Ayittey, 2011, 18). This is a clear argument suggesting human rights should not be made universal, as many states are not ready.
A serious obstacle for universal human rights is the claim that it is a new form of imperialism, or as Rengger describes, “a mask for Western interests” (2011, 1173). During the Cold War, the West dismissed human rights, supporting ‘friendly’ regimes notorious for abuses, such as Mobutu, Moi, Selassie (Adar, 1998, 35). Real concern for human rights emerged only “occasionally” (Adar, 1998, 34). Samir Amin identifies the human rights agenda as shallow rhetoric disguising the promotion of US interests (2004, 78). The human rights discussion surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq has justified the fear that human rights are a tool of neo-imperialism, particularly as the US has not promoted human rights in Kuwait despite years of presence there (Amin, 2004, 77). The US rejects criticism regarding questionable domestic policies on the grounds that it is “their way” (Franck, 2001). Third-World states accordingly argue ‘rights’ are used to undermine their sovereignty according to the whims of the West.
Western double standards and “narrow-minded and ham-handed” (Donnelly, 2003, 99) policies have been a key reason for cultural relativist and imperialist arguments persisting. Western aid to authoritarian states has consolidated their hold on power (Coyne & Ryan, 2009, 27). These factors have culminated in reducing the West’s capacity to promote human rights. Ayittey believes charges of imperialism have prevented the West from criticising authoritarian states (2005, 422). African governments have become adept at suckering in the West to play “diplomatic ping-pong” (Ibid), cultural and anti-imperialist arguments provide effective cover.
Critique of These Positions
These arguments are often made by minority/elite groups, unrepresentative of the populations they supposedly represent. The political use of these arguments has deterred international and domestic criticism of atrocious abuses of human rights. New Tactics show there is often a lack of political will to enact human rights (2010), not because rights are unsuitable for populations, but are “politically unacceptable to the rulers” (Mahmud, 1993, 495). Amartya Sen argues promises and claims by authoritative leaders are given too much respect (1999, 147). Leaders may manipulate discussion of human rights, adopting self-serving positions to prevent changes to the status quo.
Scholars argue the appeal to cultural relativist arguments such as Asian values is an “ideological attempt to justify authoritarian government” (Freeman, 2008, 363). Sen argues that Asian (authoritarian) values appear to stem “almost exclusively” (1999, 246) from those in power, stating, “to see Asian history in terms of a narrow category of authoritarian values does little justice to the rich varieties of thought in Asian intellectual traditions” (Sen, 1999, 248). Cultural relativist arguments consistently under-represent women, supposed spokespersons of ‘culture’ ensure that women are persistently under-represented (Phillips, 2001, 13), falsely presenting a culture of “male dominance” (2001, 14). This shows us that cultural relativist arguments are often a shallow tool used to impede the application of human rights.
Unrepresentative manipulation of human rights arguments can be clearly seen in anti-imperialist rhetoric. In Zimbabwe, this argument is made constantly to deflect criticism from repressive domestic policies, hiding brutal oppression “behind the language of anti-imperialism” (Phimister & Raftopolous, 2004, 387). This rhetoric garnered support from African states, “in a misplaced sense of Pan-Africanist solidarity” (Phimister & Raftopolous, 2004, 399), clouding criticism of human rights abuses (Coyne & Ryan, 2009, 27). The brutality, corruption and “utter ruination” (Pham, 2008, 132) under Mugabe’s regime makes it difficult to respect the legitimacy of his anti-imperialist argument.
Alternative Basis for Universal Human Rights
It is clear shallow arguments appealing to culture and sovereignty, as well as Western clumsiness and hypocrisy, have shielded human rights abuses from scrutiny. Donnelly argues both ‘radical’ cultural relativism and ‘radical’ universalism are misguided (1984, 403). Radical cultural relativism gives too much potential for abuse, with those in power able to dictate what determines ‘culture’ to hide abuses of power (Freeman, 2011, 120). Radical universalism is also a weak notion, dismissing culture entirely (Donnelly, 1984, 403). Cultural differences and the right to self-determination must be taken into account for human rights to be applicable (Mutua, 2008, 34), otherwise they will be irrelevant or rejected as imperialism (Ibid). Truly universal human rights require a theoretical basis which does not embrace ‘radical’ perspectives.
For human rights to be universal, it is crucial for them to be compatible with cultural differences. Universal human rights should not constitute a ‘fixed’ approach (Rengger, 2011, 1173); rights and community (culture) can and should “mutually constitute one another” (Ibid). Freeman argues there is no necessary incompatibility between communal values and individual rights (2011, 120). Globalisation has been key in generating a multi-culturalisation of human rights, making it a “truly universal project” (Mutua, 2007, 4). The human rights movement has been able to re-focus attention onto social and economic rights, giving it more legitimacy in the Third-World (Ibid). It is crucial for human rights to gain legitimacy by incorporating cross-cultural perspectives.
Dershowitz argues that existing theories of human rights do not aptly explain the wide-ranging promotion of rights seen today (In: Ramcharan, 2008, 16). The basis of rights need not have cultural or philosophical origins, but instead be a response to common injustices humanity has seen (Ramcharan, 2008, 17). Ramcharan believes Dershowitz’s argument shows “humanity’s collective experience with injustice constitutes a fruitful foundation on which to build a theory of rights” (Ibid). O’Byrne describes a modified Kantianism, with rights based on fundamental dignity “inherent in human beings, without distinction or exception” (2003, 42). All cultures have common histories of injustices, demands for human rights from oppressed populations often drive reform (Mahmud, 1993, 495). When the basis of rights is presented in these terms, it is fundamentally clear that they should be universally applied.
How Human Rights Can Be Universal
This forms a strong case for the universality of human rights, certain key factors could ensure this conception can be applied universally. An existing basis in international law provides legitimacy to the human rights movement and a tool to hold governments to account. The UDHR was formed with major influence from Non-Western states (Glendon, 2003, 38), giving it legitimacy as a universally-applicable document. This has allowed the UDHR to achieve “wide acceptance among diverse cultures” (Glendon, 2003, 27). The creation of the International Criminal Court is a major development in human rights law, being able to independently investigate and charge individuals for serious human rights violations (Cassese, 1999, 161). By ratifying the Rome Statute, states accept the Court’s jurisdiction, thus showing moral and legal acceptance of the ICC’s ideals (Plessis, 2008, 11). The legitimacy of the Court is grounded in its formulation by states and NGOs from every region, which Plessis believes shows “the existence of a social system built on universal respect for the idea of human rights” (2002, 115). The Court enjoys grass-roots support in Africa, where it is most active (Human Rights Watch, 2011). International agreements are a universal source of human rights standards, empowering civil society.
The international community, and specifically the West, can play a far more positive role in ensuring human rights are respected. The ending of the Cold War has removed “many impediments to more effective international human rights policies (Donnelly, 2003, 172), leading to numerous democratisations in Africa (Miguel, 2011). The West has played a more positive role in holding governments to account (Bujra, 2002, 37). Western embassies, UN agencies and NGOs play a significant role in monitoring human rights abuses (Ibid). Ayittey believes that the renewed push for human rights worldwide has, “[served] notice to tyrants that they can no longer butcher their people and hide it from the international community” (2005, 413). Bujra shows that authoritarian governments appear more constrained following enhanced foreign oversight (2002, 44). The international community can play a strong role in holding governments to account, providing legitimacy to domestic campaigns for human rights.
Civil society has played a crucial role in pushing for human rights worldwide. Civil society represents a legitimate conduit for human rights. Mahmud argues rights are better respected if they came from populations, not isolated leaders or foreign imposition (1993, 497). Following the Cold War, civil society has grown stronger and played a more influential role (Mutua, 2007, 4). Ayittey identifies the development of the ‘Cheetah generation’, a critical and reformist civil society, supporting accountability and human rights (2011, 236). Ghana is an example where civil society has put human rights on the agenda (Ayittey, 2011, 259). Civil society’s scrutinising role has increased in influence; following election violence in Kenya, civil society pushed for a constitution grounded in human rights in 2010 (Greste, 2010): activist John Githongo stated, “the Kenyan people have imposed a constitution upon their rulers” (Royal African Society, 2010). Civil society represents the most legitimate and effective route for human rights to be universally realised.
In conclusion, conceptions of human rights based on collective histories of humanities’ injustices make a strong case for the value of universal human rights, particularly in light of damaging manipulation to mainstream human rights theory. It is clear civil society will play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human rights. If the international community maintains a positive, critical role and domestic pushes for human rights are legitimised by international law, human rights have the potential to be universal.
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Plessis, M (2008), ‘The International Criminal Court and its work in Africa’, Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) Publication, Vol. 173
Ramcharan, B (2008), Contemporary Human Rights Ideas, Abingdon: Taylor & Francis
In recent decades, a widely contested debate over the universality of human rights has emerged. Rights are certainly not universally-applied today, with oppression, torture and various atrocities committed in many parts of the world. This paper will focus on the notion that both in the Third-World and the West, states have used human rights discussion as a political tool, which has weakened arguments for its universality. This perspective will be utilised to break down arguments made against universal human rights before presenting alternative conceptions of universal human rights and identifying developments which may ensure they can be universally applied and respected.
It is important to first define the theoretical basis of ‘universal’ human rights. Universal conceptions argue human rights are inalienable, self-evident and applicable to all human beings (Donnelly, 2003, 10). These arguments are often linked to origins in Western philosophy and natural law, developed from philosophers such as John Locke (Langlois, 2009, 12). Many scholars maintain that human rights are ‘pre-political’, thus unchangeable and unaffected by cultural or political variation. Donnelly identifies the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the basis in establishing the “contemporary consensus on internationally recognised human rights” (2003, 22). Human rights hold universal values which should be adopted by states worldwide.
A common challenge to this view is the concept of cultural relativism. What the West may consider universal norms in human rights are not applicable in other cultures. Human rights are argued to have developed from Western culture and thus they are inappropriate in application to other cultures (Langlois, 2009, 19). It has been argued that only Western philosophy places such importance on the individual (O’Byrne, 2003, 42). Claims based on universal human rights are therefore at risk of being a “weapon of cultural hegemony” (Ibid). The most clear embodiment of this challenge are Asian values, where following the incredible economic success of a number of East/South-East Asian states, leaders and academics pointed to an alternative, more authoritative standard of rights, stemming from Asian conservative cultural values (Freeman, 2008, 363). Western origins of human rights and the incompatibility of its imposition are argued to prove human rights should not and cannot be universally applicable.
There are arguments that economic development must precede human rights, believing that human rights are too expensive and too risky for poor countries (Freeman, 2008, 359). In poor states – particularly with ethnic divisions – human rights can “subvert social order and thus hinder development” (Ibid). Advocates of this view again cite Asian ‘Tiger’ economies where strong economic growth is credited to authoritative rule (Ayittey, 2011, 18). This is a clear argument suggesting human rights should not be made universal, as many states are not ready.
A serious obstacle for universal human rights is the claim that it is a new form of imperialism, or as Rengger describes, “a mask for Western interests” (2011, 1173). During the Cold War, the West dismissed human rights, supporting ‘friendly’ regimes notorious for abuses, such as Mobutu, Moi, Selassie (Adar, 1998, 35). Real concern for human rights emerged only “occasionally” (Adar, 1998, 34). Samir Amin identifies the human rights agenda as shallow rhetoric disguising the promotion of US interests (2004, 78). The human rights discussion surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq has justified the fear that human rights are a tool of neo-imperialism, particularly as the US has not promoted human rights in Kuwait despite years of presence there (Amin, 2004, 77). The US rejects criticism regarding questionable domestic policies on the grounds that it is “their way” (Franck, 2001). Third-World states accordingly argue ‘rights’ are used to undermine their sovereignty according to the whims of the West.
Western double standards and “narrow-minded and ham-handed” (Donnelly, 2003, 99) policies have been a key reason for cultural relativist and imperialist arguments persisting. Western aid to authoritarian states has consolidated their hold on power (Coyne & Ryan, 2009, 27). These factors have culminated in reducing the West’s capacity to promote human rights. Ayittey believes charges of imperialism have prevented the West from criticising authoritarian states (2005, 422). African governments have become adept at suckering in the West to play “diplomatic ping-pong” (Ibid), cultural and anti-imperialist arguments provide effective cover.
Critique of These Positions
These arguments are often made by minority/elite groups, unrepresentative of the populations they supposedly represent. The political use of these arguments has deterred international and domestic criticism of atrocious abuses of human rights. New Tactics show there is often a lack of political will to enact human rights (2010), not because rights are unsuitable for populations, but are “politically unacceptable to the rulers” (Mahmud, 1993, 495). Amartya Sen argues promises and claims by authoritative leaders are given too much respect (1999, 147). Leaders may manipulate discussion of human rights, adopting self-serving positions to prevent changes to the status quo.
Scholars argue the appeal to cultural relativist arguments such as Asian values is an “ideological attempt to justify authoritarian government” (Freeman, 2008, 363). Sen argues that Asian (authoritarian) values appear to stem “almost exclusively” (1999, 246) from those in power, stating, “to see Asian history in terms of a narrow category of authoritarian values does little justice to the rich varieties of thought in Asian intellectual traditions” (Sen, 1999, 248). Cultural relativist arguments consistently under-represent women, supposed spokespersons of ‘culture’ ensure that women are persistently under-represented (Phillips, 2001, 13), falsely presenting a culture of “male dominance” (2001, 14). This shows us that cultural relativist arguments are often a shallow tool used to impede the application of human rights.
Unrepresentative manipulation of human rights arguments can be clearly seen in anti-imperialist rhetoric. In Zimbabwe, this argument is made constantly to deflect criticism from repressive domestic policies, hiding brutal oppression “behind the language of anti-imperialism” (Phimister & Raftopolous, 2004, 387). This rhetoric garnered support from African states, “in a misplaced sense of Pan-Africanist solidarity” (Phimister & Raftopolous, 2004, 399), clouding criticism of human rights abuses (Coyne & Ryan, 2009, 27). The brutality, corruption and “utter ruination” (Pham, 2008, 132) under Mugabe’s regime makes it difficult to respect the legitimacy of his anti-imperialist argument.
Alternative Basis for Universal Human Rights
It is clear shallow arguments appealing to culture and sovereignty, as well as Western clumsiness and hypocrisy, have shielded human rights abuses from scrutiny. Donnelly argues both ‘radical’ cultural relativism and ‘radical’ universalism are misguided (1984, 403). Radical cultural relativism gives too much potential for abuse, with those in power able to dictate what determines ‘culture’ to hide abuses of power (Freeman, 2011, 120). Radical universalism is also a weak notion, dismissing culture entirely (Donnelly, 1984, 403). Cultural differences and the right to self-determination must be taken into account for human rights to be applicable (Mutua, 2008, 34), otherwise they will be irrelevant or rejected as imperialism (Ibid). Truly universal human rights require a theoretical basis which does not embrace ‘radical’ perspectives.
For human rights to be universal, it is crucial for them to be compatible with cultural differences. Universal human rights should not constitute a ‘fixed’ approach (Rengger, 2011, 1173); rights and community (culture) can and should “mutually constitute one another” (Ibid). Freeman argues there is no necessary incompatibility between communal values and individual rights (2011, 120). Globalisation has been key in generating a multi-culturalisation of human rights, making it a “truly universal project” (Mutua, 2007, 4). The human rights movement has been able to re-focus attention onto social and economic rights, giving it more legitimacy in the Third-World (Ibid). It is crucial for human rights to gain legitimacy by incorporating cross-cultural perspectives.
Dershowitz argues that existing theories of human rights do not aptly explain the wide-ranging promotion of rights seen today (In: Ramcharan, 2008, 16). The basis of rights need not have cultural or philosophical origins, but instead be a response to common injustices humanity has seen (Ramcharan, 2008, 17). Ramcharan believes Dershowitz’s argument shows “humanity’s collective experience with injustice constitutes a fruitful foundation on which to build a theory of rights” (Ibid). O’Byrne describes a modified Kantianism, with rights based on fundamental dignity “inherent in human beings, without distinction or exception” (2003, 42). All cultures have common histories of injustices, demands for human rights from oppressed populations often drive reform (Mahmud, 1993, 495). When the basis of rights is presented in these terms, it is fundamentally clear that they should be universally applied.
How Human Rights Can Be Universal
This forms a strong case for the universality of human rights, certain key factors could ensure this conception can be applied universally. An existing basis in international law provides legitimacy to the human rights movement and a tool to hold governments to account. The UDHR was formed with major influence from Non-Western states (Glendon, 2003, 38), giving it legitimacy as a universally-applicable document. This has allowed the UDHR to achieve “wide acceptance among diverse cultures” (Glendon, 2003, 27). The creation of the International Criminal Court is a major development in human rights law, being able to independently investigate and charge individuals for serious human rights violations (Cassese, 1999, 161). By ratifying the Rome Statute, states accept the Court’s jurisdiction, thus showing moral and legal acceptance of the ICC’s ideals (Plessis, 2008, 11). The legitimacy of the Court is grounded in its formulation by states and NGOs from every region, which Plessis believes shows “the existence of a social system built on universal respect for the idea of human rights” (2002, 115). The Court enjoys grass-roots support in Africa, where it is most active (Human Rights Watch, 2011). International agreements are a universal source of human rights standards, empowering civil society.
The international community, and specifically the West, can play a far more positive role in ensuring human rights are respected. The ending of the Cold War has removed “many impediments to more effective international human rights policies (Donnelly, 2003, 172), leading to numerous democratisations in Africa (Miguel, 2011). The West has played a more positive role in holding governments to account (Bujra, 2002, 37). Western embassies, UN agencies and NGOs play a significant role in monitoring human rights abuses (Ibid). Ayittey believes that the renewed push for human rights worldwide has, “[served] notice to tyrants that they can no longer butcher their people and hide it from the international community” (2005, 413). Bujra shows that authoritarian governments appear more constrained following enhanced foreign oversight (2002, 44). The international community can play a strong role in holding governments to account, providing legitimacy to domestic campaigns for human rights.
Civil society has played a crucial role in pushing for human rights worldwide. Civil society represents a legitimate conduit for human rights. Mahmud argues rights are better respected if they came from populations, not isolated leaders or foreign imposition (1993, 497). Following the Cold War, civil society has grown stronger and played a more influential role (Mutua, 2007, 4). Ayittey identifies the development of the ‘Cheetah generation’, a critical and reformist civil society, supporting accountability and human rights (2011, 236). Ghana is an example where civil society has put human rights on the agenda (Ayittey, 2011, 259). Civil society’s scrutinising role has increased in influence; following election violence in Kenya, civil society pushed for a constitution grounded in human rights in 2010 (Greste, 2010): activist John Githongo stated, “the Kenyan people have imposed a constitution upon their rulers” (Royal African Society, 2010). Civil society represents the most legitimate and effective route for human rights to be universally realised.
In conclusion, conceptions of human rights based on collective histories of humanities’ injustices make a strong case for the value of universal human rights, particularly in light of damaging manipulation to mainstream human rights theory. It is clear civil society will play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human rights. If the international community maintains a positive, critical role and domestic pushes for human rights are legitimised by international law, human rights have the potential to be universal.
Bibliography
Adar, K (1998), ‘The Wilsonian Conception of Democracy and Human Rights: A Retrospective and Prospective’, African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 33-44
Amin, S (2004), The Liberal Virus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World, New York: Monthly Review Press
Ayittey, G (2005), Africa Unchained, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Ayittey, G (2011), Defeating Dictators: Fighting Tyranny in Africa and Around the World, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Bjura, A (2002), African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment, Addis Ababa: Development Policy Management Forum
Cassese, A (1999), ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 144–171
Coyne, C. & Ryan, M (2009), ‘With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Aiding the World’s Worst Dictators’, The Independent Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 26-44
Donnelly, J (1984), ‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 400-419
Donnelly, J (2003), Universal Human Rights in Theory & Practise, New York: Cornell University Press
Franck, T (2001), ‘Are Human Rights Universal’, Foreign Affairs, Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/56666/thomas-m-franck/are-human-rights-universal#
Freeman, M (2008), Human Rights. In: P. Burnell & V. Randall, ed. (2008), Politics in the Developing World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 18
Freeman, M. (2011), Human Rights, Cambridge: Polity Press
Glendon, M (2003), ‘The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human Rights Idea’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 16, pp. 27-39
Greste. P (2010), ‘Kenya’s New Constitution Sparks Hopes of Rebirth’, BBC News, Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11103008
Human Rights Watch (2011), ‘AU: Support Justice for Gravest Crimes’, Human Rights Watch, Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/27/au-support-justice-gravest-crimes
Langlois, A (2009), Normative and Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights. In: M. Goodhart, ed. (2009), Human Rights: Politics and Practise, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 1
Mahmud, S (1993), ‘The State and Human Rights in Africa in the 1990’s: Perspectives and Prospects’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 485-498
Miguel. E (2011), ‘Africa Unleashed: Explaining the Secret of a Belated Boom’, Foreign Affairs, Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136547/edward-miguel/africa-unleashed?page=show
Mutua, M (2007), ‘Change in the Human Rights Universe’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 20, pp. 3-5
Mutua, M (2008), ‘Human Rights in Africa: The Limited Promise of Liberalism’, African Studies Review, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 17-39
New Tactics (2010), ‘Domesticating International Human Rights Law’, New Tactics, Available at: http://www.newtactics.org/en/dialogue/domesticating-intl-law
O’Byrne, D (2003), Human Rights: An Introduction, Harlow: Pearson Education
Pham, P (2008), ‘What Happened to Africa’, Human Rights and Human Welfare, Vol. 8, pp. 125-137
Phillips, A (2001), Multiculturalism, Universalism and the Claims of Democracy, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
Phimister, I. & Raftopoulos, B (2004), ‘Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-imperialism’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31, No. 101, pp. 385-400
Plessis, M (2003), ‘The Universal Aspirations of the International Criminal Court’, African Security Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 115-118
Plessis, M (2008), ‘The International Criminal Court and its work in Africa’, Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) Publication, Vol. 173
Ramcharan, B (2008), Contemporary Human Rights Ideas, Abingdon: Taylor & Francis
Sunday, 21 August 2016
Saturday, 20 August 2016
SUPPER COACH INVITED 23 PLYERS FOR TANZANIA CLASH
SUPER EAGLE COACH, ROHR NAME 23_MAN SQUAD FOR TANZANIA.
Rohr, has invited 23 players for next month's Africa cup of nation qualified against Tanzania in uyo.
There is however no place for Rizespor defender, Godfrey oboabona, while Alex iwobi miss out with a hip injury.
The invited players are expected to report in uyo by August 28.
Golkeepers: Carl ikeme, Emmanuel Daniel, ikechukwu Enzewa.
Defenders: Leon Balongu, William Troost-Ekong, chidozie Awaziem, Jamiu Alimi, Abdullahi Shehu, MUSA Muhammad, Elderson Echiejile, kingsley madu.
Midfielders:: Mikel obi, oganyi Onazi, Wilfred Ndidi, Nosa igiebor.
FORWARD: Ahmad MUSA, Kelechi Iheanacho, moses simon, victor Moses, Imoh Ezekiel, odion Ighalo, Brown Ideye, victor Osimhen.
BEST OF LUCK.
Rohr, has invited 23 players for next month's Africa cup of nation qualified against Tanzania in uyo.
There is however no place for Rizespor defender, Godfrey oboabona, while Alex iwobi miss out with a hip injury.
The invited players are expected to report in uyo by August 28.
Golkeepers: Carl ikeme, Emmanuel Daniel, ikechukwu Enzewa.
Defenders: Leon Balongu, William Troost-Ekong, chidozie Awaziem, Jamiu Alimi, Abdullahi Shehu, MUSA Muhammad, Elderson Echiejile, kingsley madu.
Midfielders:: Mikel obi, oganyi Onazi, Wilfred Ndidi, Nosa igiebor.
FORWARD: Ahmad MUSA, Kelechi Iheanacho, moses simon, victor Moses, Imoh Ezekiel, odion Ighalo, Brown Ideye, victor Osimhen.
BEST OF LUCK.
Friday, 19 August 2016
POLITICAL ECONOMICS
POLITICAL ECONOMCS
Keynesian economics is a theory of total spending in the economy (called aggregate demand) and its effects on output and inflation. Although the term has been used (and abused) to describe many things over the years, six principal tenets seem central to Keynesianism. The first three describe how the economy works.
1. A Keynesian believes that aggregate demand is influenced by a host of economic decisions—both public and private—and sometimes behaves erratically. The public decisions include, most prominently, those on monetary and fiscal (i.e., spending and tax) policies. Some decades ago, economists heatedly debated the relative strengths of monetary and fiscal policies, with some Keynesians arguing that monetary policy is powerless, and some monetarists arguing that fiscal policy is powerless. Both of these are essentially dead issues today. Nearly all Keynesians and monetarists now believe that both fiscal and monetary policies affect aggregate demand. A few economists, however, believe in debt neutrality—the doctrine that substitutions of government borrowing for taxes have no effects on total demand (more on this below).
2. According to Keynesian theory, changes in aggregate demand, whether anticipated or unanticipated, have their greatest short-run effect on real output and employment, not on prices. This idea is portrayed, for example, in phillips curves that show inflation rising only slowly when unemployment falls. Keynesians believe that what is true about the short run cannot necessarily be inferred from what must happen in the long run, and we live in the short run. They often quote Keynes’s famous statement, “In the long run, we are all dead,” to make the point.
Monetary policy can produce real effects on output and employment only if some prices are rigid—if nominal wages (wages in dollars, not in real purchasing power), for example, do not adjust instantly. Otherwise, an injection of new money would change all prices by the same percentage. So Keynesian models generally either assume or try to explain rigid prices or wages. Rationalizing rigid prices is a difficult theoretical problem because, according to standard microeconomic theory, real supplies and demands should not change if all nominal prices rise or fall proportionally.
But Keynesians believe that, because prices are somewhat rigid, fluctuations in any component of spending—consumption, investment, or government expenditures—cause output to fluctuate. If government spending increases, for example, and all other components of spending remain constant, then output will increase. Keynesian models of economic activity also include a so-called multiplier effect; that is, output increases by a multiple of the original change in spending that caused it. Thus, a ten-billion-dollar increase in government spending could cause total output to rise by fifteen billion dollars (a multiplier of 1.5) or by five billion (a multiplier of 0.5). Contrary to what many people believe, Keynesian analysis does not require that the multiplier exceed 1.0. For Keynesian economics to work, however, the multiplier must be greater than zero.
3. Keynesians believe that prices, and especially wages, respond slowly to changes in supply and demand, resulting in periodic shortages and surpluses, especially of labor. Even Milton Friedman acknowledged that “under any conceivable institutional arrangements, and certainly under those that now prevail in the United States, there is only a limited amount of flexibility in prices and wages.”1 In current parlance, that would certainly be called a Keynesian position.
No policy prescriptions follow from these three beliefs alone. And many economists who do not call themselves Keynesian would nevertheless accept the entire list. What distinguishes Keynesians from other economists is their belief in the following three tenets about economic policy.
4. Keynesians do not think that the typical level of unemployment is ideal—partly because unemployment is subject to the caprice of aggregate demand, and partly because they believe that prices adjust only gradually. In fact, Keynesians typically see unemployment as both too high on average and too variable, although they know that rigorous theoretical justification for these positions is hard to come by. Keynesians also feel certain that periods of recession or depression are economic maladies, not, as in real business cycle theory, efficient market responses to unattractive opportunities.
5. Many, but not all, Keynesians advocate activist stabilization policy to reduce the amplitude of the business cycle, which they rank among the most important of all economic problems. Here, however, even some conservative Keynesians part company by doubting either the efficacy of stabilization policy or the wisdom of attempting it.
This does not mean that Keynesians advocate what used to be called fine-tuning—adjusting government spending, taxes, and the money supply every few months to keep the economy at full employment. Almost all economists, including most Keynesians, now believe that the government simply cannot know enough soon enough to fine-tune successfully. Three lags make it unlikely that fine-tuning will work. First, there is a lag between the time that a change in policy is required and the time that the government recognizes this. Second, there is a lag between when the government recognizes that a change in policy is required and when it takes action. In the United States, this lag can be very long for fiscal policy because Congress and the administration must first agree on most changes in spending and taxes. The third lag comes between the time that policy is changed and when the changes affect the economy. This, too, can be many months. Yet many Keynesians still believe that more modest goals for stabilization policy—coarse-tuning, if you will—are not only defensible but sensible. For example, an economist need not have detailed quantitative knowledge of lags to prescribe a dose of expansionary monetary policy when the unemployment rate is very high.
6. Finally, and even less unanimously, some Keynesians are more concerned about combating unemployment than about conquering inflation. They have concluded from the evidence that the costs of low inflation are small. However, there are plenty of anti-inflation Keynesians. Most of the world’s current and past central bankers, for example, merit this title whether they like it or not. Needless to say, views on the relative importance of unemployment and inflation heavily influence the policy advice that economists give and that policymakers accept. Keynesians typically advocate more aggressively expansionist policies than non-Keynesians.
Keynesians’ belief in aggressive government action to stabilize the economy is based on value judgments and on the beliefs that (a) macroeconomic fluctuations significantly reduce economic well-being and (b) the government is knowledgeable and capable enough to improve on the free market.
The brief debate between Keynesians and new classical economists in the 1980s was fought primarily over (a) and over the first three tenets of Keynesianism—tenets the monetarists had accepted. New classicals believed that anticipated changes in the money supply do not affect real output; that markets, even the labor market, adjust quickly to eliminate shortages and surpluses; and that business cycles may be efficient. For reasons that will be made clear below, I believe that the “objective” scientific evidence on these matters points strongly in the Keynesian direction. In the 1990s, the new classical schools also came to accept the view that prices are sticky and that, therefore, the labor market does not adjust as quickly as they previously thought (see new classical macroeconomics).
Before leaving the realm of definition, I must underscore several glaring and intentional omissions.
First, I have said nothing about the rational expectations school of thought. Like Keynes himself, many Keynesians doubt that school’s view that people use all available information to form their expectations about economic policy. Other Keynesians accept the view. But when it comes to the large issues with which I have concerned myself, nothing much rides on whether or not expectations are rational. Rational expectations do not, for example, preclude rigid prices; rational expectations models with sticky prices are thoroughly Keynesian by my definition. I should note, though, that some new classicals see rational expectations as much more fundamental to the debate.
The second omission is the hypothesis that there is a “natural rate” of unemployment in the long run. Prior to 1970, Keynesians believed that the long-run level of unemployment depended on government policy, and that the government could achieve a low unemployment rate by accepting a high but steady rate of inflation. In the late 1960s, Milton Friedman, a monetarist, and Columbia’s Edmund Phelps, a Keynesian, rejected the idea of such a long-run trade-off on theoretical grounds. They argued that the only way the government could keep unemployment below what they called the “natural rate” was with macroeconomic policies that would continuously drive inflation higher and higher. In the long run, they argued, the unemployment rate could not be below the natural rate. Shortly thereafter, Keynesians like Northwestern’s Robert Gordon presented empirical evidence for Friedman’s and Phelps’s view. Since about 1972 Keynesians have integrated the “natural rate” of unemployment into their thinking. So the natural rate hypothesis played essentially no role in the intellectual ferment of the 1975–1985 period.
Third, I have ignored the choice between monetary and fiscal policy as the preferred instrument of stabilization policy. Economists differ about this and occasionally change sides. By my definition, however, it is perfectly possible to be a Keynesian and still believe either that responsibility for stabilization policy should, in principle, be ceded to the monetary authority or that it is, in practice, so ceded. In fact, most Keynesians today share one or both of those beliefs.
Keynesian theory was much denigrated in academic circles from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s. It has staged a strong comeback since then, however. The main reason appears to be that Keynesian economics was better able to explain the economic events of the 1970s and 1980s than its principal intellectual competitor, new classical economics.
True to its classical roots, new classical theory emphasizes the ability of a market economy to cure recessions by downward adjustments in wages and prices. The new classical economists of the mid-1970s attributed economic downturns to people’s misperceptions about what was happening to relative prices (such as real wages). Misperceptions would arise, they argued, if people did not know the current price level or inflation rate. But such misperceptions should be fleeting and surely cannot be large in societies in which price indexes are published monthly and the typical monthly inflation rate is less than 1 percent. Therefore, economic downturns, by the early new classical view, should be mild and brief. Yet, during the 1980s most of the world’s industrial economies endured deep and long recessions. Keynesian economics may be theoretically untidy, but it certainly predicts periods of persistent, involuntary unemployment.
According to the early new classical theorists of the 1970s and 1980s, a correctly perceived decrease in the growth of the money supply should have only small effects, if any, on real output. Yet, when the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England announced that monetary policy would be tightened to fight inflation, and then made good on their promises, severe recessions followed in each country. New classicals might claim that the tightening was unanticipated (because people did not believe what the monetary authorities said). Perhaps it was, in part. But surely the broad contours of the restrictive policies were anticipated, or at least correctly perceived as they unfolded. Old-fashioned Keynesian theory, which says that any monetary restriction is contractionary because firms and individuals are locked into fixed-price contracts, not inflation-adjusted ones, seems more consistent with actual events.
An offshoot of new classical theory formulated by Harvard’s Robert Barro is the idea of debt neutrality (see government debt and deficits). Barro argues that inflation, unemployment, real GNP, and real national saving should not be affected by whether the government finances its spending with high taxes and low deficits or with low taxes and high deficits. Because people are rational, he argues, they will correctly perceive that low taxes and high deficits today must mean higher future taxes for them and their heirs. They will, Barro argues, cut consumption and increase their saving by one dollar for each dollar increase in future tax liabilities. Thus, a rise in private saving should offset any increase in the government’s deficit. Naïve Keynesian analysis, by contrast, sees an increased deficit, with government spending held constant, as an increase in aggregate demand. If, as happened in the United States in the early 1980s, the stimulus to demand is nullified by contractionary monetary policy, real interest rates should rise strongly. There is no reason, in the Keynesian view, to expect the private saving rate to rise.
The massive U.S. tax cuts between 1981 and 1984 provided something approximating a laboratory test of these alternative views. What happened? The private saving rate did not rise. Real interest rates soared. With fiscal stimulus offset by monetary contraction, real GNP growth was approximately unaffected; it grew at about the same rate as it had in the recent past. Again, this all seems more consistent with Keynesian than with new classical theory.
Finally, there was the European depression of the 1980s, the worst since the depression of the 1930s. The Keynesian explanation is straightforward. Governments, led by the British and German central banks, decided to fight inflation with highly restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. The anti-inflation crusade was strengthened by the European monetary system, which, in effect, spread the stern German monetary policy all over Europe. The new classical school has no comparable explanation. New classicals, and conservative economists in general, argue that European governments interfere more heavily in labor markets (with high unemployment benefits, for example, and restrictions on firing workers). But most of these interferences were in place in the early 1970s, when unemployment was extremely low.
Keynesian economics is a theory of total spending in the economy (called aggregate demand) and its effects on output and inflation. Although the term has been used (and abused) to describe many things over the years, six principal tenets seem central to Keynesianism. The first three describe how the economy works.
1. A Keynesian believes that aggregate demand is influenced by a host of economic decisions—both public and private—and sometimes behaves erratically. The public decisions include, most prominently, those on monetary and fiscal (i.e., spending and tax) policies. Some decades ago, economists heatedly debated the relative strengths of monetary and fiscal policies, with some Keynesians arguing that monetary policy is powerless, and some monetarists arguing that fiscal policy is powerless. Both of these are essentially dead issues today. Nearly all Keynesians and monetarists now believe that both fiscal and monetary policies affect aggregate demand. A few economists, however, believe in debt neutrality—the doctrine that substitutions of government borrowing for taxes have no effects on total demand (more on this below).
2. According to Keynesian theory, changes in aggregate demand, whether anticipated or unanticipated, have their greatest short-run effect on real output and employment, not on prices. This idea is portrayed, for example, in phillips curves that show inflation rising only slowly when unemployment falls. Keynesians believe that what is true about the short run cannot necessarily be inferred from what must happen in the long run, and we live in the short run. They often quote Keynes’s famous statement, “In the long run, we are all dead,” to make the point.
Monetary policy can produce real effects on output and employment only if some prices are rigid—if nominal wages (wages in dollars, not in real purchasing power), for example, do not adjust instantly. Otherwise, an injection of new money would change all prices by the same percentage. So Keynesian models generally either assume or try to explain rigid prices or wages. Rationalizing rigid prices is a difficult theoretical problem because, according to standard microeconomic theory, real supplies and demands should not change if all nominal prices rise or fall proportionally.
But Keynesians believe that, because prices are somewhat rigid, fluctuations in any component of spending—consumption, investment, or government expenditures—cause output to fluctuate. If government spending increases, for example, and all other components of spending remain constant, then output will increase. Keynesian models of economic activity also include a so-called multiplier effect; that is, output increases by a multiple of the original change in spending that caused it. Thus, a ten-billion-dollar increase in government spending could cause total output to rise by fifteen billion dollars (a multiplier of 1.5) or by five billion (a multiplier of 0.5). Contrary to what many people believe, Keynesian analysis does not require that the multiplier exceed 1.0. For Keynesian economics to work, however, the multiplier must be greater than zero.
3. Keynesians believe that prices, and especially wages, respond slowly to changes in supply and demand, resulting in periodic shortages and surpluses, especially of labor. Even Milton Friedman acknowledged that “under any conceivable institutional arrangements, and certainly under those that now prevail in the United States, there is only a limited amount of flexibility in prices and wages.”1 In current parlance, that would certainly be called a Keynesian position.
No policy prescriptions follow from these three beliefs alone. And many economists who do not call themselves Keynesian would nevertheless accept the entire list. What distinguishes Keynesians from other economists is their belief in the following three tenets about economic policy.
4. Keynesians do not think that the typical level of unemployment is ideal—partly because unemployment is subject to the caprice of aggregate demand, and partly because they believe that prices adjust only gradually. In fact, Keynesians typically see unemployment as both too high on average and too variable, although they know that rigorous theoretical justification for these positions is hard to come by. Keynesians also feel certain that periods of recession or depression are economic maladies, not, as in real business cycle theory, efficient market responses to unattractive opportunities.
5. Many, but not all, Keynesians advocate activist stabilization policy to reduce the amplitude of the business cycle, which they rank among the most important of all economic problems. Here, however, even some conservative Keynesians part company by doubting either the efficacy of stabilization policy or the wisdom of attempting it.
This does not mean that Keynesians advocate what used to be called fine-tuning—adjusting government spending, taxes, and the money supply every few months to keep the economy at full employment. Almost all economists, including most Keynesians, now believe that the government simply cannot know enough soon enough to fine-tune successfully. Three lags make it unlikely that fine-tuning will work. First, there is a lag between the time that a change in policy is required and the time that the government recognizes this. Second, there is a lag between when the government recognizes that a change in policy is required and when it takes action. In the United States, this lag can be very long for fiscal policy because Congress and the administration must first agree on most changes in spending and taxes. The third lag comes between the time that policy is changed and when the changes affect the economy. This, too, can be many months. Yet many Keynesians still believe that more modest goals for stabilization policy—coarse-tuning, if you will—are not only defensible but sensible. For example, an economist need not have detailed quantitative knowledge of lags to prescribe a dose of expansionary monetary policy when the unemployment rate is very high.
6. Finally, and even less unanimously, some Keynesians are more concerned about combating unemployment than about conquering inflation. They have concluded from the evidence that the costs of low inflation are small. However, there are plenty of anti-inflation Keynesians. Most of the world’s current and past central bankers, for example, merit this title whether they like it or not. Needless to say, views on the relative importance of unemployment and inflation heavily influence the policy advice that economists give and that policymakers accept. Keynesians typically advocate more aggressively expansionist policies than non-Keynesians.
Keynesians’ belief in aggressive government action to stabilize the economy is based on value judgments and on the beliefs that (a) macroeconomic fluctuations significantly reduce economic well-being and (b) the government is knowledgeable and capable enough to improve on the free market.
The brief debate between Keynesians and new classical economists in the 1980s was fought primarily over (a) and over the first three tenets of Keynesianism—tenets the monetarists had accepted. New classicals believed that anticipated changes in the money supply do not affect real output; that markets, even the labor market, adjust quickly to eliminate shortages and surpluses; and that business cycles may be efficient. For reasons that will be made clear below, I believe that the “objective” scientific evidence on these matters points strongly in the Keynesian direction. In the 1990s, the new classical schools also came to accept the view that prices are sticky and that, therefore, the labor market does not adjust as quickly as they previously thought (see new classical macroeconomics).
Before leaving the realm of definition, I must underscore several glaring and intentional omissions.
First, I have said nothing about the rational expectations school of thought. Like Keynes himself, many Keynesians doubt that school’s view that people use all available information to form their expectations about economic policy. Other Keynesians accept the view. But when it comes to the large issues with which I have concerned myself, nothing much rides on whether or not expectations are rational. Rational expectations do not, for example, preclude rigid prices; rational expectations models with sticky prices are thoroughly Keynesian by my definition. I should note, though, that some new classicals see rational expectations as much more fundamental to the debate.
The second omission is the hypothesis that there is a “natural rate” of unemployment in the long run. Prior to 1970, Keynesians believed that the long-run level of unemployment depended on government policy, and that the government could achieve a low unemployment rate by accepting a high but steady rate of inflation. In the late 1960s, Milton Friedman, a monetarist, and Columbia’s Edmund Phelps, a Keynesian, rejected the idea of such a long-run trade-off on theoretical grounds. They argued that the only way the government could keep unemployment below what they called the “natural rate” was with macroeconomic policies that would continuously drive inflation higher and higher. In the long run, they argued, the unemployment rate could not be below the natural rate. Shortly thereafter, Keynesians like Northwestern’s Robert Gordon presented empirical evidence for Friedman’s and Phelps’s view. Since about 1972 Keynesians have integrated the “natural rate” of unemployment into their thinking. So the natural rate hypothesis played essentially no role in the intellectual ferment of the 1975–1985 period.
Third, I have ignored the choice between monetary and fiscal policy as the preferred instrument of stabilization policy. Economists differ about this and occasionally change sides. By my definition, however, it is perfectly possible to be a Keynesian and still believe either that responsibility for stabilization policy should, in principle, be ceded to the monetary authority or that it is, in practice, so ceded. In fact, most Keynesians today share one or both of those beliefs.
Keynesian theory was much denigrated in academic circles from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s. It has staged a strong comeback since then, however. The main reason appears to be that Keynesian economics was better able to explain the economic events of the 1970s and 1980s than its principal intellectual competitor, new classical economics.
True to its classical roots, new classical theory emphasizes the ability of a market economy to cure recessions by downward adjustments in wages and prices. The new classical economists of the mid-1970s attributed economic downturns to people’s misperceptions about what was happening to relative prices (such as real wages). Misperceptions would arise, they argued, if people did not know the current price level or inflation rate. But such misperceptions should be fleeting and surely cannot be large in societies in which price indexes are published monthly and the typical monthly inflation rate is less than 1 percent. Therefore, economic downturns, by the early new classical view, should be mild and brief. Yet, during the 1980s most of the world’s industrial economies endured deep and long recessions. Keynesian economics may be theoretically untidy, but it certainly predicts periods of persistent, involuntary unemployment.
According to the early new classical theorists of the 1970s and 1980s, a correctly perceived decrease in the growth of the money supply should have only small effects, if any, on real output. Yet, when the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England announced that monetary policy would be tightened to fight inflation, and then made good on their promises, severe recessions followed in each country. New classicals might claim that the tightening was unanticipated (because people did not believe what the monetary authorities said). Perhaps it was, in part. But surely the broad contours of the restrictive policies were anticipated, or at least correctly perceived as they unfolded. Old-fashioned Keynesian theory, which says that any monetary restriction is contractionary because firms and individuals are locked into fixed-price contracts, not inflation-adjusted ones, seems more consistent with actual events.
An offshoot of new classical theory formulated by Harvard’s Robert Barro is the idea of debt neutrality (see government debt and deficits). Barro argues that inflation, unemployment, real GNP, and real national saving should not be affected by whether the government finances its spending with high taxes and low deficits or with low taxes and high deficits. Because people are rational, he argues, they will correctly perceive that low taxes and high deficits today must mean higher future taxes for them and their heirs. They will, Barro argues, cut consumption and increase their saving by one dollar for each dollar increase in future tax liabilities. Thus, a rise in private saving should offset any increase in the government’s deficit. Naïve Keynesian analysis, by contrast, sees an increased deficit, with government spending held constant, as an increase in aggregate demand. If, as happened in the United States in the early 1980s, the stimulus to demand is nullified by contractionary monetary policy, real interest rates should rise strongly. There is no reason, in the Keynesian view, to expect the private saving rate to rise.
The massive U.S. tax cuts between 1981 and 1984 provided something approximating a laboratory test of these alternative views. What happened? The private saving rate did not rise. Real interest rates soared. With fiscal stimulus offset by monetary contraction, real GNP growth was approximately unaffected; it grew at about the same rate as it had in the recent past. Again, this all seems more consistent with Keynesian than with new classical theory.
Finally, there was the European depression of the 1980s, the worst since the depression of the 1930s. The Keynesian explanation is straightforward. Governments, led by the British and German central banks, decided to fight inflation with highly restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. The anti-inflation crusade was strengthened by the European monetary system, which, in effect, spread the stern German monetary policy all over Europe. The new classical school has no comparable explanation. New classicals, and conservative economists in general, argue that European governments interfere more heavily in labor markets (with high unemployment benefits, for example, and restrictions on firing workers). But most of these interferences were in place in the early 1970s, when unemployment was extremely low.
KEYNESIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC
KEYNESIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC
Keynesian economics is a theory of total spending in the economy (called aggregate demand) and its effects on output and inflation. Although the term has been used (and abused) to describe many things over the years, six principal tenets seem central to Keynesianism. The first three describe how the economy works.
1. A Keynesian believes that aggregate demand is influenced by a host of economic decisions—both public and private—and sometimes behaves erratically. The public decisions include, most prominently, those on monetary and fiscal (i.e., spending and tax) policies. Some decades ago, economists heatedly debated the relative strengths of monetary and fiscal policies, with some Keynesians arguing that monetary policy is powerless, and some monetarists arguing that fiscal policy is powerless. Both of these are essentially dead issues today. Nearly all Keynesians and monetarists now believe that both fiscal and monetary policies affect aggregate demand. A few economists, however, believe in debt neutrality—the doctrine that substitutions of government borrowing for taxes have no effects on total demand (more on this below).
2. According to Keynesian theory, changes in aggregate demand, whether anticipated or unanticipated, have their greatest short-run effect on real output and employment, not on prices. This idea is portrayed, for example, in phillips curves that show inflation rising only slowly when unemployment falls. Keynesians believe that what is true about the short run cannot necessarily be inferred from what must happen in the long run, and we live in the short run. They often quote Keynes’s famous statement, “In the long run, we are all dead,” to make the point.
Monetary policy can produce real effects on output and employment only if some prices are rigid—if nominal wages (wages in dollars, not in real purchasing power), for example, do not adjust instantly. Otherwise, an injection of new money would change all prices by the same percentage. So Keynesian models generally either assume or try to explain rigid prices or wages. Rationalizing rigid prices is a difficult theoretical problem because, according to standard microeconomic theory, real supplies and demands should not change if all nominal prices rise or fall proportionally.
But Keynesians believe that, because prices are somewhat rigid, fluctuations in any component of spending—consumption, investment, or government expenditures—cause output to fluctuate. If government spending increases, for example, and all other components of spending remain constant, then output will increase. Keynesian models of economic activity also include a so-called multiplier effect; that is, output increases by a multiple of the original change in spending that caused it. Thus, a ten-billion-dollar increase in government spending could cause total output to rise by fifteen billion dollars (a multiplier of 1.5) or by five billion (a multiplier of 0.5). Contrary to what many people believe, Keynesian analysis does not require that the multiplier exceed 1.0. For Keynesian economics to work, however, the multiplier must be greater than zero.
3. Keynesians believe that prices, and especially wages, respond slowly to changes in supply and demand, resulting in periodic shortages and surpluses, especially of labor. Even Milton Friedman acknowledged that “under any conceivable institutional arrangements, and certainly under those that now prevail in the United States, there is only a limited amount of flexibility in prices and wages.”1 In current parlance, that would certainly be called a Keynesian position.
No policy prescriptions follow from these three beliefs alone. And many economists who do not call themselves Keynesian would nevertheless accept the entire list. What distinguishes Keynesians from other economists is their belief in the following three tenets about economic policy.
4. Keynesians do not think that the typical level of unemployment is ideal—partly because unemployment is subject to the caprice of aggregate demand, and partly because they believe that prices adjust only gradually. In fact, Keynesians typically see unemployment as both too high on average and too variable, although they know that rigorous theoretical justification for these positions is hard to come by. Keynesians also feel certain that periods of recession or depression are economic maladies, not, as in real business cycle theory, efficient market responses to unattractive opportunities.
5. Many, but not all, Keynesians advocate activist stabilization policy to reduce the amplitude of the business cycle, which they rank among the most important of all economic problems. Here, however, even some conservative Keynesians part company by doubting either the efficacy of stabilization policy or the wisdom of attempting it.
This does not mean that Keynesians advocate what used to be called fine-tuning—adjusting government spending, taxes, and the money supply every few months to keep the economy at full employment. Almost all economists, including most Keynesians, now believe that the government simply cannot know enough soon enough to fine-tune successfully. Three lags make it unlikely that fine-tuning will work. First, there is a lag between the time that a change in policy is required and the time that the government recognizes this. Second, there is a lag between when the government recognizes that a change in policy is required and when it takes action. In the United States, this lag can be very long for fiscal policy because Congress and the administration must first agree on most changes in spending and taxes. The third lag comes between the time that policy is changed and when the changes affect the economy. This, too, can be many months. Yet many Keynesians still believe that more modest goals for stabilization policy—coarse-tuning, if you will—are not only defensible but sensible. For example, an economist need not have detailed quantitative knowledge of lags to prescribe a dose of expansionary monetary policy when the unemployment rate is very high.
6. Finally, and even less unanimously, some Keynesians are more concerned about combating unemployment than about conquering inflation. They have concluded from the evidence that the costs of low inflation are small. However, there are plenty of anti-inflation Keynesians. Most of the world’s current and past central bankers, for example, merit this title whether they like it or not. Needless to say, views on the relative importance of unemployment and inflation heavily influence the policy advice that economists give and that policymakers accept. Keynesians typically advocate more aggressively expansionist policies than non-Keynesians.
Keynesians’ belief in aggressive government action to stabilize the economy is based on value judgments and on the beliefs that (a) macroeconomic fluctuations significantly reduce economic well-being and (b) the government is knowledgeable and capable enough to improve on the free market.
The brief debate between Keynesians and new classical economists in the 1980s was fought primarily over (a) and over the first three tenets of Keynesianism—tenets the monetarists had accepted. New classicals believed that anticipated changes in the money supply do not affect real output; that markets, even the labor market, adjust quickly to eliminate shortages and surpluses; and that business cycles may be efficient. For reasons that will be made clear below, I believe that the “objective” scientific evidence on these matters points strongly in the Keynesian direction. In the 1990s, the new classical schools also came to accept the view that prices are sticky and that, therefore, the labor market does not adjust as quickly as they previously thought (see new classical macroeconomics).
Before leaving the realm of definition, I must underscore several glaring and intentional omissions.
First, I have said nothing about the rational expectations school of thought. Like Keynes himself, many Keynesians doubt that school’s view that people use all available information to form their expectations about economic policy. Other Keynesians accept the view. But when it comes to the large issues with which I have concerned myself, nothing much rides on whether or not expectations are rational. Rational expectations do not, for example, preclude rigid prices; rational expectations models with sticky prices are thoroughly Keynesian by my definition. I should note, though, that some new classicals see rational expectations as much more fundamental to the debate.
The second omission is the hypothesis that there is a “natural rate” of unemployment in the long run. Prior to 1970, Keynesians believed that the long-run level of unemployment depended on government policy, and that the government could achieve a low unemployment rate by accepting a high but steady rate of inflation. In the late 1960s, Milton Friedman, a monetarist, and Columbia’s Edmund Phelps, a Keynesian, rejected the idea of such a long-run trade-off on theoretical grounds. They argued that the only way the government could keep unemployment below what they called the “natural rate” was with macroeconomic policies that would continuously drive inflation higher and higher. In the long run, they argued, the unemployment rate could not be below the natural rate. Shortly thereafter, Keynesians like Northwestern’s Robert Gordon presented empirical evidence for Friedman’s and Phelps’s view. Since about 1972 Keynesians have integrated the “natural rate” of unemployment into their thinking. So the natural rate hypothesis played essentially no role in the intellectual ferment of the 1975–1985 period.
Third, I have ignored the choice between monetary and fiscal policy as the preferred instrument of stabilization policy. Economists differ about this and occasionally change sides. By my definition, however, it is perfectly possible to be a Keynesian and still believe either that responsibility for stabilization policy should, in principle, be ceded to the monetary authority or that it is, in practice, so ceded. In fact, most Keynesians today share one or both of those beliefs.
Keynesian theory was much denigrated in academic circles from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s. It has staged a strong comeback since then, however. The main reason appears to be that Keynesian economics was better able to explain the economic events of the 1970s and 1980s than its principal intellectual competitor, new classical economics.
True to its classical roots, new classical theory emphasizes the ability of a market economy to cure recessions by downward adjustments in wages and prices. The new classical economists of the mid-1970s attributed economic downturns to people’s misperceptions about what was happening to relative prices (such as real wages). Misperceptions would arise, they argued, if people did not know the current price level or inflation rate. But such misperceptions should be fleeting and surely cannot be large in societies in which price indexes are published monthly and the typical monthly inflation rate is less than 1 percent. Therefore, economic downturns, by the early new classical view, should be mild and brief. Yet, during the 1980s most of the world’s industrial economies endured deep and long recessions. Keynesian economics may be theoretically untidy, but it certainly predicts periods of persistent, involuntary unemployment.
According to the early new classical theorists of the 1970s and 1980s, a correctly perceived decrease in the growth of the money supply should have only small effects, if any, on real output. Yet, when the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England announced that monetary policy would be tightened to fight inflation, and then made good on their promises, severe recessions followed in each country. New classicals might claim that the tightening was unanticipated (because people did not believe what the monetary authorities said). Perhaps it was, in part. But surely the broad contours of the restrictive policies were anticipated, or at least correctly perceived as they unfolded. Old-fashioned Keynesian theory, which says that any monetary restriction is contractionary because firms and individuals are locked into fixed-price contracts, not inflation-adjusted ones, seems more consistent with actual events.
An offshoot of new classical theory formulated by Harvard’s Robert Barro is the idea of debt neutrality (see government debt and deficits). Barro argues that inflation, unemployment, real GNP, and real national saving should not be affected by whether the government finances its spending with high taxes and low deficits or with low taxes and high deficits. Because people are rational, he argues, they will correctly perceive that low taxes and high deficits today must mean higher future taxes for them and their heirs. They will, Barro argues, cut consumption and increase their saving by one dollar for each dollar increase in future tax liabilities. Thus, a rise in private saving should offset any increase in the government’s deficit. Naïve Keynesian analysis, by contrast, sees an increased deficit, with government spending held constant, as an increase in aggregate demand. If, as happened in the United States in the early 1980s, the stimulus to demand is nullified by contractionary monetary policy, real interest rates should rise strongly. There is no reason, in the Keynesian view, to expect the private saving rate to rise.
The massive U.S. tax cuts between 1981 and 1984 provided something approximating a laboratory test of these alternative views. What happened? The private saving rate did not rise. Real interest rates soared. With fiscal stimulus offset by monetary contraction, real GNP growth was approximately unaffected; it grew at about the same rate as it had in the recent past. Again, this all seems more consistent with Keynesian than with new classical theory.
Finally, there was the European depression of the 1980s, the worst since the depression of the 1930s. The Keynesian explanation is straightforward. Governments, led by the British and German central banks, decided to fight inflation with highly restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. The anti-inflation crusade was strengthened by the European monetary system, which, in effect, spread the stern German monetary policy all over Europe. The new classical school has no comparable explanation. New classicals, and conservative economists in general, argue that European governments interfere more heavily in labor markets (with high unemployment benefits, for example, and restrictions on firing workers). But most of these interferences were in place in the early 1970s, when unemployment was extremely low.
Keynesian economics is a theory of total spending in the economy (called aggregate demand) and its effects on output and inflation. Although the term has been used (and abused) to describe many things over the years, six principal tenets seem central to Keynesianism. The first three describe how the economy works.
1. A Keynesian believes that aggregate demand is influenced by a host of economic decisions—both public and private—and sometimes behaves erratically. The public decisions include, most prominently, those on monetary and fiscal (i.e., spending and tax) policies. Some decades ago, economists heatedly debated the relative strengths of monetary and fiscal policies, with some Keynesians arguing that monetary policy is powerless, and some monetarists arguing that fiscal policy is powerless. Both of these are essentially dead issues today. Nearly all Keynesians and monetarists now believe that both fiscal and monetary policies affect aggregate demand. A few economists, however, believe in debt neutrality—the doctrine that substitutions of government borrowing for taxes have no effects on total demand (more on this below).
2. According to Keynesian theory, changes in aggregate demand, whether anticipated or unanticipated, have their greatest short-run effect on real output and employment, not on prices. This idea is portrayed, for example, in phillips curves that show inflation rising only slowly when unemployment falls. Keynesians believe that what is true about the short run cannot necessarily be inferred from what must happen in the long run, and we live in the short run. They often quote Keynes’s famous statement, “In the long run, we are all dead,” to make the point.
Monetary policy can produce real effects on output and employment only if some prices are rigid—if nominal wages (wages in dollars, not in real purchasing power), for example, do not adjust instantly. Otherwise, an injection of new money would change all prices by the same percentage. So Keynesian models generally either assume or try to explain rigid prices or wages. Rationalizing rigid prices is a difficult theoretical problem because, according to standard microeconomic theory, real supplies and demands should not change if all nominal prices rise or fall proportionally.
But Keynesians believe that, because prices are somewhat rigid, fluctuations in any component of spending—consumption, investment, or government expenditures—cause output to fluctuate. If government spending increases, for example, and all other components of spending remain constant, then output will increase. Keynesian models of economic activity also include a so-called multiplier effect; that is, output increases by a multiple of the original change in spending that caused it. Thus, a ten-billion-dollar increase in government spending could cause total output to rise by fifteen billion dollars (a multiplier of 1.5) or by five billion (a multiplier of 0.5). Contrary to what many people believe, Keynesian analysis does not require that the multiplier exceed 1.0. For Keynesian economics to work, however, the multiplier must be greater than zero.
3. Keynesians believe that prices, and especially wages, respond slowly to changes in supply and demand, resulting in periodic shortages and surpluses, especially of labor. Even Milton Friedman acknowledged that “under any conceivable institutional arrangements, and certainly under those that now prevail in the United States, there is only a limited amount of flexibility in prices and wages.”1 In current parlance, that would certainly be called a Keynesian position.
No policy prescriptions follow from these three beliefs alone. And many economists who do not call themselves Keynesian would nevertheless accept the entire list. What distinguishes Keynesians from other economists is their belief in the following three tenets about economic policy.
4. Keynesians do not think that the typical level of unemployment is ideal—partly because unemployment is subject to the caprice of aggregate demand, and partly because they believe that prices adjust only gradually. In fact, Keynesians typically see unemployment as both too high on average and too variable, although they know that rigorous theoretical justification for these positions is hard to come by. Keynesians also feel certain that periods of recession or depression are economic maladies, not, as in real business cycle theory, efficient market responses to unattractive opportunities.
5. Many, but not all, Keynesians advocate activist stabilization policy to reduce the amplitude of the business cycle, which they rank among the most important of all economic problems. Here, however, even some conservative Keynesians part company by doubting either the efficacy of stabilization policy or the wisdom of attempting it.
This does not mean that Keynesians advocate what used to be called fine-tuning—adjusting government spending, taxes, and the money supply every few months to keep the economy at full employment. Almost all economists, including most Keynesians, now believe that the government simply cannot know enough soon enough to fine-tune successfully. Three lags make it unlikely that fine-tuning will work. First, there is a lag between the time that a change in policy is required and the time that the government recognizes this. Second, there is a lag between when the government recognizes that a change in policy is required and when it takes action. In the United States, this lag can be very long for fiscal policy because Congress and the administration must first agree on most changes in spending and taxes. The third lag comes between the time that policy is changed and when the changes affect the economy. This, too, can be many months. Yet many Keynesians still believe that more modest goals for stabilization policy—coarse-tuning, if you will—are not only defensible but sensible. For example, an economist need not have detailed quantitative knowledge of lags to prescribe a dose of expansionary monetary policy when the unemployment rate is very high.
6. Finally, and even less unanimously, some Keynesians are more concerned about combating unemployment than about conquering inflation. They have concluded from the evidence that the costs of low inflation are small. However, there are plenty of anti-inflation Keynesians. Most of the world’s current and past central bankers, for example, merit this title whether they like it or not. Needless to say, views on the relative importance of unemployment and inflation heavily influence the policy advice that economists give and that policymakers accept. Keynesians typically advocate more aggressively expansionist policies than non-Keynesians.
Keynesians’ belief in aggressive government action to stabilize the economy is based on value judgments and on the beliefs that (a) macroeconomic fluctuations significantly reduce economic well-being and (b) the government is knowledgeable and capable enough to improve on the free market.
The brief debate between Keynesians and new classical economists in the 1980s was fought primarily over (a) and over the first three tenets of Keynesianism—tenets the monetarists had accepted. New classicals believed that anticipated changes in the money supply do not affect real output; that markets, even the labor market, adjust quickly to eliminate shortages and surpluses; and that business cycles may be efficient. For reasons that will be made clear below, I believe that the “objective” scientific evidence on these matters points strongly in the Keynesian direction. In the 1990s, the new classical schools also came to accept the view that prices are sticky and that, therefore, the labor market does not adjust as quickly as they previously thought (see new classical macroeconomics).
Before leaving the realm of definition, I must underscore several glaring and intentional omissions.
First, I have said nothing about the rational expectations school of thought. Like Keynes himself, many Keynesians doubt that school’s view that people use all available information to form their expectations about economic policy. Other Keynesians accept the view. But when it comes to the large issues with which I have concerned myself, nothing much rides on whether or not expectations are rational. Rational expectations do not, for example, preclude rigid prices; rational expectations models with sticky prices are thoroughly Keynesian by my definition. I should note, though, that some new classicals see rational expectations as much more fundamental to the debate.
The second omission is the hypothesis that there is a “natural rate” of unemployment in the long run. Prior to 1970, Keynesians believed that the long-run level of unemployment depended on government policy, and that the government could achieve a low unemployment rate by accepting a high but steady rate of inflation. In the late 1960s, Milton Friedman, a monetarist, and Columbia’s Edmund Phelps, a Keynesian, rejected the idea of such a long-run trade-off on theoretical grounds. They argued that the only way the government could keep unemployment below what they called the “natural rate” was with macroeconomic policies that would continuously drive inflation higher and higher. In the long run, they argued, the unemployment rate could not be below the natural rate. Shortly thereafter, Keynesians like Northwestern’s Robert Gordon presented empirical evidence for Friedman’s and Phelps’s view. Since about 1972 Keynesians have integrated the “natural rate” of unemployment into their thinking. So the natural rate hypothesis played essentially no role in the intellectual ferment of the 1975–1985 period.
Third, I have ignored the choice between monetary and fiscal policy as the preferred instrument of stabilization policy. Economists differ about this and occasionally change sides. By my definition, however, it is perfectly possible to be a Keynesian and still believe either that responsibility for stabilization policy should, in principle, be ceded to the monetary authority or that it is, in practice, so ceded. In fact, most Keynesians today share one or both of those beliefs.
Keynesian theory was much denigrated in academic circles from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s. It has staged a strong comeback since then, however. The main reason appears to be that Keynesian economics was better able to explain the economic events of the 1970s and 1980s than its principal intellectual competitor, new classical economics.
True to its classical roots, new classical theory emphasizes the ability of a market economy to cure recessions by downward adjustments in wages and prices. The new classical economists of the mid-1970s attributed economic downturns to people’s misperceptions about what was happening to relative prices (such as real wages). Misperceptions would arise, they argued, if people did not know the current price level or inflation rate. But such misperceptions should be fleeting and surely cannot be large in societies in which price indexes are published monthly and the typical monthly inflation rate is less than 1 percent. Therefore, economic downturns, by the early new classical view, should be mild and brief. Yet, during the 1980s most of the world’s industrial economies endured deep and long recessions. Keynesian economics may be theoretically untidy, but it certainly predicts periods of persistent, involuntary unemployment.
According to the early new classical theorists of the 1970s and 1980s, a correctly perceived decrease in the growth of the money supply should have only small effects, if any, on real output. Yet, when the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England announced that monetary policy would be tightened to fight inflation, and then made good on their promises, severe recessions followed in each country. New classicals might claim that the tightening was unanticipated (because people did not believe what the monetary authorities said). Perhaps it was, in part. But surely the broad contours of the restrictive policies were anticipated, or at least correctly perceived as they unfolded. Old-fashioned Keynesian theory, which says that any monetary restriction is contractionary because firms and individuals are locked into fixed-price contracts, not inflation-adjusted ones, seems more consistent with actual events.
An offshoot of new classical theory formulated by Harvard’s Robert Barro is the idea of debt neutrality (see government debt and deficits). Barro argues that inflation, unemployment, real GNP, and real national saving should not be affected by whether the government finances its spending with high taxes and low deficits or with low taxes and high deficits. Because people are rational, he argues, they will correctly perceive that low taxes and high deficits today must mean higher future taxes for them and their heirs. They will, Barro argues, cut consumption and increase their saving by one dollar for each dollar increase in future tax liabilities. Thus, a rise in private saving should offset any increase in the government’s deficit. Naïve Keynesian analysis, by contrast, sees an increased deficit, with government spending held constant, as an increase in aggregate demand. If, as happened in the United States in the early 1980s, the stimulus to demand is nullified by contractionary monetary policy, real interest rates should rise strongly. There is no reason, in the Keynesian view, to expect the private saving rate to rise.
The massive U.S. tax cuts between 1981 and 1984 provided something approximating a laboratory test of these alternative views. What happened? The private saving rate did not rise. Real interest rates soared. With fiscal stimulus offset by monetary contraction, real GNP growth was approximately unaffected; it grew at about the same rate as it had in the recent past. Again, this all seems more consistent with Keynesian than with new classical theory.
Finally, there was the European depression of the 1980s, the worst since the depression of the 1930s. The Keynesian explanation is straightforward. Governments, led by the British and German central banks, decided to fight inflation with highly restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. The anti-inflation crusade was strengthened by the European monetary system, which, in effect, spread the stern German monetary policy all over Europe. The new classical school has no comparable explanation. New classicals, and conservative economists in general, argue that European governments interfere more heavily in labor markets (with high unemployment benefits, for example, and restrictions on firing workers). But most of these interferences were in place in the early 1970s, when unemployment was extremely low.
ABA WOMEN RIOT OF 1929
ABA WOMEN RIOT OF 1929
The single road leading to this community that in 1929, produced some heroines
of Nigeria’s anti- colonial struggle, remains unmotorable while the few primary
schools in the place reminds the visitor of the Hobesian state of nature, with their
dirty and busy surroundings and the children who were literately forced to line up
in the hot sun this Thursday afternoon, May 7, to wave to the visitors, wore rags
as uniforms, with many of them on bare foot.
Nchara which shares boundaries with the Ngwa people of Abia state on its North-
West and the Anangs of Akwa Ibom state, on its Southern part,occupies a pride
of place in almost every history book that chronicles the Nigerian political
development, at least between 1914 and 1960.
It is from this community which is described by one of its sons, as having a “fair
topography but a rich soil” which produces more than a quarter of the food stuff,
especially cassava, consumed by Abians, that a group of women, led by the very
courageous IKONNA NWANYIUKWU ENYIA, confronted their Warrant Chief,
OKEUGU, who dared to enforce the obnoxious law then by the colonial masters,
that women should start paying taxes, like their husbands.
That confrontation led to what is there after referred to in Nigerian history cum
political Science books, as the ABA WOMEN RIOT OF 1929.
Though the heroic struggle of Madam Ikonna and her compatriots which led to the
abrogation of that unfair piece of law, not only in Igbo land but in other parts of
colonial Nigeria, is only given a footnote in most books that records it, the effort of
these heroines of the peoples war have never been adequately honored by the
Nigerian state.
More painful too, is the fact that historians or chroniclers of that part of our
National history have never taken time to correct the several distortions that have
been associated with the Nchrara women’s confrontation of the dreaded Warrant
Chief and the District Head (DH).
For instance, that act of valour by Madam Ikonna and her colleagues continues to
wear the wrong tag, “Aba Women Riot” when the scene of action was never in Aba
Again, no effort has been made to record for generations unborn, other struggles
waged by Nchara/Oloko women under the leadership of Ikonna, nor is there any
account of the historical background of the lady warrior and up till now, nothing
has been done either by Ikwuana Council Area, the Abia state or federal
Governments of Nigeria to honuor or immortalize this great women whose patriotic
zeal, courage and acts of valour must have inspired and influenced such other
female Nationalists as Margaret Ekpo, Chief Mrs Funmilayo Ransom Kuti, Hajia
Gambo Sawaba, among others, who came after her, to join the struggle against
socio, political and economic oppressors in Nigeria.
Madam Ikonna, born in 1877, into the family of Mazi Orji Onwuama Onyeukwu
from Oloko Village but got married to the family of Enyia, Ndiokpolu Akanu
Achara, in Oloko Clan of the old Bende Division of what is now known as Abia
state
A very beautiful woman in her youth, Ikonna was said to have been so loved by her
father that he gave her the name, (Ikonna), meaning her father’s heart throb
because she had so much resemblance with him.
Again, her beauty, strength and fearlessness, became for her as a young girl,
sources of disadvantage. Going by the belief then that the Whiteman’s education
was meant for only Lazy male children, coupled with the fact that her no nonsense
attitude could lead her into trouble that may result in her being sold into slavery,
forced her parents not to allow her venture into acquiring what she herself was
later to tag the “White man’s staff” (Western education).
But her educational disadvantage did not prevent her from getting married to Mazi
Enyia Mgbudu of Umu Okengoegbe, Obewon Amahia, to whom she bore four
children, a girl and three boys. As a young woman, Ikonna had both the leadership
qualities and militant disposition to organize the women of Nchara, Oloko clan, for
positive action against societal ills.
So in 1929 when Chief Okeugo, the Warrant Chief of Oloko, in obedience to the
wishes of the colonial masters, broke the sad news that women should start
paying tax, Ikonna mobilized the women folk to confront the authorities.
She went beyond her immediate Nchara community, to Umugo, Ahaba, Usaka
Eleogu, Azuiyi, Obeahia, Amizi and Awomuku, all neighboring communities within
Oloko clan, to mobilize women for a protest match against the tax law and that
protest was said to have taken the women, who were in Unclothedness, except the local
Akori leaf they used in covering their women hood, to the residence of the District
Head whose name was given as Captain Hill.
At Chief Okeugo’s house, Ikonna was said to have personally charged at the man,
pushing him around and removing his cap. Also at the District Head’s house,
Ikonna and her protesting colleagues, also had a brush with the guard (Cotuma)
who they subdued. She was however arrested and detained by the colonial
authorities over the protests and later prosecuted by acommission of enquiry set
up for that purpose by the colonial authorities but that did not deter her from
engaging in further protests years after.
In 1957, that is 28 years after the “Aba Women” riot. Ikonna led yet another
women protest against the Eastern Nigerian Government led by late Dr. Nnamdi
Azikwe. This time it was against the government policy of excessive taxation
against the men.
Ikonna and her colleagues had reasoned then that self rule having been achieved
by the Eastern region, the indigenous government had no business imposing
excessive taxes on the citizens. The government saw reasons with her and
relaxed the tax law, but not before warning her not to lead any women unrest
again, before she left Dr. Azikiwe’s office in Enugu .
Two years later, in 1959, the woman was again, up in arms. The Eastern Nigerian
Government had shared a certain food formula among school children which
claimed the lifes of some of them. Ikonna again, led another delegation of women
to Enugu where they demonstrated against the government policy. She was of
course arrested and detained for a couple of days but released because the
government feared that her continued detention could spark off another women
riot.
For a woman who did all these for humanity, it is expected that she should be
honored and the accounts of her acts of valour be given a pride of place. But this
has not been the case.
Apart from the giant seize statue of the woman recently erected by Ikonna’s
ground children and the May 7 visit by representatives of women from Igbo
speaking parts of Nigeria to her grave side, there is nothing to show that once in
this life time, there was a woman known as Ikonna Nwanyiukwu Enyia.
The single road leading to this community that in 1929, produced some heroines
of Nigeria’s anti- colonial struggle, remains unmotorable while the few primary
schools in the place reminds the visitor of the Hobesian state of nature, with their
dirty and busy surroundings and the children who were literately forced to line up
in the hot sun this Thursday afternoon, May 7, to wave to the visitors, wore rags
as uniforms, with many of them on bare foot.
Nchara which shares boundaries with the Ngwa people of Abia state on its North-
West and the Anangs of Akwa Ibom state, on its Southern part,occupies a pride
of place in almost every history book that chronicles the Nigerian political
development, at least between 1914 and 1960.
It is from this community which is described by one of its sons, as having a “fair
topography but a rich soil” which produces more than a quarter of the food stuff,
especially cassava, consumed by Abians, that a group of women, led by the very
courageous IKONNA NWANYIUKWU ENYIA, confronted their Warrant Chief,
OKEUGU, who dared to enforce the obnoxious law then by the colonial masters,
that women should start paying taxes, like their husbands.
That confrontation led to what is there after referred to in Nigerian history cum
political Science books, as the ABA WOMEN RIOT OF 1929.
Though the heroic struggle of Madam Ikonna and her compatriots which led to the
abrogation of that unfair piece of law, not only in Igbo land but in other parts of
colonial Nigeria, is only given a footnote in most books that records it, the effort of
these heroines of the peoples war have never been adequately honored by the
Nigerian state.
More painful too, is the fact that historians or chroniclers of that part of our
National history have never taken time to correct the several distortions that have
been associated with the Nchrara women’s confrontation of the dreaded Warrant
Chief and the District Head (DH).
For instance, that act of valour by Madam Ikonna and her colleagues continues to
wear the wrong tag, “Aba Women Riot” when the scene of action was never in Aba
Again, no effort has been made to record for generations unborn, other struggles
waged by Nchara/Oloko women under the leadership of Ikonna, nor is there any
account of the historical background of the lady warrior and up till now, nothing
has been done either by Ikwuana Council Area, the Abia state or federal
Governments of Nigeria to honuor or immortalize this great women whose patriotic
zeal, courage and acts of valour must have inspired and influenced such other
female Nationalists as Margaret Ekpo, Chief Mrs Funmilayo Ransom Kuti, Hajia
Gambo Sawaba, among others, who came after her, to join the struggle against
socio, political and economic oppressors in Nigeria.
Madam Ikonna, born in 1877, into the family of Mazi Orji Onwuama Onyeukwu
from Oloko Village but got married to the family of Enyia, Ndiokpolu Akanu
Achara, in Oloko Clan of the old Bende Division of what is now known as Abia
state
A very beautiful woman in her youth, Ikonna was said to have been so loved by her
father that he gave her the name, (Ikonna), meaning her father’s heart throb
because she had so much resemblance with him.
Again, her beauty, strength and fearlessness, became for her as a young girl,
sources of disadvantage. Going by the belief then that the Whiteman’s education
was meant for only Lazy male children, coupled with the fact that her no nonsense
attitude could lead her into trouble that may result in her being sold into slavery,
forced her parents not to allow her venture into acquiring what she herself was
later to tag the “White man’s staff” (Western education).
But her educational disadvantage did not prevent her from getting married to Mazi
Enyia Mgbudu of Umu Okengoegbe, Obewon Amahia, to whom she bore four
children, a girl and three boys. As a young woman, Ikonna had both the leadership
qualities and militant disposition to organize the women of Nchara, Oloko clan, for
positive action against societal ills.
So in 1929 when Chief Okeugo, the Warrant Chief of Oloko, in obedience to the
wishes of the colonial masters, broke the sad news that women should start
paying tax, Ikonna mobilized the women folk to confront the authorities.
She went beyond her immediate Nchara community, to Umugo, Ahaba, Usaka
Eleogu, Azuiyi, Obeahia, Amizi and Awomuku, all neighboring communities within
Oloko clan, to mobilize women for a protest match against the tax law and that
protest was said to have taken the women, who were in Unclothedness, except the local
Akori leaf they used in covering their women hood, to the residence of the District
Head whose name was given as Captain Hill.
At Chief Okeugo’s house, Ikonna was said to have personally charged at the man,
pushing him around and removing his cap. Also at the District Head’s house,
Ikonna and her protesting colleagues, also had a brush with the guard (Cotuma)
who they subdued. She was however arrested and detained by the colonial
authorities over the protests and later prosecuted by acommission of enquiry set
up for that purpose by the colonial authorities but that did not deter her from
engaging in further protests years after.
In 1957, that is 28 years after the “Aba Women” riot. Ikonna led yet another
women protest against the Eastern Nigerian Government led by late Dr. Nnamdi
Azikwe. This time it was against the government policy of excessive taxation
against the men.
Ikonna and her colleagues had reasoned then that self rule having been achieved
by the Eastern region, the indigenous government had no business imposing
excessive taxes on the citizens. The government saw reasons with her and
relaxed the tax law, but not before warning her not to lead any women unrest
again, before she left Dr. Azikiwe’s office in Enugu .
Two years later, in 1959, the woman was again, up in arms. The Eastern Nigerian
Government had shared a certain food formula among school children which
claimed the lifes of some of them. Ikonna again, led another delegation of women
to Enugu where they demonstrated against the government policy. She was of
course arrested and detained for a couple of days but released because the
government feared that her continued detention could spark off another women
riot.
For a woman who did all these for humanity, it is expected that she should be
honored and the accounts of her acts of valour be given a pride of place. But this
has not been the case.
Apart from the giant seize statue of the woman recently erected by Ikonna’s
ground children and the May 7 visit by representatives of women from Igbo
speaking parts of Nigeria to her grave side, there is nothing to show that once in
this life time, there was a woman known as Ikonna Nwanyiukwu Enyia.
Thursday, 18 August 2016
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRACY
Democracy, (from Greek: "δημοκρατία") or "rule of the commoners", was originally conceived in Classical Greece, whereby political representatives were chosen by lot (as in a jury) from amongst the male citizens: rich and poor. In modern times it has become equated to elections or "a system of government in which all the people of a state or polity....elect representatives to a parliament or similar assembly", as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary.[1] Democracy is further defined as (a:) "government by the people; especially : rule of the majority (b:) "a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation ...."[2]
The American Founding Fathers rejected 'democracy' as defined by the Greeks, preferring instead 'a natural aristocracy',[3] whereby only the landed gentry were entitled to a place in Congress. The Americans, as with the English, took their cue from the Roman republic model: only the patrician classes were involved in government. As such, many people today, including academics, have come to understand democracy in terms of elections, rather than selection by lot. For example, according to political scientist Larry Diamond, it consists of four key elements: (a) A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections; (b) The active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; (c) Protection of the human rights of all citizens, and (d) A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.[4]
In the 5th century BC, to denote the political systems then existing in Greek city-states, notably Athens, the term is an antonym to ἀριστοκρατία (aristokratía) "rule of an elite". While theoretically these definitions are in opposition, in practice the distinction has been blurred historically.[5] The political system of Classical Athens, for example, granted democratic citizenship to free men and excluded slaves and women from political participation. In virtually all democratic governments throughout ancient and modern history, democratic citizenship consisted of an elite class until full enfranchisement was won for all adult citizens in most modern democracies through the suffrage movements of the 19th and 20th centuries. The English word dates to the 16th century, from the older Middle French and Middle Latin equivalents.
Democracy contrasts with forms of government where power is either held by an individual, as in an absolute monarchy, or where power is held by a small number of individuals, as in an oligarchy. Nevertheless, these oppositions, inherited from Greek philosophy,[6] are now ambiguous because contemporary governments have mixed democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic elements. Karl Popper defined democracy in contrast to dictatorship or tyranny, thus focusing on opportunities for the people to control their leaders and to oust them without the need for a revolution.[7]
Contents [hide]
1 Characteristics
2 History 2.1 Ancient origins
2.2 Middle Ages
2.3 Modern era 2.3.1 Early modern period
2.3.2 18th and 19th centuries
2.3.3 20th and 21st centuries
3 Measurement of democracy
4 Types of democracies 4.1 Basic forms 4.1.1 Direct
4.1.2 Representative 4.1.2.1 Parliamentary
4.1.2.2 Presidential
4.1.3 Hybrid or semi-direct
4.2 Variants 4.2.1 Constitutional monarchy
4.2.2 Republic
4.2.3 Liberal democracy
4.2.4 Socialist
4.2.5 Anarchist
4.2.6 Sortition
4.2.7 Consociational
4.2.8 Consensus democracy
4.2.9 Supranational
4.2.10 Inclusive
4.2.11 Participatory politics
4.2.12 Cosmopolitan
4.2.13 Creative Democracy
4.3 Non-governmental
5 Theory 5.1 Aristotle
5.2 Rationale 5.2.1 Aggregative
5.2.2 Deliberative
5.2.3 Radical
5.3 Criticism 5.3.1 Inefficiencies
5.3.2 Popular rule as a façade
5.3.3 Mob rule
5.3.4 Political instability
5.3.5 Fraudulent elections
5.3.6 Opposition
6 Development
7 See also
8 References
9 Further reading
10 External links
Characteristics[edit]
No consensus exists on how to define democracy, but legal equality, political freedom and rule of law have been identified as important characteristics.[8][9] These principles are reflected in all eligible citizens being equal before the law and having equal access to legislative processes. For example, in a representative democracy, every vote has equal weight, no unreasonable restrictions can apply to anyone seeking to become a representative,[according to whom?] and the freedom of its eligible citizens is secured by legitimised rights and liberties which are typically protected by a constitution.[10][11] Other uses of "democracy" include that of direct democracy.
One theory holds that democracy requires three fundamental principles: (1) upward control, i.e. sovereignty residing at the lowest levels of authority, (2) political equality, and (3) social norms by which individuals and institutions only consider acceptable acts that reflect the first two principles of upward control and political equality.[12]
The term "democracy" is sometimes used as shorthand for liberal democracy, which is a variant of representative democracy that may include elements such as political pluralism; equality before the law; the right to petition elected officials for redress of grievances; due process; civil liberties; human rights; and elements of civil society outside the government.[citation needed] Roger Scruton argues that democracy alone cannot provide personal and political freedom unless the institutions of civil society are also present.[13]
In some countries, notably in the United Kingdom which originated the Westminster system, the dominant principle is that of parliamentary sovereignty, while maintaining judicial independence.[14][15] In the United States, separation of powers is often cited as a central attribute. In India, parliamentary sovereignty is subject to the Constitution of India which includes judicial review.[16] Though the term "democracy" is typically used in the context of a political state, the principles also are applicable to private organisations.
Majority rule is often listed as a characteristic of democracy. Hence, democracy allows for political minorities to be oppressed by the "tyranny of the majority" in the absence of legal protections of individual or group rights. An essential part of an "ideal" representative democracy is competitive elections that are substantively and procedurally "fair," i.e., just and equitable. In some countries, freedom of political expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press are considered important to ensure that voters are well informed enabling them to vote according to their own interests.[17][18]
It has also been suggested that a basic feature of democracy is the capacity of all voters to participate freely and fully in the life of their society.[19] With its emphasis on notions of social contract and the collective will of all the voters, democracy can also be characterised as a form of political collectivism because it is defined as a form of government in which all eligible citizens have an equal say in lawmaking.[20]
While representative democracy is sometimes equated with the republican form of government, the term "republic" classically has encompassed both democracies and aristocracies.[21][22] Many democracies are constitutional monarchies, such as the United Kingdom.
History[edit]
Main article: History of democracy
Ancient origins[edit]
See also: Athenian democracy
Cleisthenes, "father of Athenian democracy", modern bust
The term "democracy" first appeared in ancient Greek political and philosophical thought in the city-state of Athens during classical antiquity.[23][24] Led by Cleisthenes, Athenians established what is generally held as the first democracy in 508–507 BC. Cleisthenes is referred to as "the father of Athenian democracy."[25]
Athenian democracy took the form of a direct democracy, and it had two distinguishing features: the random selection of ordinary citizens to fill the few existing government administrative and judicial offices,[26] and a legislative assembly consisting of all Athenian citizens.[27] All eligible citizens were allowed to speak and vote in the assembly, which set the laws of the city state. However, Athenian citizenship excluded women, slaves, foreigners (μέτοικοι / métoikoi), non-landowners, and males under 20 years old.[citation needed][contradictory]
Of the estimated 200,000 to 400,000 inhabitants of Athens, there were between 30,000 and 60,000 citizens.[citation needed] The exclusion of large parts of the population from the citizen body is closely related to the ancient understanding of citizenship. In most of antiquity the benefit of citizenship was tied to the obligation to fight war campaigns.[28]
Athenian democracy was not only direct in the sense that decisions were made by the assembled people, but also the most direct in the sense that the people through the assembly, boule and courts of law controlled the entire political process and a large proportion of citizens were involved constantly in the public business.[29] Even though the rights of the individual were not secured by the Athenian constitution in the modern sense (the ancient Greeks had no word for "rights"[30]), the Athenians enjoyed their liberties not in opposition to the government but by living in a city that was not subject to another power and by not being subjects themselves to the rule of another person.[31]
Range voting appeared in Sparta as early as 700 BC. The Apella was an assembly of the people, held once a month, in which every male citizen of age 30 and above could participate. In the Apella, Spartans elected leaders and cast votes by range voting and shouting. Aristotle called this "childish", as compared with the stone voting ballots used by the Athenians. Sparta adopted it because of its simplicity, and to prevent any bias voting, buying, or cheating that was predominant in the early democratic elections.[32][33]
Even though the Roman Republic contributed significantly to many aspects of democracy, only a minority of Romans were citizens with votes in elections for representatives. The votes of the powerful were given more weight through a system of gerrymandering, so most high officials, including members of the Senate, came from a few wealthy and noble families.[34] In addition, the Roman Republic was the first government in the western world to have a Republic as a nation-state, although it didn't have much of a democracy. The Romans invented the concept of classics and many works from Ancient Greece were preserved.[35] Additionally, the Roman model of governance inspired many political thinkers over the centuries,[36] and today's modern representative democracies imitate more the Roman than the Greek models because it was a state in which supreme power was held by the people and their elected representatives, and which had an elected or nominated leader.[37] Other cultures, such as the Iroquoi Nation in the Americas between around 1450 and 1600 AD also developed a form of democratic society before they came in contact with the Europeans. This indicates that forms of democracy may have been invented in other societies around the world.
Middle Ages[edit]
During the Middle Ages, there were various systems involving elections or assemblies, although often only involving a small part of the population. These included:
the Frostating in Norway,
the Althing in Iceland,
the Løgting in the Faeroe Islands,
Scandinavian Things,
the election of Uthman in the Rashidun Caliphate,
the South Indian Kingdom of the Chola in the state of Tamil Nadu in the Indian Subcontinent had an electoral system at 920 A.D., about 1100 years ago,[38]
Carantania, old Slavic/Slovenian principality, the Ducal Inauguration from 7th to 15th century,
the upper-caste election of the Gopala in the Bengal region of the Indian Subcontinent,
the Holy Roman Empire's Hoftag and Imperial Diets (mostly Nobles and Clergy),
Frisia in the 10th-15th Century (Weight of vote based on landownership)
the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (10% of population),
certain medieval Italian city-states such as Venice, Genoa, Florence, Pisa, Lucca, Amalfi, Siena and San Marino
the tuatha system in early medieval Ireland,
the Veche in Novgorod and Pskov Republics of medieval Russia,
The States in Tirol and Switzerland,
the autonomous merchant city of Sakai in the 16th century in Japan,
Volta-Nigeric societies such as Igbo.
the Mekhk-Khel system of the Nakh peoples of the North Caucasus, by which representatives to the Council of Elders for each teip (clan) were popularly elected by that teip's members.
The 10th Sikh Guru Gobind Singh ji (Nanak X) established the world's first Sikh democratic republic state ending the aristocracy on day of 1st Vasakh 1699 and Gurbani as sole constitution of this Sikh republic on the Indian subcontinent.[citation needed]
Most regions in medieval Europe were ruled by clergy or feudal lords.
The Kouroukan Fouga divided the Mali Empire into ruling clans (lineages) that were represented at a great assembly called the Gbara. However, the charter made Mali more similar to a constitutional monarchy than a democratic republic. A little closer to modern democracy were the Cossack republics of Ukraine in the 16th and 17th centuries: Cossack Hetmanate and Zaporizhian Sich. The highest post – the Hetman – was elected by the representatives from the country's districts.
Magna Carta, 1215, England
The Parliament of England had its roots in the restrictions on the power of kings written into Magna Carta (1215), which explicitly protected certain rights of the King's subjects and implicitly supported what became the English writ of habeas corpus, safeguarding individual freedom against unlawful imprisonment with right to appeal.[39][40] The first representative national assembly in England was Simon de Montfort's Parliament in 1265.[41] The emergence of petitioning is some of the earliest evidence of parliament being used as a forum to address the general grievances of ordinary people. However, the power to call parliament remained at the pleasure of the monarch.[42]
Modern era[edit]
Early modern period[edit]
During the early modern period, the power of the Parliament of England continually increased. Passage of the Petition of Right in 1628 and Habeas Corpus Act in 1679 established certain liberties and remain in effect. The idea of a political party took form with groups freely debating rights to political representation during the Putney Debates of 1647. After the English Civil Wars (1642–1651) and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the Bill of Rights was enacted in 1689, which codified certain rights and liberties, and is still in effect. The Bill set out the requirement for regular elections, rules for freedom of speech in Parliament and limited the power of the monarch, ensuring that, unlike much of Europe at the time, royal absolutism would not prevail.[43][44]
In North America, representative government began in Jamestown, Virginia, with the election of the House of Burgesses (forerunner of the Virginia General Assembly) in 1619. English Puritans who migrated from 1620 established colonies in New England whose local governance was democratic and which contributed to the democratic development of the United States;[45] although these local assemblies had some small amounts of devolved power, the ultimate authority was held by the Crown and the English Parliament. The Puritans (Pilgrim Fathers), Baptists, and Quakers who founded these colonies applied the democratic organisation of their congregations also to the administration of their communities in worldly matters.[46][47][48]
18th and 19th centuries[edit]
The establishment of universal male suffrage in France in 1848 was an important milestone in the history of democracy
The first Parliament of Great Britain was established in 1707, after the merger of the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Scotland under the Acts of Union. Although the monarch increasingly became a figurehead,[49] only a small minority actually had a voice; Parliament was elected by only a few percent of the population (less than 3% as late as 1780).[50] During the Age of Liberty in Sweden (1718-1772), civil rights were expanded and power shifted from the monarch to parliament. The taxed peasantry was represented in parliament, although with little influence, but commoners without taxed property had no suffrage.
The creation of the short-lived Corsican Republic in 1755 marked the first nation in modern history to adopt a democratic constitution (all men and women above age of 25 could vote[51]). This Corsican Constitution was the first based on Enlightenment principles and included female suffrage, something that was not granted in most other democracies until the 20th century.
In the American colonial period before 1776, and for some time after, often only adult white male property owners could vote; enslaved Africans, most free black people and most women were not extended the franchise.[52] On the American frontier, democracy became a way of life, with more widespread social, economic and political equality.[53] Although not described as a democracy by the founding fathers,[54] they shared a determination to root the American experiment in the principles of natural freedom and equality.[55]
The American Revolution led to the adoption of the United States Constitution in 1787, the oldest surviving, still active, governmental codified constitution. The Constitution provided for an elected government and protected civil rights and liberties for some, but did not end slavery nor extend voting rights in the United States beyond white male property owners (about 6% of the population).[56] The Bill of Rights in 1791 set limits on government power to protect personal freedoms but had little impact on judgements by the courts for the first 130 years after ratification.[57]
In 1789, Revolutionary France adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and, although short-lived, the National Convention was elected by all males in 1792.[58] However, in the early 19th century, little of democracy - as theory, practice, or even as word - remained in the North Atlantic world.[59]
During this period, slavery remained a social and economic institution in places around the world. This was particularly the case in the eleven states of the American South. A variety of organisations were established advocating the movement of black people from the United States to locations where they would enjoy greater freedom and equality.
The United Kingdom's Slave Trade Act 1807 banned the trade across the British Empire, which was enforced internationally by the Royal Navy under treaties Britain negotiated with other nations.[60] As the voting franchise in the U.K. was increased, it also was made more uniform in a series of reforms beginning with the Reform Act of 1832. In 1833, the United Kingdom passed the Slavery Abolition Act which took effect across the British Empire.
Universal male suffrage was established in France in March 1848 in the wake of the French Revolution of 1848.[61] In 1848, several revolutions broke out in Europe as rulers were confronted with popular demands for liberal constitutions and more democratic government.[62]
In the 1860 United States Census, the slave population in the United States had grown to four million,[63] and in Reconstruction after the Civil War (late 1860s), the newly freed slaves became citizens with a nominal right to vote for men. Full enfranchisement of citizens was not secured until after the African-American Civil Rights Movement (1955–1968) gained passage by the United States Congress of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.[64][65]
20th and 21st centuries[edit]
The number of nations 1800–2003 scoring 8 or higher on Polity IV scale, another widely used measure of democracy
20th-century transitions to liberal democracy have come in successive "waves of democracy", variously resulting from wars, revolutions, decolonisation, and religious and economic circumstances.[66] World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires resulted in the creation of new nation-states from Europe, most of them at least nominally democratic.
In the 1920s democracy flourished and women's suffrage advanced, but the Great Depression brought disenchantment and most of the countries of Europe, Latin America, and Asia turned to strong-man rule or dictatorships. Fascism and dictatorships flourished in Nazi Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal, as well as nondemocratic goverment in the Baltics, the Balkans, Brazil, Cuba, China, and Japan, among others.[67]
World War II brought a definitive reversal of this trend in western Europe. The democratisation of the American, British, and French sectors of occupied Germany (disputed[68]), Austria, Italy, and the occupied Japan served as a model for the later theory of goverment change. However, most of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet sector of Germany fell into the non-democratic Soviet bloc.
The war was followed by decolonisation, and again most of the new independent states had nominally democratic constitutions. India emerged as the world's largest democracy and continues to be so.[69] Countries that were once part of the British Empire often adopted the British Westminster system.[70][71]
By 1960, the vast majority of country-states were nominally democracies, although most of the world's populations lived in nations that experienced sham elections, and other forms of subterfuge (particularly in Communist nations and the former colonies.)
A subsequent wave of democratisation brought substantial gains toward true liberal democracy for many nations. Spain, Portugal (1974), and several of the military dictatorships in South America returned to civilian rule in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Argentina in 1983, Bolivia, Uruguay in 1984, Brazil in 1985, and Chile in the early 1990s). This was followed by nations in East and South Asia by the mid-to-late 1980s.
Economic malaise in the 1980s, along with resentment of Soviet oppression, contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the associated end of the Cold War, and the democratisation and liberalisation of the former Eastern bloc countries. The most successful of the new democracies were those geographically and culturally closest to western Europe, and they are now members or candidate members of the European Union.
The liberal trend spread to some nations in Africa in the 1990s, most prominently in South Africa. Some recent examples of attempts of liberalisation include the Indonesian Revolution of 1998, the Bulldozer Revolution in Yugoslavia, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, and the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia.
According to Freedom House, in 2007 there were 123 electoral democracies (up from 40 in 1972).[72] According to World Forum on Democracy, electoral democracies now represent 120 of the 192 existing countries and constitute 58.2 percent of the world's population. At the same time liberal democracies i.e. countries Freedom House regards as free and respectful of basic human rights and the rule of law are 85 in number and represent 38 percent of the global population.[73]
In 2007 the United Nations declared September 15 the International Day of Democracy.[74]
Measurement of democracy[edit]
Country ratings from Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2016 survey, concerning the state of world freedom in 2015.[75]
Free (86) Partly Free (59) Not Free (50)
Countries designated "electoral democracies" in Freedom House's 2015 survey "Freedom in the World", covering the year 2014.[76]
Several freedom indices are used to measure democracy:
Freedom in the World published each year since 1972 by the U.S.-based Freedom House ranks countries by political rights and civil liberties that are derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Countries are assessed as free, partly free, or unfree.[76]
Worldwide Press Freedom Index is published each year since 2002 (except that 2011 was combined with 2012) by France-based Reporters Without Borders. Countries are assessed as having a good situation, a satisfactory situation, noticeable problems, a difficult situation, or a very serious situation.[77]
Freedom of the Press published each year since 1980 by Freedom House.
The Index of Freedom in the World is an index measuring classical civil liberties published by Canada's Fraser Institute, Germany's Liberales Institute, and the U.S. Cato Institute.[78] It is not currently included in the table below.
The CIRI Human Rights Data Project measures a range of human, civil, women's and workers rights.[79] It is now hosted by the University of Connecticut. It was created in 1994.[80] In its 2011 report, the U.S. was ranked 38th in overall human rights.[81]
The Democracy Index, published by the U.K.-based Economist Intelligence Unit, is an assessment of countries' democracy. Countries are rated to be either Full Democracies, Flawed Democracies, Hybrid Regimes, or Authoritarian regimes. Full democracies, flawed democracies, and hybrid regimes are considered to be democracies, and the authoritarian nations are considered to be dictatorial. The index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories.[82]
The U.S.-based Polity data series is a widely used data series in political science research. It contains coded annual information on regime authority characteristics and transitions for all independent states with greater than 500,000 total population and covers the years 1800–2006. Polity's conclusions about a state's level of democracy are based on an evaluation of that state's elections for competitiveness, openness and level of participation. Data from this series is not currently included in the table below. The Polity work is sponsored by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) which is funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. However, the views expressed in the reports are the authors' alone and do not represent the views of the US Government.
MaxRange, a dataset defining level of democracy and institutional structure(regime-type) on a 100-graded scale where every value represents a unique regime type. Values are sorted from 1-100 based on level of democracy and political accountability. MaxRange defines the value corresponding to all states and every month from 1789 to 2015 and updating. MaxRange is created and developed by Max Range, and is now associated with the university of Halmstad, Sweden.[83]
Types of democracies[edit]
Main article: Types of democracy
Democracy has taken a number of forms, both in theory and practice. Some varieties of democracy provide better representation and more freedom for their citizens than others.[84][85] However, if any democracy is not structured so as to prohibit the government from excluding the people from the legislative process, or any branch of government from altering the separation of powers in its own favour, then a branch of the system can accumulate too much power and destroy the democracy.[86][87][88]
World's states coloured by form of government1
Presidential republics2 Semi-presidential republics2
Republics with an executive president dependent on a parliament Parliamentary republics2
Parliamentary constitutional monarchies Constitutional monarchies in which the monarch personally exercises power
Absolute monarchies One-party states
Countries where constitutional provisions for government have been suspended Countries which do not fit any of the above systems
1This map was compiled according to the Wikipedia list of countries by system of government. See there for sources. 2Several states constitutionally deemed to be multiparty republics are broadly described by outsiders as authoritarian states. This map presents only the de jure form of government, and not the de facto degree of democracy.
The following kinds of democracy are not exclusive of one another: many specify details of aspects that are independent of one another and can co-exist in a single system.
Basic forms[edit]
Several variants of democracy exist, but there are two basic forms, both of which concern how the whole body of all eligible citizens executes its will. One form of democracy is direct democracy, in which all eligible citizens have active participation in the political decision making, for example voting on policy initiatives directly.[89] In most modern democracies, the whole body of eligible citizens remain the sovereign power but political power is exercised indirectly through elected representatives; this is called a representative democracy.
Direct[edit]
A Landsgemeinde (in 2009) of the Canton of Glarus, an example of direct democracy in Switzerland
In Switzerland, without needing to register, every citizen receives ballot papers and information brochures for each vote (and can send it back by post). Switzerland has a direct democracy system and votes are organised about four times a year.
Main article: Direct democracy
Direct democracy is a political system where the citizens participate in the decision-making personally, contrary to relying on intermediaries or representatives. The use of a lot system, a characteristic of Athenian democracy, is unique to direct democracies. In this system, important governmental and administrative tasks are performed by citizens picked from a lottery.[90] A direct democracy gives the voting population the power to:
1.Change constitutional laws,
2.Put forth initiatives, referendums and suggestions for laws,
3.Give binding orders to elective officials, such as revoking them before the end of their elected term, or initiating a lawsuit for breaking a campaign promise.
Within modern-day representative governments, certain electoral tools like referendums, citizens' initiatives and recall elections are referred to as forms of direct democracy.[91] Direct democracy as a government system currently only exists in the Swiss cantons of Appenzell Innerrhoden and Glarus.[92]
Representative[edit]
Main article: Representative democracy
Representative democracy involves the election of government officials by the people being represented. If the head of state is also democratically elected then it is called a democratic republic.[93] The most common mechanisms involve election of the candidate with a majority or a plurality of the votes. Most western countries have representative systems.[92]
Representatives may be elected or become diplomatic representatives by a particular district (or constituency), or represent the entire electorate through proportional systems, with some using a combination of the two. Some representative democracies also incorporate elements of direct democracy, such as referendums. A characteristic of representative democracy is that while the representatives are elected by the people to act in the people's interest, they retain the freedom to exercise their own judgement as how best to do so. Such reasons have driven criticism upon representative democracy,[94][95] pointing out the contradictions of representation mechanisms' with democracy[96][97]
Parliamentary[edit]
Main article: Parliamentary system
Parliamentary democracy is a representative democracy where government is appointed by, or can be dismissed by, representatives as opposed to a "presidential rule" wherein the president is both head of state and the head of government and is elected by the voters. Under a parliamentary democracy, government is exercised by delegation to an executive ministry and subject to ongoing review, checks and balances by the legislative parliament elected by the people.[98][99][100][101]
Parliamentary systems have the right to dismiss a Prime Minister at any point in time that they feel he or she is not doing their job to the expectations of the legislature. This is done through a Vote of No Confidence where the legislature decides whether or not to remove the Prime Minister from office by a majority support for his or her dismissal.[102] In some countries, the Prime Minister can also call an election whenever he or she so chooses, and typically the Prime Minister will hold an election when he or she knows that they are in good favour with the public as to get re-elected. In other parliamentary democracies extra elections are virtually never held, a minority government being preferred until the next ordinary elections. An important feature of the parliamentary democracy is the concept of the "loyal opposition". The essence of the concept is that the second largest political party (or coalition) opposes the governing party (or coalition), while still remaining loyal to the state and its democratic principles.
Presidential[edit]
Main article: Presidential system
Presidential Democracy is a system where the public elects the president through free and fair elections. The president serves as both the head of state and head of government controlling most of the executive powers. The president serves for a specific term and cannot exceed that amount of time. Elections typically have a fixed date and aren't easily changed. The president has direct control over the cabinet, specifically appointing the cabinet members.[102]
The president cannot be easily removed from office by the legislature, but he or she cannot remove members of the legislative branch any more easily. This provides some measure of separation of powers. In consequence however, the president and the legislature may end up in the control of separate parties, allowing one to block the other and thereby interfere with the orderly operation of the state. This may be the reason why presidential democracy is not very common outside the Americas, Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia.[102]
A semi-presidential system is a system of democracy in which the government includes both a prime minister and a president. The particular powers held by the prime minister and president vary by country.[102]
Hybrid or semi-direct[edit]
See also: Politics of Switzerland and Voting in Switzerland
Some modern democracies that are predominantly representative in nature also heavily rely upon forms of political action that are directly democratic. These democracies, which combine elements of representative democracy and direct democracy, are termed hybrid democracies,[103] semi-direct democracies or participatory democracies. Examples include Switzerland and some U.S. states, where frequent use is made of referendums and initiatives.
The Swiss confederation is a semi-direct democracy.[92] At the federal level, citizens can propose changes to the constitution (federal popular initiative) or ask for a referendum to be held on any law voted by the parliament.[92] Between January 1995 and June 2005, Swiss citizens voted 31 times, to answer 103 questions (during the same period, French citizens participated in only two referendums).[92] Although in the past 120 years less than 250 initiatives have been put to referendum. The populace has been conservative, approving only about 10% of the initiatives put before them; in addition, they have often opted for a version of the initiative rewritten by government.[citation needed]
In the United States, no mechanisms of direct democracy exists at the federal level, but over half of the states and many localities provide for citizen-sponsored ballot initiatives (also called "ballot measures", "ballot questions" or "propositions"), and the vast majority of states allow for referendums. Examples include the extensive use of referendums in the US state of California, which is a state that has more than 20 million voters.[104]
In New England, Town meetings are often used, especially in rural areas, to manage local government. This creates a hybrid form of government, with a local direct democracy and a state government which is representative. For example, most Vermont towns hold annual town meetings in March in which town officers are elected, budgets for the town and schools are voted on, and citizens have the opportunity to speak and be heard on political matters.[105]
Variants[edit]
Constitutional monarchy[edit]
Main article: Constitutional monarchy
Queen Elizabeth II, a constitutional monarch
Many countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Scandinavian countries, Thailand, Japan and Bhutan turned powerful monarchs into constitutional monarchs with limited or, often gradually, merely symbolic roles. For example, in the predecessor states to the United Kingdom, constitutional monarchy began to emerge and has continued uninterrupted since the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and passage of the Bill of Rights 1689.[14][43]
In other countries, the monarchy was abolished along with the aristocratic system (as in France, China, Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece and Egypt). An elected president, with or without significant powers, became the head of state in these countries.
Élite upper houses of legislatures, which often had lifetime or hereditary tenure, were common in many nations. Over time, these either had their powers limited (as with the British House of Lords) or else became elective and remained powerful (as with the Australian Senate).
Republic[edit]
Main article: Republicanism
The term republic has many different meanings, but today often refers to a representative democracy with an elected head of state, such as a president, serving for a limited term, in contrast to states with a hereditary monarch as a head of state, even if these states also are representative democracies with an elected or appointed head of government such as a prime minister.[106]
The Founding Fathers of the United States rarely praised and often criticised democracy, which in their time tended to specifically mean direct democracy, often without the protection of a constitution enshrining basic rights; James Madison argued, especially in The Federalist No. 10, that what distinguished a democracy from a republic was that the former became weaker as it got larger and suffered more violently from the effects of faction, whereas a republic could get stronger as it got larger and combats faction by its very structure.
What was critical to American values, John Adams insisted,[107] was that the government be "bound by fixed laws, which the people have a voice in making, and a right to defend." As Benjamin Franklin was exiting after writing the U.S. constitution, a woman asked him "Well, Doctor, what have we got—a republic or a monarchy?". He replied "A republic—if you can keep it."[108]
Liberal democracy[edit]
Main article: Liberal democracy
A liberal democracy is a representative democracy in which the ability of the elected representatives to exercise decision-making power is subject to the rule of law, and moderated by a constitution or laws that emphasise the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals, and which places constraints on the leaders and on the extent to which the will of the majority can be exercised against the rights of minorities (see civil liberties).
In a liberal democracy, it is possible for some large-scale decisions to emerge from the many individual decisions that citizens are free to make. In other words, citizens can "vote with their feet" or "vote with their dollars", resulting in significant informal government-by-the-masses that exercises many "powers" associated with formal government elsewhere.
Socialist[edit]
Socialist thought has several different views on democracy. Social democracy, democratic socialism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat (usually exercised through Soviet democracy) are some examples. Many democratic socialists and social democrats believe in a form of participatory, industrial, economic and/or workplace democracy combined with a representative democracy.
Within Marxist orthodoxy there is a hostility to what is commonly called "liberal democracy", which they simply refer to as parliamentary democracy because of its often centralised nature. Because of their desire to eliminate the political elitism they see in capitalism, Marxists, Leninists and Trotskyists believe in direct democracy implemented through a system of communes (which are sometimes called soviets). This system ultimately manifests itself as council democracy and begins with workplace democracy. (See Democracy in Marxism.)
Democracy cannot consist solely of elections that are nearly always fictitious and managed by rich landowners and professional politicians.
— Che Guevara, Speech, Uruguay, 1961[109]
Anarchist[edit]
Anarchists are split in this domain, depending on whether they believe that a majority-rule is tyrannic or not. The only form of democracy considered acceptable to many anarchists is direct democracy. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon argued that the only acceptable form of direct democracy is one in which it is recognised that majority decisions are not binding on the minority, even when unanimous.[110] However, anarcho-communist Murray Bookchin criticised individualist anarchists for opposing democracy,[111] and says "majority rule" is consistent with anarchism.[112]
Some anarcho-communists oppose the majoritarian nature of direct democracy, feeling that it can impede individual liberty and opt in favour of a non-majoritarian form of consensus democracy, similar to Proudhon's position on direct democracy.[113] Henry David Thoreau, who did not self-identify as an anarchist but argued for "a better government"[114] and is cited as an inspiration by some anarchists, argued that people should not be in the position of ruling others or being ruled when there is no consent.
Anarcho-capitalists, voluntaryists and other right-anarchists oppose institutional democracy as they consider it in conflict with widely held moral values and ethical principles and their conception of individual rights. The a priori Rothbardian argument is that the state is a coercive institution which necessarily violates the non-aggression principle (NAP). Some right-anarchists also criticise democracy on a posteriori consequentialist grounds, in terms of inefficiency or disability in bringing about maximisation of individual liberty. They maintain the people who participate in democratic institutions are foremost driven by economic self-interest.[115][116]
Sortition[edit]
Main article: Sortition
Sometimes called "democracy without elections", sortition chooses decision makers via a random process. The intention is that those chosen will be representative of the opinions and interests of the people at large, and be more fair and impartial than an elected official. The technique was in widespread use in Athenian Democracy and Renaissance Florence[117] and is still used in modern jury selection.
Consociational[edit]
Main article: Consociational democracy
A consociational democracy allows for simultaneous majority votes in two or more ethno-religious constituencies, and policies are enacted only if they gain majority support from both or all of them.
Consensus democracy[edit]
Main article: Consensus democracy
A consensus democracy, in contrast, would not be dichotomous. Instead, decisions would be based on a multi-option approach, and policies would be enacted if they gained sufficient support, either in a purely verbal agreement, or via a consensus vote - a multi-option preference vote. If the threshold of support were at a sufficiently high level, minorities would be as it were protected automatically. Furthermore, any voting would be ethno-colour blind.
Supranational[edit]
Qualified majority voting is designed by the Treaty of Rome to be the principal method of reaching decisions in the European Council of Ministers. This system allocates votes to member states in part according to their population, but heavily weighted in favour of the smaller states. This might be seen as a form of representative democracy, but representatives to the Council might be appointed rather than directly elected.
Inclusive[edit]
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Main article: Inclusive Democracy
Inclusive democracy is a political theory and political project that aims for direct democracy in all fields of social life: political democracy in the form of face-to-face assemblies which are confederated, economic democracy in a stateless, moneyless and marketless economy, democracy in the social realm, i.e. self-management in places of work and education, and ecological democracy which aims to reintegrate society and nature. The theoretical project of inclusive democracy emerged from the work of political philosopher Takis Fotopoulos in "Towards An Inclusive Democracy" and was further developed in the journal Democracy & Nature and its successor The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy.
The basic unit of decision making in an inclusive democracy is the demotic assembly, i.e. the assembly of demos, the citizen body in a given geographical area which may encompass a town and the surrounding villages, or even neighbourhoods of large cities. An inclusive democracy today can only take the form of a confederal democracy that is based on a network of administrative councils whose members or delegates are elected from popular face-to-face democratic assemblies in the various demoi. Thus, their role is purely administrative and practical, not one of policy-making like that of representatives in representative democracy.
The citizen body is advised by experts but it is the citizen body which functions as the ultimate decision-taker . Authority can be delegated to a segment of the citizen body to carry out specific duties, for example to serve as members of popular courts, or of regional and confederal councils. Such delegation is made, in principle, by lot, on a rotation basis, and is always recallable by the citizen body. Delegates to regional and confederal bodies should have specific mandates.
Participatory politics[edit]
Main article: Participatory politics
A Parpolity or Participatory Polity is a theoretical form of democracy that is ruled by a Nested Council structure. The guiding philosophy is that people should have decision making power in proportion to how much they are affected by the decision. Local councils of 25–50 people are completely autonomous on issues that affect only them, and these councils send delegates to higher level councils who are again autonomous regarding issues that affect only the population affected by that council.
A council court of randomly chosen citizens serves as a check on the tyranny of the majority, and rules on which body gets to vote on which issue. Delegates may vote differently from how their sending council might wish, but are mandated to communicate the wishes of their sending council. Delegates are recallable at any time. Referendums are possible at any time via votes of most lower-level councils, however, not everything is a referendum as this is most likely a waste of time. A parpolity is meant to work in tandem with a participatory economy.
Cosmopolitan[edit]
Main article: Cosmopolitan democracy
Cosmopolitan democracy, also known as Global democracy or World Federalism, is a political system in which democracy is implemented on a global scale, either directly or through representatives. An important justification for this kind of system is that the decisions made in national or regional democracies often affect people outside the constituency who, by definition, cannot vote. By contrast, in a cosmopolitan democracy, the people who are affected by decisions also have a say in them.[118]
According to its supporters, any attempt to solve global problems is undemocratic without some form of cosmopolitan democracy. The general principle of cosmopolitan democracy is to expand some or all of the values and norms of democracy, including the rule of law; the non-violent resolution of conflicts; and equality among citizens, beyond the limits of the state. To be fully implemented, this would require reforming existing international organisations, e.g. the United Nations, as well as the creation of new institutions such as a World Parliament, which ideally would enhance public control over, and accountability in, international politics.
Cosmopolitan Democracy has been promoted, among others, by physicist Albert Einstein,[119] writer Kurt Vonnegut, columnist George Monbiot, and professors David Held and Daniele Archibugi.[120] The creation of the International Criminal Court in 2003 was seen as a major step forward by many supporters of this type of cosmopolitan democracy.
Creative Democracy[edit]
Main article: Creative Democracy
Creative Democracy is advocated by American philosopher John Dewey. The main idea about Creative Democracy is that democracy encourages individual capacity building and the interaction among the society. Dewey argues that democracy is a way of life in his work of ""Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us" [121] and an experience built on faith in human nature, faith in human beings, and faith in working with others. Democracy, in Dewey's view, is a moral ideal requiring actual effort and work by people; it is not an institutional concept that exists outside of ourselves. "The task of democracy", Dewey concludes, "is forever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute".
Non-governmental[edit]
Aside from the public sphere, similar democratic principles and mechanisms of voting and representation have been used to govern other kinds of groups. Many non-governmental organisations decide policy and leadership by voting. Most trade unions and cooperatives are governed by democratic elections. Corporations are controlled by shareholders on the principle of one share, one vote. An analogous system, that fuses elements of democracy with sharia law, has been termed islamocracy.[122]
Theory[edit]
A marble statue of Aristotle
Aristotle[edit]
Aristotle contrasted rule by the many (democracy/polity), with rule by the few (oligarchy/aristocracy), and with rule by a single person (tyranny or today autocracy/absolute monarchy). He also thought that there was a good and a bad variant of each system (he considered democracy to be the degenerate counterpart to polity).[123][124]
For Aristotle the underlying principle of democracy is freedom, since only in a democracy the citizens can have a share in freedom. In essence, he argues that this is what every democracy should make its aim. There are two main aspects of freedom: being ruled and ruling in turn, since everyone is equal according to number, not merit, and to be able to live as one pleases.
But one factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, ... And one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a slave.
— Aristotle, Politics 1317b (Book 6, Part II)
Rationale[edit]
Among modern political theorists, there are three contending conceptions of the fundamental rationale for democracy: aggregative democracy, deliberative democracy, and radical democracy.[125]
Aggregative[edit]
The theory of aggregative democracy claims that the aim of the democratic processes is to solicit citizens' preferences and aggregate them together to determine what social policies society should adopt. Therefore, proponents of this view hold that democratic participation should primarily focus on voting, where the policy with the most votes gets implemented.
Different variants of aggregative democracy exist. Under minimalism, democracy is a system of government in which citizens have given teams of political leaders the right to rule in periodic elections. According to this minimalist conception, citizens cannot and should not "rule" because, for example, on most issues, most of the time, they have no clear views or their views are not well-founded. Joseph Schumpeter articulated this view most famously in his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.[126] Contemporary proponents of minimalism include William H. Riker, Adam Przeworski, Richard Posner.
According to the theory of direct democracy, on the other hand, citizens should vote directly, not through their representatives, on legislative proposals. Proponents of direct democracy offer varied reasons to support this view. Political activity can be valuable in itself, it socialises and educates citizens, and popular participation can check powerful elites. Most importantly, citizens do not really rule themselves unless they directly decide laws and policies.
Governments will tend to produce laws and policies that are close to the views of the median voter – with half to their left and the other half to their right. This is not actually a desirable outcome as it represents the action of self-interested and somewhat unaccountable political elites competing for votes. Anthony Downs suggests that ideological political parties are necessary to act as a mediating broker between individual and governments. Downs laid out this view in his 1957 book An Economic Theory of Democracy.[127]
Robert A. Dahl argues that the fundamental democratic principle is that, when it comes to binding collective decisions, each person in a political community is entitled to have his/her interests be given equal consideration (not necessarily that all people are equally satisfied by the collective decision). He uses the term polyarchy to refer to societies in which there exists a certain set of institutions and procedures which are perceived as leading to such democracy. First and foremost among these institutions is the regular occurrence of free and open elections which are used to select representatives who then manage all or most of the public policy of the society. However, these polyarchic procedures may not create a full democracy if, for example, poverty prevents political participation.[128] Similarly, Ronald Dworkin argues that "democracy is a substantive, not a merely procedural, ideal."[129]
Deliberative[edit]
Deliberative democracy is based on the notion that democracy is government by deliberation. Unlike aggregative democracy, deliberative democracy holds that, for a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic deliberation, not merely the aggregation of preferences that occurs in voting. Authentic deliberation is deliberation among decision-makers that is free from distortions of unequal political power, such as power a decision-maker obtained through economic wealth or the support of interest groups.[130][131][132] If the decision-makers cannot reach consensus after authentically deliberating on a proposal, then they vote on the proposal using a form of majority rule.
Radical[edit]
Radical democracy is based on the idea that there are hierarchical and oppressive power relations that exist in society. Democracy's role is to make visible and challenge those relations by allowing for difference, dissent and antagonisms in decision making processes.
Criticism[edit]
Main article: Criticism of democracy
Protests
Inefficiencies[edit]
Some economists have criticized the efficiency of democracy. They base this on their premise of the irrational voter. Their argument is that voters are highly uninformed about many political issues, especially relating to economics, and have a strong bias about the few issues on which they are fairly knowledgeable. A common example often quoted to substantiate this point is the high economic development achieved by China (a non-democratic country) as compared to India (a democratic country).[citation needed]
Popular rule as a façade[edit]
The 20th-century Italian thinkers Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca (independently) argued that democracy was illusory, and served only to mask the reality of elite rule. Indeed, they argued that elite oligarchy is the unbendable law of human nature, due largely to the apathy and division of the masses (as opposed to the drive, initiative and unity of the elites), and that democratic institutions would do no more than shift the exercise of power from oppression to manipulation.[133] As Louis Brandeis once professed, "We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can't have both."[134]
Mob rule[edit]
Plato's The Republic presents a critical view of democracy through the narration of Socrates: "Democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequaled alike."[135] In his work, Plato lists 5 forms of government from best to worst. Assuming that the Republic was intended to be a serious critique of the political thought in Athens, Plato argues that only Kallipolis, an aristocracy led by the unwilling philosopher-kings (the wisest men), is a just form of government.[136]
James Madison critiqued direct democracy (which he referred to simply as "democracy") in Federalist No. 10, arguing that representative democracy—which he described using the term "republic"—is a preferable form of government, saying: "... democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." Madison offered that republics were superior to democracies because republics safeguarded against tyranny of the majority, stating in Federalist No. 10: "the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic".
Political instability[edit]
More recently, democracy is criticised for not offering enough political stability. As governments are frequently elected on and off there tends to be frequent changes in the policies of democratic countries both domestically and internationally. Even if a political party maintains power, vociferous, headline grabbing protests and harsh criticism from the mass media are often enough to force sudden, unexpected political change. Frequent policy changes with regard to business and immigration are likely to deter investment and so hinder economic growth. For this reason, many people have put forward the idea that democracy is undesirable for a developing country in which economic growth and the reduction of poverty are top priorities.[137]
This opportunist alliance not only has the handicap of having to cater to too many ideologically opposing factions, but it is usually short lived since any perceived or actual imbalance in the treatment of coalition partners, or changes to leadership in the coalition partners themselves, can very easily result in the coalition partner withdrawing its support from the government.
Fraudulent elections[edit]
In representative democracies, it may not benefit incumbents to conduct fair elections. A study showed that incumbents who rig elections stay in office 2.5 times as long as those who permit fair elections.[138] Democracies in countries with high per capita income have been found to be less prone to violence, but in countries with low incomes the tendency is the reverse.[138] Election misconduct is more likely in countries with low per capita incomes, small populations, rich in natural resources, and a lack of institutional checks and balances. Sub-Saharan countries, as well as Afghanistan, all tend to fall into that category.[138]
Governments that have frequent elections tend to have significantly more stable economic policies than those governments who have infrequent elections. However, this trend does not apply to governments where fraudulent elections are common.[138]
Opposition[edit]
Main article: Anti-democratic thought
Democracy in modern times has almost always faced opposition from the previously existing government, and many times it has faced opposition from social elites. The implementation of a democratic government within a non-democratic state is typically brought about by democratic revolution.
Post-Enlightenment ideologies such as fascism, nazism, and neo-fundamentalism oppose democracy on different grounds, generally citing that the concept of democracy as a constant process is flawed and detrimental to a preferable course of development.
Development[edit]
Main article: Democratisation
Several philosophers and researchers have outlined historical and social factors seen as supporting the evolution of democracy. Cultural factors like Protestantism influenced the development of democracy, rule of law, human rights and political liberty (the faithful elected priests, religious freedom and tolerance has been practiced).
Other commentators have mentioned the influence of wealth (e.g. S. M. Lipset, 1959). In a related theory, Ronald Inglehart suggests that improved living-standards can convince people that they can take their basic survival for granted, leading to increased emphasis on self-expression values, which is highly correlated to democracy.[139]
Carroll Quigley concludes that the characteristics of weapons are the main predictor of democracy:[140][141] Democracy tends to emerge only when the best weapons available are easy for individuals to buy and use.[142] By the 1800s, guns were the best personal weapons available, and in America, almost everyone could afford to buy a gun, and could learn how to use it fairly easily. Governments couldn't do any better: it became the age of mass armies of citizen soldiers with guns[142] Similarly, Periclean Greece was an age of the citizen soldier and democracy.[143]
Recent theories stress the relevance of education and of human capital - and within them of cognitive ability to increasing tolerance, rationality, political literacy and participation. Two effects of education and cognitive ability are distinguished: a cognitive effect (competence to make rational choices, better information-processing) and an ethical effect (support of democratic values, freedom, human rights etc.), which itself depends on intelligence.[144][145][146]
Evidence that is consistent with conventional theories of why democracy emerges and is sustained has been hard to come by. Recent statistical analyses have challenged modernisation theory by demonstrating that there is no reliable evidence for the claim that democracy is more likely to emerge when countries become wealthier, more educated, or less unequal.[147] Neither is there convincing evidence that increased reliance on oil revenues prevents democratisation, despite a vast theoretical literature on "the Resource Curse" that asserts that oil revenues sever the link between citizen taxation and government accountability, seen as the key to representative democracy.[148] The lack of evidence for these conventional theories of democratisation have led researchers to search for the "deep" determinants of contemporary political institutions, be they geographical or demographic.[149][150]
In the 21st century, democracy has become such a popular method of reaching decisions that its application beyond politics to other areas such as entertainment, food and fashion, consumerism, urban planning, education, art, literature, science and theology has been criticised as "the reigning dogma of our time".[151] The argument suggests that applying a populist or market-driven approach to art and literature (for example), means that innovative creative work goes unpublished or unproduced. In education, the argument is that essential but more difficult studies are not undertaken. Science, as a truth-based discipline, is particularly corrupted by the idea that the correct conclusion can be arrived at by popular vote. However, more recently, theorists have also advanced the concept epistemic democracy to assert that democracy actually does a good job tracking the truth.
Robert Michels asserts that although democracy can never be fully realised, democracy may be developed automatically in the act of striving for democracy: "The peasant in the fable, when on his death-bed, tells his sons that a treasure is buried in the field. After the old man's death the sons dig everywhere in order to discover the treasure. They do not find it. But their indefatigable labor improves the soil and secures for them a comparative well-being. The treasure in the fable may well symbolise democracy."[152]
Dr. Harald Wydra, in his book Communism and The Emergence of Democracy (2007), maintains that the development of democracy should not be viewed as a purely procedural or as a static concept but rather as an ongoing "process of meaning formation".[153] Drawing on Claude Lefort's idea of the empty place of power, that "power emanates from the people [...] but is the power of nobody", he remarks that democracy is reverence to a symbolic mythical authority as in reality, there is no such thing as the people or demos. Democratic political figures are not supreme rulers but rather temporary guardians of an empty place. Any claim to substance such as the collective good, the public interest or the will of the nation is subject to the competitive struggle and times of for[clarification needed] gaining the authority of office and government. The essence of the democratic system is an empty place, void of real people which can only be temporarily filled and never be appropriated. The seat of power is there, but remains open to constant change. As such, what "democracy" is or what is "democratic" progresses throughout history as a continual and potentially never ending process of social construction.[citation needed]
In 2010 a study by a German military think-tank analyzed how peak oil might change the global economy. The study raises fears for the survival of democracy itself. It suggests that parts of the population could perceive the upheaval triggered by peak oil as a general systemic crisis. This would create "room for ideological and extremist alternatives to existing forms of government".[154]
See also[edit]
iconPolitics portal
Constitutional liberalism
Democracy Ranking
Democratic peace theory
E-democracy
Empowered democracy
Foucault–Habermas debate
Good governance
Parliament in the Making
Shadow government (conspiracy)
Spatial Citizenship
Statism
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145.Jump up ^ Deary, I. J.; Batty, G. D.; Gale, C. R. (2008). "Bright children become enlightened adults". Psychological Science. 19 (1): 1–6. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02036.x.
146.Jump up ^ Rindermann, H (2008). "Relevance of education and intelligence for the political development of nations: Democracy, rule of law and political liberty". Intelligence. 36 (4): 306–322. doi:10.1016/j.intell.2007.09.003.
147.Jump up ^ Albertus, Michael; Menaldo, Victor (2012). "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratisation". Comparative Politics. 44 (2): 151–169. doi:10.5129/001041512798838003.
148.Jump up ^ "The Resource Curse: Does the Emperor Have no Clothes?".
149.Jump up ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-85526-6.
150.Jump up ^ "Rainfall and Democracy".
151.Jump up ^ Farrelly, Elizabeth (2011-09-15). "Deafened by the roar of the crowd". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 2011-09-17.
152.Jump up ^ Robert Michels (1999) [1962 by Crowell-Collier]. Political Parties. Transaction Publishers. p. 243. ISBN 978-1-4128-3116-1. Retrieved 5 June 2013.
153.Jump up ^ Harald Wydra, Communism and the Emergence of Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.22-27.
154.Jump up ^ Military Study Warns of a Potentially Drastic Oil Crisis". Spiegel Online. September 1, 2010
Further reading[edit]
This article's further reading may not follow Wikipedia's content policies or guidelines. Please improve this article by removing excessive, less relevant or many publications with the same point of view; or by incorporating the relevant publications into the body of the article through appropriate citations. (January 2016) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)
Appleby, Joyce. (1992). Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination. Harvard University Press.
Archibugi, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy, Princeton University Press ISBN 978-0-691-13490-1
Becker, Peter, Heideking, Juergen, & Henretta, James A. (2002). Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750–1850. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-80066-2
Benhabib, Seyla. (1996). Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-04478-1
Blattberg, Charles. (2000). From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting Practice First, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-829688-1.
Birch, Anthony H. (1993). The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-41463-0
Castiglione, Dario. (2005). "Republicanism and its Legacy." European Journal of Political Theory. pp 453–65.
Copp, David, Jean Hampton, & John E. Roemer. (1993). The Idea of Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-43254-2
Caputo, Nicholas. (2005). America's Bible of Democracy: Returning to the Constitution. SterlingHouse Publisher, Inc. ISBN 978-1-58501-092-9
Dahl, Robert A. (1991). Democracy and its Critics. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-04938-1
Dahl, Robert A. (2000). On Democracy. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-08455-9
Dahl, Robert A. Ian Shapiro & Jose Antonio Cheibub. (2003). The Democracy Sourcebook. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-54147-3
Dahl, Robert A. (1963). A Preface to Democratic Theory. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-13426-0
Davenport, Christian. (2007). State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-86490-9
Diamond, Larry & Marc Plattner. (1996). The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-5304-3
Diamond, Larry & Richard Gunther. (2001). Political Parties and Democracy. JHU Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-6863-4
Diamond, Larry & Leonardo Morlino. (2005). Assessing the Quality of Democracy. JHU Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-8287-6
Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner & Philip J. Costopoulos. (2005). World Religions and Democracy. JHU Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-8080-3
Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner & Daniel Brumberg. (2003). Islam and Democracy in the Middle East. JHU Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-7847-3
Elster, Jon. (1998). Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-59696-1
Emerson, Peter (2007) "Designing an All-Inclusive Democracy." Springer. ISBN 978-3-540-33163-6
Emerson, Peter (2012) "Defining Democracy." Springer. ISBN 978-3-642-20903-1
Fotopoulos, Takis. (2006). "Liberal and Socialist "Democracies" versus Inclusive Democracy", The International Journal Of Inclusive Democracy. 2(2)
Fotopoulos, Takis. (1992). "Direct and Economic Democracy in Ancient Athens and its Significance Today", Democracy & Nature, 1(1)
Gabardi, Wayne. (2001). Contemporary Models of Democracy. Polity.
Griswold, Daniel. (2007). Trade, Democracy and Peace: The Virtuous Cycle at the Wayback Machine (archived September 28, 2007)[dead link]
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-19766-4
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. (2002). Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12019-5
Haldane, Robert Burdone (1918). The future of democracy. London: Headley Bros. Publishers Ltd.
Halperin, M. H., Siegle, J. T. & Weinstein, M. M. (2005). The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-95052-7
Hansen, Mogens Herman. (1991). The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-18017-3
Held, David. (2006). Models of Democracy. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-5472-9
Inglehart, Ronald. (1997). Modernisation and Postmodernisation. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-01180-6
Isakhan, Ben and Stockwell, Stephen (co-editors). (2011) The Secret History of Democracy. Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN 978-0-230-24421-4
Jarvie, I. C.; Milford, K. (2006). Karl Popper: Life and time, and values in a world of facts Volume 1 of Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Karl Milford. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. ISBN 978-0-7546-5375-2.
Khan, L. Ali. (2003). A Theory of Universal Democracy: Beyond the End of History. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 978-90-411-2003-8
Köchler, Hans. (1987). The Crisis of Representative Democracy. Peter Lang. ISBN 978-3-8204-8843-2
Lijphart, Arend. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-07893-0
Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1959). "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy". American Political Science Review. 53 (1): 69–105. doi:10.2307/1951731. JSTOR 1951731.
Macpherson, C. B. (1977). The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-289106-8
Morgan, Edmund. (1989). Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-30623-1
Ober, J.; Hedrick, C. W. (1996). Dēmokratia: a conversation on democracies, ancient and modern. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-01108-7.
Plattner, Marc F. & Aleksander Smolar. (2000). Globalisation, Power, and Democracy. JHU Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-6568-8
Plattner, Marc F. & João Carlos Espada. (2000). The Democratic Invention. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-6419-3
Putnam, Robert. (2001). Making Democracy Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-5-551-09103-5
Raaflaub, Kurt A.; Ober, Josiah; Wallace, Robert W (2007). Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24562-4.
Riker, William H.. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. Yale University Press.
Sen, Amartya K. (1999). "Democracy as a Universal Value". Journal of Democracy. 10 (3): 3–17. doi:10.1353/jod.1999.0055.
Tannsjo, Torbjorn. (2008). Global Democracy: The Case for a World Government. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-3499-6. Argues that not only is world government necessary if we want to deal successfully with global problems it is also, pace Kant and Rawls, desirable in its own right.
Thompson, Dennis (1970). The Democratic Citizen: Social Science and Democratic Theory in the 20th Century. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-13173-5
Volk, Kyle G. (2014). Moral Minorities and the Making of American Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weingast, Barry. (1997). "The Political Foundations of the Rule of Law and Democracy". American Political Science Review. 91 (2): 245–263. doi:10.2307/2952354. JSTOR 2952354.
Weatherford, Jack. (1990). Indian Givers: How the Indians Transformed the World. New York: Fawcett Columbine. ISBN 978-0-449-90496-1
Whitehead, Laurence. (2002). Emerging Market Democracies: East Asia and Latin America. JHU Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-7219-8
Willard, Charles Arthur. (1996). Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-89845-2
Wood, E. M. (1995). Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing historical materialism. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-47682-9
Wood, Gordon S. (1991). The Radicalism of the American Revolution. Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0-679-73688-2 examines democratic dimensions of republicanism
External links[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Democracy.
Wikiquote has quotations related to: Democracy
Look up democracy in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.
Library resources about
Democracy
Resources in your library
Democracy at DMOZ
The Official Website of Democracy Foundation , Mumbai - INDIA
Centre for Democratic Network Governance
Democracy at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Democracy
The Economist Intelligence Unit's index of democracy
Ewbank, N. The Nature of Athenian Democracy, Clio History Journal, 2009.
"Democracy Conference". Innertemple.org.uk. Archived from the original on 2010-05-28.[dead link]
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America Full hypertext with critical essays on America in 1831–32 from American Studies at the University of Virginia
Democracy Watch (Canada) – Leading democracy monitoring organisation
Democratic Audit (UK) – Independent research organisation which produces evidence-based reports that assess democracy and human rights in the UK
Data visualizations of data on democratisation and list of data sources on political regimes on 'Our World in Data', by Max Roser.
[1] MaxRange Classifying political regime type and democracy level to all states and months 1789-2015
CritiqueErik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn: Liberty or Equality.
J.K. Baltzersen: Churchill on Democracy Revisited, (24 January 2005)
GegenStandpunkt: The Democratic State: Critique of Bourgeois Sovereignty
Frank Karsten: Democracy Can't Be Fixed. It's Inherently Broken[dead link], Lew Rockwell
Democracy, (from Greek: "δημοκρατία") or "rule of the commoners", was originally conceived in Classical Greece, whereby political representatives were chosen by lot (as in a jury) from amongst the male citizens: rich and poor. In modern times it has become equated to elections or "a system of government in which all the people of a state or polity....elect representatives to a parliament or similar assembly", as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary.[1] Democracy is further defined as (a:) "government by the people; especially : rule of the majority (b:) "a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation ...."[2]
The American Founding Fathers rejected 'democracy' as defined by the Greeks, preferring instead 'a natural aristocracy',[3] whereby only the landed gentry were entitled to a place in Congress. The Americans, as with the English, took their cue from the Roman republic model: only the patrician classes were involved in government. As such, many people today, including academics, have come to understand democracy in terms of elections, rather than selection by lot. For example, according to political scientist Larry Diamond, it consists of four key elements: (a) A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections; (b) The active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; (c) Protection of the human rights of all citizens, and (d) A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.[4]
In the 5th century BC, to denote the political systems then existing in Greek city-states, notably Athens, the term is an antonym to ἀριστοκρατία (aristokratía) "rule of an elite". While theoretically these definitions are in opposition, in practice the distinction has been blurred historically.[5] The political system of Classical Athens, for example, granted democratic citizenship to free men and excluded slaves and women from political participation. In virtually all democratic governments throughout ancient and modern history, democratic citizenship consisted of an elite class until full enfranchisement was won for all adult citizens in most modern democracies through the suffrage movements of the 19th and 20th centuries. The English word dates to the 16th century, from the older Middle French and Middle Latin equivalents.
Democracy contrasts with forms of government where power is either held by an individual, as in an absolute monarchy, or where power is held by a small number of individuals, as in an oligarchy. Nevertheless, these oppositions, inherited from Greek philosophy,[6] are now ambiguous because contemporary governments have mixed democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic elements. Karl Popper defined democracy in contrast to dictatorship or tyranny, thus focusing on opportunities for the people to control their leaders and to oust them without the need for a revolution.[7]
Contents [hide]
1 Characteristics
2 History 2.1 Ancient origins
2.2 Middle Ages
2.3 Modern era 2.3.1 Early modern period
2.3.2 18th and 19th centuries
2.3.3 20th and 21st centuries
3 Measurement of democracy
4 Types of democracies 4.1 Basic forms 4.1.1 Direct
4.1.2 Representative 4.1.2.1 Parliamentary
4.1.2.2 Presidential
4.1.3 Hybrid or semi-direct
4.2 Variants 4.2.1 Constitutional monarchy
4.2.2 Republic
4.2.3 Liberal democracy
4.2.4 Socialist
4.2.5 Anarchist
4.2.6 Sortition
4.2.7 Consociational
4.2.8 Consensus democracy
4.2.9 Supranational
4.2.10 Inclusive
4.2.11 Participatory politics
4.2.12 Cosmopolitan
4.2.13 Creative Democracy
4.3 Non-governmental
5 Theory 5.1 Aristotle
5.2 Rationale 5.2.1 Aggregative
5.2.2 Deliberative
5.2.3 Radical
5.3 Criticism 5.3.1 Inefficiencies
5.3.2 Popular rule as a façade
5.3.3 Mob rule
5.3.4 Political instability
5.3.5 Fraudulent elections
5.3.6 Opposition
6 Development
7 See also
8 References
9 Further reading
10 External links
Characteristics[edit]
No consensus exists on how to define democracy, but legal equality, political freedom and rule of law have been identified as important characteristics.[8][9] These principles are reflected in all eligible citizens being equal before the law and having equal access to legislative processes. For example, in a representative democracy, every vote has equal weight, no unreasonable restrictions can apply to anyone seeking to become a representative,[according to whom?] and the freedom of its eligible citizens is secured by legitimised rights and liberties which are typically protected by a constitution.[10][11] Other uses of "democracy" include that of direct democracy.
One theory holds that democracy requires three fundamental principles: (1) upward control, i.e. sovereignty residing at the lowest levels of authority, (2) political equality, and (3) social norms by which individuals and institutions only consider acceptable acts that reflect the first two principles of upward control and political equality.[12]
The term "democracy" is sometimes used as shorthand for liberal democracy, which is a variant of representative democracy that may include elements such as political pluralism; equality before the law; the right to petition elected officials for redress of grievances; due process; civil liberties; human rights; and elements of civil society outside the government.[citation needed] Roger Scruton argues that democracy alone cannot provide personal and political freedom unless the institutions of civil society are also present.[13]
In some countries, notably in the United Kingdom which originated the Westminster system, the dominant principle is that of parliamentary sovereignty, while maintaining judicial independence.[14][15] In the United States, separation of powers is often cited as a central attribute. In India, parliamentary sovereignty is subject to the Constitution of India which includes judicial review.[16] Though the term "democracy" is typically used in the context of a political state, the principles also are applicable to private organisations.
Majority rule is often listed as a characteristic of democracy. Hence, democracy allows for political minorities to be oppressed by the "tyranny of the majority" in the absence of legal protections of individual or group rights. An essential part of an "ideal" representative democracy is competitive elections that are substantively and procedurally "fair," i.e., just and equitable. In some countries, freedom of political expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press are considered important to ensure that voters are well informed enabling them to vote according to their own interests.[17][18]
It has also been suggested that a basic feature of democracy is the capacity of all voters to participate freely and fully in the life of their society.[19] With its emphasis on notions of social contract and the collective will of all the voters, democracy can also be characterised as a form of political collectivism because it is defined as a form of government in which all eligible citizens have an equal say in lawmaking.[20]
While representative democracy is sometimes equated with the republican form of government, the term "republic" classically has encompassed both democracies and aristocracies.[21][22] Many democracies are constitutional monarchies, such as the United Kingdom.
History[edit]
Main article: History of democracy
Ancient origins[edit]
See also: Athenian democracy
Cleisthenes, "father of Athenian democracy", modern bust
The term "democracy" first appeared in ancient Greek political and philosophical thought in the city-state of Athens during classical antiquity.[23][24] Led by Cleisthenes, Athenians established what is generally held as the first democracy in 508–507 BC. Cleisthenes is referred to as "the father of Athenian democracy."[25]
Athenian democracy took the form of a direct democracy, and it had two distinguishing features: the random selection of ordinary citizens to fill the few existing government administrative and judicial offices,[26] and a legislative assembly consisting of all Athenian citizens.[27] All eligible citizens were allowed to speak and vote in the assembly, which set the laws of the city state. However, Athenian citizenship excluded women, slaves, foreigners (μέτοικοι / métoikoi), non-landowners, and males under 20 years old.[citation needed][contradictory]
Of the estimated 200,000 to 400,000 inhabitants of Athens, there were between 30,000 and 60,000 citizens.[citation needed] The exclusion of large parts of the population from the citizen body is closely related to the ancient understanding of citizenship. In most of antiquity the benefit of citizenship was tied to the obligation to fight war campaigns.[28]
Athenian democracy was not only direct in the sense that decisions were made by the assembled people, but also the most direct in the sense that the people through the assembly, boule and courts of law controlled the entire political process and a large proportion of citizens were involved constantly in the public business.[29] Even though the rights of the individual were not secured by the Athenian constitution in the modern sense (the ancient Greeks had no word for "rights"[30]), the Athenians enjoyed their liberties not in opposition to the government but by living in a city that was not subject to another power and by not being subjects themselves to the rule of another person.[31]
Range voting appeared in Sparta as early as 700 BC. The Apella was an assembly of the people, held once a month, in which every male citizen of age 30 and above could participate. In the Apella, Spartans elected leaders and cast votes by range voting and shouting. Aristotle called this "childish", as compared with the stone voting ballots used by the Athenians. Sparta adopted it because of its simplicity, and to prevent any bias voting, buying, or cheating that was predominant in the early democratic elections.[32][33]
Even though the Roman Republic contributed significantly to many aspects of democracy, only a minority of Romans were citizens with votes in elections for representatives. The votes of the powerful were given more weight through a system of gerrymandering, so most high officials, including members of the Senate, came from a few wealthy and noble families.[34] In addition, the Roman Republic was the first government in the western world to have a Republic as a nation-state, although it didn't have much of a democracy. The Romans invented the concept of classics and many works from Ancient Greece were preserved.[35] Additionally, the Roman model of governance inspired many political thinkers over the centuries,[36] and today's modern representative democracies imitate more the Roman than the Greek models because it was a state in which supreme power was held by the people and their elected representatives, and which had an elected or nominated leader.[37] Other cultures, such as the Iroquoi Nation in the Americas between around 1450 and 1600 AD also developed a form of democratic society before they came in contact with the Europeans. This indicates that forms of democracy may have been invented in other societies around the world.
Middle Ages[edit]
During the Middle Ages, there were various systems involving elections or assemblies, although often only involving a small part of the population. These included:
the Frostating in Norway,
the Althing in Iceland,
the Løgting in the Faeroe Islands,
Scandinavian Things,
the election of Uthman in the Rashidun Caliphate,
the South Indian Kingdom of the Chola in the state of Tamil Nadu in the Indian Subcontinent had an electoral system at 920 A.D., about 1100 years ago,[38]
Carantania, old Slavic/Slovenian principality, the Ducal Inauguration from 7th to 15th century,
the upper-caste election of the Gopala in the Bengal region of the Indian Subcontinent,
the Holy Roman Empire's Hoftag and Imperial Diets (mostly Nobles and Clergy),
Frisia in the 10th-15th Century (Weight of vote based on landownership)
the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (10% of population),
certain medieval Italian city-states such as Venice, Genoa, Florence, Pisa, Lucca, Amalfi, Siena and San Marino
the tuatha system in early medieval Ireland,
the Veche in Novgorod and Pskov Republics of medieval Russia,
The States in Tirol and Switzerland,
the autonomous merchant city of Sakai in the 16th century in Japan,
Volta-Nigeric societies such as Igbo.
the Mekhk-Khel system of the Nakh peoples of the North Caucasus, by which representatives to the Council of Elders for each teip (clan) were popularly elected by that teip's members.
The 10th Sikh Guru Gobind Singh ji (Nanak X) established the world's first Sikh democratic republic state ending the aristocracy on day of 1st Vasakh 1699 and Gurbani as sole constitution of this Sikh republic on the Indian subcontinent.[citation needed]
Most regions in medieval Europe were ruled by clergy or feudal lords.
The Kouroukan Fouga divided the Mali Empire into ruling clans (lineages) that were represented at a great assembly called the Gbara. However, the charter made Mali more similar to a constitutional monarchy than a democratic republic. A little closer to modern democracy were the Cossack republics of Ukraine in the 16th and 17th centuries: Cossack Hetmanate and Zaporizhian Sich. The highest post – the Hetman – was elected by the representatives from the country's districts.
Magna Carta, 1215, England
The Parliament of England had its roots in the restrictions on the power of kings written into Magna Carta (1215), which explicitly protected certain rights of the King's subjects and implicitly supported what became the English writ of habeas corpus, safeguarding individual freedom against unlawful imprisonment with right to appeal.[39][40] The first representative national assembly in England was Simon de Montfort's Parliament in 1265.[41] The emergence of petitioning is some of the earliest evidence of parliament being used as a forum to address the general grievances of ordinary people. However, the power to call parliament remained at the pleasure of the monarch.[42]
Modern era[edit]
Early modern period[edit]
During the early modern period, the power of the Parliament of England continually increased. Passage of the Petition of Right in 1628 and Habeas Corpus Act in 1679 established certain liberties and remain in effect. The idea of a political party took form with groups freely debating rights to political representation during the Putney Debates of 1647. After the English Civil Wars (1642–1651) and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the Bill of Rights was enacted in 1689, which codified certain rights and liberties, and is still in effect. The Bill set out the requirement for regular elections, rules for freedom of speech in Parliament and limited the power of the monarch, ensuring that, unlike much of Europe at the time, royal absolutism would not prevail.[43][44]
In North America, representative government began in Jamestown, Virginia, with the election of the House of Burgesses (forerunner of the Virginia General Assembly) in 1619. English Puritans who migrated from 1620 established colonies in New England whose local governance was democratic and which contributed to the democratic development of the United States;[45] although these local assemblies had some small amounts of devolved power, the ultimate authority was held by the Crown and the English Parliament. The Puritans (Pilgrim Fathers), Baptists, and Quakers who founded these colonies applied the democratic organisation of their congregations also to the administration of their communities in worldly matters.[46][47][48]
18th and 19th centuries[edit]
The establishment of universal male suffrage in France in 1848 was an important milestone in the history of democracy
The first Parliament of Great Britain was established in 1707, after the merger of the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Scotland under the Acts of Union. Although the monarch increasingly became a figurehead,[49] only a small minority actually had a voice; Parliament was elected by only a few percent of the population (less than 3% as late as 1780).[50] During the Age of Liberty in Sweden (1718-1772), civil rights were expanded and power shifted from the monarch to parliament. The taxed peasantry was represented in parliament, although with little influence, but commoners without taxed property had no suffrage.
The creation of the short-lived Corsican Republic in 1755 marked the first nation in modern history to adopt a democratic constitution (all men and women above age of 25 could vote[51]). This Corsican Constitution was the first based on Enlightenment principles and included female suffrage, something that was not granted in most other democracies until the 20th century.
In the American colonial period before 1776, and for some time after, often only adult white male property owners could vote; enslaved Africans, most free black people and most women were not extended the franchise.[52] On the American frontier, democracy became a way of life, with more widespread social, economic and political equality.[53] Although not described as a democracy by the founding fathers,[54] they shared a determination to root the American experiment in the principles of natural freedom and equality.[55]
The American Revolution led to the adoption of the United States Constitution in 1787, the oldest surviving, still active, governmental codified constitution. The Constitution provided for an elected government and protected civil rights and liberties for some, but did not end slavery nor extend voting rights in the United States beyond white male property owners (about 6% of the population).[56] The Bill of Rights in 1791 set limits on government power to protect personal freedoms but had little impact on judgements by the courts for the first 130 years after ratification.[57]
In 1789, Revolutionary France adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and, although short-lived, the National Convention was elected by all males in 1792.[58] However, in the early 19th century, little of democracy - as theory, practice, or even as word - remained in the North Atlantic world.[59]
During this period, slavery remained a social and economic institution in places around the world. This was particularly the case in the eleven states of the American South. A variety of organisations were established advocating the movement of black people from the United States to locations where they would enjoy greater freedom and equality.
The United Kingdom's Slave Trade Act 1807 banned the trade across the British Empire, which was enforced internationally by the Royal Navy under treaties Britain negotiated with other nations.[60] As the voting franchise in the U.K. was increased, it also was made more uniform in a series of reforms beginning with the Reform Act of 1832. In 1833, the United Kingdom passed the Slavery Abolition Act which took effect across the British Empire.
Universal male suffrage was established in France in March 1848 in the wake of the French Revolution of 1848.[61] In 1848, several revolutions broke out in Europe as rulers were confronted with popular demands for liberal constitutions and more democratic government.[62]
In the 1860 United States Census, the slave population in the United States had grown to four million,[63] and in Reconstruction after the Civil War (late 1860s), the newly freed slaves became citizens with a nominal right to vote for men. Full enfranchisement of citizens was not secured until after the African-American Civil Rights Movement (1955–1968) gained passage by the United States Congress of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.[64][65]
20th and 21st centuries[edit]
The number of nations 1800–2003 scoring 8 or higher on Polity IV scale, another widely used measure of democracy
20th-century transitions to liberal democracy have come in successive "waves of democracy", variously resulting from wars, revolutions, decolonisation, and religious and economic circumstances.[66] World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires resulted in the creation of new nation-states from Europe, most of them at least nominally democratic.
In the 1920s democracy flourished and women's suffrage advanced, but the Great Depression brought disenchantment and most of the countries of Europe, Latin America, and Asia turned to strong-man rule or dictatorships. Fascism and dictatorships flourished in Nazi Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal, as well as nondemocratic goverment in the Baltics, the Balkans, Brazil, Cuba, China, and Japan, among others.[67]
World War II brought a definitive reversal of this trend in western Europe. The democratisation of the American, British, and French sectors of occupied Germany (disputed[68]), Austria, Italy, and the occupied Japan served as a model for the later theory of goverment change. However, most of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet sector of Germany fell into the non-democratic Soviet bloc.
The war was followed by decolonisation, and again most of the new independent states had nominally democratic constitutions. India emerged as the world's largest democracy and continues to be so.[69] Countries that were once part of the British Empire often adopted the British Westminster system.[70][71]
By 1960, the vast majority of country-states were nominally democracies, although most of the world's populations lived in nations that experienced sham elections, and other forms of subterfuge (particularly in Communist nations and the former colonies.)
A subsequent wave of democratisation brought substantial gains toward true liberal democracy for many nations. Spain, Portugal (1974), and several of the military dictatorships in South America returned to civilian rule in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Argentina in 1983, Bolivia, Uruguay in 1984, Brazil in 1985, and Chile in the early 1990s). This was followed by nations in East and South Asia by the mid-to-late 1980s.
Economic malaise in the 1980s, along with resentment of Soviet oppression, contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the associated end of the Cold War, and the democratisation and liberalisation of the former Eastern bloc countries. The most successful of the new democracies were those geographically and culturally closest to western Europe, and they are now members or candidate members of the European Union.
The liberal trend spread to some nations in Africa in the 1990s, most prominently in South Africa. Some recent examples of attempts of liberalisation include the Indonesian Revolution of 1998, the Bulldozer Revolution in Yugoslavia, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, and the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia.
According to Freedom House, in 2007 there were 123 electoral democracies (up from 40 in 1972).[72] According to World Forum on Democracy, electoral democracies now represent 120 of the 192 existing countries and constitute 58.2 percent of the world's population. At the same time liberal democracies i.e. countries Freedom House regards as free and respectful of basic human rights and the rule of law are 85 in number and represent 38 percent of the global population.[73]
In 2007 the United Nations declared September 15 the International Day of Democracy.[74]
Measurement of democracy[edit]
Country ratings from Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2016 survey, concerning the state of world freedom in 2015.[75]
Free (86) Partly Free (59) Not Free (50)
Countries designated "electoral democracies" in Freedom House's 2015 survey "Freedom in the World", covering the year 2014.[76]
Several freedom indices are used to measure democracy:
Freedom in the World published each year since 1972 by the U.S.-based Freedom House ranks countries by political rights and civil liberties that are derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Countries are assessed as free, partly free, or unfree.[76]
Worldwide Press Freedom Index is published each year since 2002 (except that 2011 was combined with 2012) by France-based Reporters Without Borders. Countries are assessed as having a good situation, a satisfactory situation, noticeable problems, a difficult situation, or a very serious situation.[77]
Freedom of the Press published each year since 1980 by Freedom House.
The Index of Freedom in the World is an index measuring classical civil liberties published by Canada's Fraser Institute, Germany's Liberales Institute, and the U.S. Cato Institute.[78] It is not currently included in the table below.
The CIRI Human Rights Data Project measures a range of human, civil, women's and workers rights.[79] It is now hosted by the University of Connecticut. It was created in 1994.[80] In its 2011 report, the U.S. was ranked 38th in overall human rights.[81]
The Democracy Index, published by the U.K.-based Economist Intelligence Unit, is an assessment of countries' democracy. Countries are rated to be either Full Democracies, Flawed Democracies, Hybrid Regimes, or Authoritarian regimes. Full democracies, flawed democracies, and hybrid regimes are considered to be democracies, and the authoritarian nations are considered to be dictatorial. The index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories.[82]
The U.S.-based Polity data series is a widely used data series in political science research. It contains coded annual information on regime authority characteristics and transitions for all independent states with greater than 500,000 total population and covers the years 1800–2006. Polity's conclusions about a state's level of democracy are based on an evaluation of that state's elections for competitiveness, openness and level of participation. Data from this series is not currently included in the table below. The Polity work is sponsored by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) which is funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. However, the views expressed in the reports are the authors' alone and do not represent the views of the US Government.
MaxRange, a dataset defining level of democracy and institutional structure(regime-type) on a 100-graded scale where every value represents a unique regime type. Values are sorted from 1-100 based on level of democracy and political accountability. MaxRange defines the value corresponding to all states and every month from 1789 to 2015 and updating. MaxRange is created and developed by Max Range, and is now associated with the university of Halmstad, Sweden.[83]
Types of democracies[edit]
Main article: Types of democracy
Democracy has taken a number of forms, both in theory and practice. Some varieties of democracy provide better representation and more freedom for their citizens than others.[84][85] However, if any democracy is not structured so as to prohibit the government from excluding the people from the legislative process, or any branch of government from altering the separation of powers in its own favour, then a branch of the system can accumulate too much power and destroy the democracy.[86][87][88]
World's states coloured by form of government1
Presidential republics2 Semi-presidential republics2
Republics with an executive president dependent on a parliament Parliamentary republics2
Parliamentary constitutional monarchies Constitutional monarchies in which the monarch personally exercises power
Absolute monarchies One-party states
Countries where constitutional provisions for government have been suspended Countries which do not fit any of the above systems
1This map was compiled according to the Wikipedia list of countries by system of government. See there for sources. 2Several states constitutionally deemed to be multiparty republics are broadly described by outsiders as authoritarian states. This map presents only the de jure form of government, and not the de facto degree of democracy.
The following kinds of democracy are not exclusive of one another: many specify details of aspects that are independent of one another and can co-exist in a single system.
Basic forms[edit]
Several variants of democracy exist, but there are two basic forms, both of which concern how the whole body of all eligible citizens executes its will. One form of democracy is direct democracy, in which all eligible citizens have active participation in the political decision making, for example voting on policy initiatives directly.[89] In most modern democracies, the whole body of eligible citizens remain the sovereign power but political power is exercised indirectly through elected representatives; this is called a representative democracy.
Direct[edit]
A Landsgemeinde (in 2009) of the Canton of Glarus, an example of direct democracy in Switzerland
In Switzerland, without needing to register, every citizen receives ballot papers and information brochures for each vote (and can send it back by post). Switzerland has a direct democracy system and votes are organised about four times a year.
Main article: Direct democracy
Direct democracy is a political system where the citizens participate in the decision-making personally, contrary to relying on intermediaries or representatives. The use of a lot system, a characteristic of Athenian democracy, is unique to direct democracies. In this system, important governmental and administrative tasks are performed by citizens picked from a lottery.[90] A direct democracy gives the voting population the power to:
1.Change constitutional laws,
2.Put forth initiatives, referendums and suggestions for laws,
3.Give binding orders to elective officials, such as revoking them before the end of their elected term, or initiating a lawsuit for breaking a campaign promise.
Within modern-day representative governments, certain electoral tools like referendums, citizens' initiatives and recall elections are referred to as forms of direct democracy.[91] Direct democracy as a government system currently only exists in the Swiss cantons of Appenzell Innerrhoden and Glarus.[92]
Representative[edit]
Main article: Representative democracy
Representative democracy involves the election of government officials by the people being represented. If the head of state is also democratically elected then it is called a democratic republic.[93] The most common mechanisms involve election of the candidate with a majority or a plurality of the votes. Most western countries have representative systems.[92]
Representatives may be elected or become diplomatic representatives by a particular district (or constituency), or represent the entire electorate through proportional systems, with some using a combination of the two. Some representative democracies also incorporate elements of direct democracy, such as referendums. A characteristic of representative democracy is that while the representatives are elected by the people to act in the people's interest, they retain the freedom to exercise their own judgement as how best to do so. Such reasons have driven criticism upon representative democracy,[94][95] pointing out the contradictions of representation mechanisms' with democracy[96][97]
Parliamentary[edit]
Main article: Parliamentary system
Parliamentary democracy is a representative democracy where government is appointed by, or can be dismissed by, representatives as opposed to a "presidential rule" wherein the president is both head of state and the head of government and is elected by the voters. Under a parliamentary democracy, government is exercised by delegation to an executive ministry and subject to ongoing review, checks and balances by the legislative parliament elected by the people.[98][99][100][101]
Parliamentary systems have the right to dismiss a Prime Minister at any point in time that they feel he or she is not doing their job to the expectations of the legislature. This is done through a Vote of No Confidence where the legislature decides whether or not to remove the Prime Minister from office by a majority support for his or her dismissal.[102] In some countries, the Prime Minister can also call an election whenever he or she so chooses, and typically the Prime Minister will hold an election when he or she knows that they are in good favour with the public as to get re-elected. In other parliamentary democracies extra elections are virtually never held, a minority government being preferred until the next ordinary elections. An important feature of the parliamentary democracy is the concept of the "loyal opposition". The essence of the concept is that the second largest political party (or coalition) opposes the governing party (or coalition), while still remaining loyal to the state and its democratic principles.
Presidential[edit]
Main article: Presidential system
Presidential Democracy is a system where the public elects the president through free and fair elections. The president serves as both the head of state and head of government controlling most of the executive powers. The president serves for a specific term and cannot exceed that amount of time. Elections typically have a fixed date and aren't easily changed. The president has direct control over the cabinet, specifically appointing the cabinet members.[102]
The president cannot be easily removed from office by the legislature, but he or she cannot remove members of the legislative branch any more easily. This provides some measure of separation of powers. In consequence however, the president and the legislature may end up in the control of separate parties, allowing one to block the other and thereby interfere with the orderly operation of the state. This may be the reason why presidential democracy is not very common outside the Americas, Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia.[102]
A semi-presidential system is a system of democracy in which the government includes both a prime minister and a president. The particular powers held by the prime minister and president vary by country.[102]
Hybrid or semi-direct[edit]
See also: Politics of Switzerland and Voting in Switzerland
Some modern democracies that are predominantly representative in nature also heavily rely upon forms of political action that are directly democratic. These democracies, which combine elements of representative democracy and direct democracy, are termed hybrid democracies,[103] semi-direct democracies or participatory democracies. Examples include Switzerland and some U.S. states, where frequent use is made of referendums and initiatives.
The Swiss confederation is a semi-direct democracy.[92] At the federal level, citizens can propose changes to the constitution (federal popular initiative) or ask for a referendum to be held on any law voted by the parliament.[92] Between January 1995 and June 2005, Swiss citizens voted 31 times, to answer 103 questions (during the same period, French citizens participated in only two referendums).[92] Although in the past 120 years less than 250 initiatives have been put to referendum. The populace has been conservative, approving only about 10% of the initiatives put before them; in addition, they have often opted for a version of the initiative rewritten by government.[citation needed]
In the United States, no mechanisms of direct democracy exists at the federal level, but over half of the states and many localities provide for citizen-sponsored ballot initiatives (also called "ballot measures", "ballot questions" or "propositions"), and the vast majority of states allow for referendums. Examples include the extensive use of referendums in the US state of California, which is a state that has more than 20 million voters.[104]
In New England, Town meetings are often used, especially in rural areas, to manage local government. This creates a hybrid form of government, with a local direct democracy and a state government which is representative. For example, most Vermont towns hold annual town meetings in March in which town officers are elected, budgets for the town and schools are voted on, and citizens have the opportunity to speak and be heard on political matters.[105]
Variants[edit]
Constitutional monarchy[edit]
Main article: Constitutional monarchy
Queen Elizabeth II, a constitutional monarch
Many countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Scandinavian countries, Thailand, Japan and Bhutan turned powerful monarchs into constitutional monarchs with limited or, often gradually, merely symbolic roles. For example, in the predecessor states to the United Kingdom, constitutional monarchy began to emerge and has continued uninterrupted since the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and passage of the Bill of Rights 1689.[14][43]
In other countries, the monarchy was abolished along with the aristocratic system (as in France, China, Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece and Egypt). An elected president, with or without significant powers, became the head of state in these countries.
Élite upper houses of legislatures, which often had lifetime or hereditary tenure, were common in many nations. Over time, these either had their powers limited (as with the British House of Lords) or else became elective and remained powerful (as with the Australian Senate).
Republic[edit]
Main article: Republicanism
The term republic has many different meanings, but today often refers to a representative democracy with an elected head of state, such as a president, serving for a limited term, in contrast to states with a hereditary monarch as a head of state, even if these states also are representative democracies with an elected or appointed head of government such as a prime minister.[106]
The Founding Fathers of the United States rarely praised and often criticised democracy, which in their time tended to specifically mean direct democracy, often without the protection of a constitution enshrining basic rights; James Madison argued, especially in The Federalist No. 10, that what distinguished a democracy from a republic was that the former became weaker as it got larger and suffered more violently from the effects of faction, whereas a republic could get stronger as it got larger and combats faction by its very structure.
What was critical to American values, John Adams insisted,[107] was that the government be "bound by fixed laws, which the people have a voice in making, and a right to defend." As Benjamin Franklin was exiting after writing the U.S. constitution, a woman asked him "Well, Doctor, what have we got—a republic or a monarchy?". He replied "A republic—if you can keep it."[108]
Liberal democracy[edit]
Main article: Liberal democracy
A liberal democracy is a representative democracy in which the ability of the elected representatives to exercise decision-making power is subject to the rule of law, and moderated by a constitution or laws that emphasise the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals, and which places constraints on the leaders and on the extent to which the will of the majority can be exercised against the rights of minorities (see civil liberties).
In a liberal democracy, it is possible for some large-scale decisions to emerge from the many individual decisions that citizens are free to make. In other words, citizens can "vote with their feet" or "vote with their dollars", resulting in significant informal government-by-the-masses that exercises many "powers" associated with formal government elsewhere.
Socialist[edit]
Socialist thought has several different views on democracy. Social democracy, democratic socialism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat (usually exercised through Soviet democracy) are some examples. Many democratic socialists and social democrats believe in a form of participatory, industrial, economic and/or workplace democracy combined with a representative democracy.
Within Marxist orthodoxy there is a hostility to what is commonly called "liberal democracy", which they simply refer to as parliamentary democracy because of its often centralised nature. Because of their desire to eliminate the political elitism they see in capitalism, Marxists, Leninists and Trotskyists believe in direct democracy implemented through a system of communes (which are sometimes called soviets). This system ultimately manifests itself as council democracy and begins with workplace democracy. (See Democracy in Marxism.)
Democracy cannot consist solely of elections that are nearly always fictitious and managed by rich landowners and professional politicians.
— Che Guevara, Speech, Uruguay, 1961[109]
Anarchist[edit]
Anarchists are split in this domain, depending on whether they believe that a majority-rule is tyrannic or not. The only form of democracy considered acceptable to many anarchists is direct democracy. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon argued that the only acceptable form of direct democracy is one in which it is recognised that majority decisions are not binding on the minority, even when unanimous.[110] However, anarcho-communist Murray Bookchin criticised individualist anarchists for opposing democracy,[111] and says "majority rule" is consistent with anarchism.[112]
Some anarcho-communists oppose the majoritarian nature of direct democracy, feeling that it can impede individual liberty and opt in favour of a non-majoritarian form of consensus democracy, similar to Proudhon's position on direct democracy.[113] Henry David Thoreau, who did not self-identify as an anarchist but argued for "a better government"[114] and is cited as an inspiration by some anarchists, argued that people should not be in the position of ruling others or being ruled when there is no consent.
Anarcho-capitalists, voluntaryists and other right-anarchists oppose institutional democracy as they consider it in conflict with widely held moral values and ethical principles and their conception of individual rights. The a priori Rothbardian argument is that the state is a coercive institution which necessarily violates the non-aggression principle (NAP). Some right-anarchists also criticise democracy on a posteriori consequentialist grounds, in terms of inefficiency or disability in bringing about maximisation of individual liberty. They maintain the people who participate in democratic institutions are foremost driven by economic self-interest.[115][116]
Sortition[edit]
Main article: Sortition
Sometimes called "democracy without elections", sortition chooses decision makers via a random process. The intention is that those chosen will be representative of the opinions and interests of the people at large, and be more fair and impartial than an elected official. The technique was in widespread use in Athenian Democracy and Renaissance Florence[117] and is still used in modern jury selection.
Consociational[edit]
Main article: Consociational democracy
A consociational democracy allows for simultaneous majority votes in two or more ethno-religious constituencies, and policies are enacted only if they gain majority support from both or all of them.
Consensus democracy[edit]
Main article: Consensus democracy
A consensus democracy, in contrast, would not be dichotomous. Instead, decisions would be based on a multi-option approach, and policies would be enacted if they gained sufficient support, either in a purely verbal agreement, or via a consensus vote - a multi-option preference vote. If the threshold of support were at a sufficiently high level, minorities would be as it were protected automatically. Furthermore, any voting would be ethno-colour blind.
Supranational[edit]
Qualified majority voting is designed by the Treaty of Rome to be the principal method of reaching decisions in the European Council of Ministers. This system allocates votes to member states in part according to their population, but heavily weighted in favour of the smaller states. This might be seen as a form of representative democracy, but representatives to the Council might be appointed rather than directly elected.
Inclusive[edit]
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Main article: Inclusive Democracy
Inclusive democracy is a political theory and political project that aims for direct democracy in all fields of social life: political democracy in the form of face-to-face assemblies which are confederated, economic democracy in a stateless, moneyless and marketless economy, democracy in the social realm, i.e. self-management in places of work and education, and ecological democracy which aims to reintegrate society and nature. The theoretical project of inclusive democracy emerged from the work of political philosopher Takis Fotopoulos in "Towards An Inclusive Democracy" and was further developed in the journal Democracy & Nature and its successor The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy.
The basic unit of decision making in an inclusive democracy is the demotic assembly, i.e. the assembly of demos, the citizen body in a given geographical area which may encompass a town and the surrounding villages, or even neighbourhoods of large cities. An inclusive democracy today can only take the form of a confederal democracy that is based on a network of administrative councils whose members or delegates are elected from popular face-to-face democratic assemblies in the various demoi. Thus, their role is purely administrative and practical, not one of policy-making like that of representatives in representative democracy.
The citizen body is advised by experts but it is the citizen body which functions as the ultimate decision-taker . Authority can be delegated to a segment of the citizen body to carry out specific duties, for example to serve as members of popular courts, or of regional and confederal councils. Such delegation is made, in principle, by lot, on a rotation basis, and is always recallable by the citizen body. Delegates to regional and confederal bodies should have specific mandates.
Participatory politics[edit]
Main article: Participatory politics
A Parpolity or Participatory Polity is a theoretical form of democracy that is ruled by a Nested Council structure. The guiding philosophy is that people should have decision making power in proportion to how much they are affected by the decision. Local councils of 25–50 people are completely autonomous on issues that affect only them, and these councils send delegates to higher level councils who are again autonomous regarding issues that affect only the population affected by that council.
A council court of randomly chosen citizens serves as a check on the tyranny of the majority, and rules on which body gets to vote on which issue. Delegates may vote differently from how their sending council might wish, but are mandated to communicate the wishes of their sending council. Delegates are recallable at any time. Referendums are possible at any time via votes of most lower-level councils, however, not everything is a referendum as this is most likely a waste of time. A parpolity is meant to work in tandem with a participatory economy.
Cosmopolitan[edit]
Main article: Cosmopolitan democracy
Cosmopolitan democracy, also known as Global democracy or World Federalism, is a political system in which democracy is implemented on a global scale, either directly or through representatives. An important justification for this kind of system is that the decisions made in national or regional democracies often affect people outside the constituency who, by definition, cannot vote. By contrast, in a cosmopolitan democracy, the people who are affected by decisions also have a say in them.[118]
According to its supporters, any attempt to solve global problems is undemocratic without some form of cosmopolitan democracy. The general principle of cosmopolitan democracy is to expand some or all of the values and norms of democracy, including the rule of law; the non-violent resolution of conflicts; and equality among citizens, beyond the limits of the state. To be fully implemented, this would require reforming existing international organisations, e.g. the United Nations, as well as the creation of new institutions such as a World Parliament, which ideally would enhance public control over, and accountability in, international politics.
Cosmopolitan Democracy has been promoted, among others, by physicist Albert Einstein,[119] writer Kurt Vonnegut, columnist George Monbiot, and professors David Held and Daniele Archibugi.[120] The creation of the International Criminal Court in 2003 was seen as a major step forward by many supporters of this type of cosmopolitan democracy.
Creative Democracy[edit]
Main article: Creative Democracy
Creative Democracy is advocated by American philosopher John Dewey. The main idea about Creative Democracy is that democracy encourages individual capacity building and the interaction among the society. Dewey argues that democracy is a way of life in his work of ""Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us" [121] and an experience built on faith in human nature, faith in human beings, and faith in working with others. Democracy, in Dewey's view, is a moral ideal requiring actual effort and work by people; it is not an institutional concept that exists outside of ourselves. "The task of democracy", Dewey concludes, "is forever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute".
Non-governmental[edit]
Aside from the public sphere, similar democratic principles and mechanisms of voting and representation have been used to govern other kinds of groups. Many non-governmental organisations decide policy and leadership by voting. Most trade unions and cooperatives are governed by democratic elections. Corporations are controlled by shareholders on the principle of one share, one vote. An analogous system, that fuses elements of democracy with sharia law, has been termed islamocracy.[122]
Theory[edit]
A marble statue of Aristotle
Aristotle[edit]
Aristotle contrasted rule by the many (democracy/polity), with rule by the few (oligarchy/aristocracy), and with rule by a single person (tyranny or today autocracy/absolute monarchy). He also thought that there was a good and a bad variant of each system (he considered democracy to be the degenerate counterpart to polity).[123][124]
For Aristotle the underlying principle of democracy is freedom, since only in a democracy the citizens can have a share in freedom. In essence, he argues that this is what every democracy should make its aim. There are two main aspects of freedom: being ruled and ruling in turn, since everyone is equal according to number, not merit, and to be able to live as one pleases.
But one factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, ... And one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a slave.
— Aristotle, Politics 1317b (Book 6, Part II)
Rationale[edit]
Among modern political theorists, there are three contending conceptions of the fundamental rationale for democracy: aggregative democracy, deliberative democracy, and radical democracy.[125]
Aggregative[edit]
The theory of aggregative democracy claims that the aim of the democratic processes is to solicit citizens' preferences and aggregate them together to determine what social policies society should adopt. Therefore, proponents of this view hold that democratic participation should primarily focus on voting, where the policy with the most votes gets implemented.
Different variants of aggregative democracy exist. Under minimalism, democracy is a system of government in which citizens have given teams of political leaders the right to rule in periodic elections. According to this minimalist conception, citizens cannot and should not "rule" because, for example, on most issues, most of the time, they have no clear views or their views are not well-founded. Joseph Schumpeter articulated this view most famously in his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.[126] Contemporary proponents of minimalism include William H. Riker, Adam Przeworski, Richard Posner.
According to the theory of direct democracy, on the other hand, citizens should vote directly, not through their representatives, on legislative proposals. Proponents of direct democracy offer varied reasons to support this view. Political activity can be valuable in itself, it socialises and educates citizens, and popular participation can check powerful elites. Most importantly, citizens do not really rule themselves unless they directly decide laws and policies.
Governments will tend to produce laws and policies that are close to the views of the median voter – with half to their left and the other half to their right. This is not actually a desirable outcome as it represents the action of self-interested and somewhat unaccountable political elites competing for votes. Anthony Downs suggests that ideological political parties are necessary to act as a mediating broker between individual and governments. Downs laid out this view in his 1957 book An Economic Theory of Democracy.[127]
Robert A. Dahl argues that the fundamental democratic principle is that, when it comes to binding collective decisions, each person in a political community is entitled to have his/her interests be given equal consideration (not necessarily that all people are equally satisfied by the collective decision). He uses the term polyarchy to refer to societies in which there exists a certain set of institutions and procedures which are perceived as leading to such democracy. First and foremost among these institutions is the regular occurrence of free and open elections which are used to select representatives who then manage all or most of the public policy of the society. However, these polyarchic procedures may not create a full democracy if, for example, poverty prevents political participation.[128] Similarly, Ronald Dworkin argues that "democracy is a substantive, not a merely procedural, ideal."[129]
Deliberative[edit]
Deliberative democracy is based on the notion that democracy is government by deliberation. Unlike aggregative democracy, deliberative democracy holds that, for a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic deliberation, not merely the aggregation of preferences that occurs in voting. Authentic deliberation is deliberation among decision-makers that is free from distortions of unequal political power, such as power a decision-maker obtained through economic wealth or the support of interest groups.[130][131][132] If the decision-makers cannot reach consensus after authentically deliberating on a proposal, then they vote on the proposal using a form of majority rule.
Radical[edit]
Radical democracy is based on the idea that there are hierarchical and oppressive power relations that exist in society. Democracy's role is to make visible and challenge those relations by allowing for difference, dissent and antagonisms in decision making processes.
Criticism[edit]
Main article: Criticism of democracy
Protests
Inefficiencies[edit]
Some economists have criticized the efficiency of democracy. They base this on their premise of the irrational voter. Their argument is that voters are highly uninformed about many political issues, especially relating to economics, and have a strong bias about the few issues on which they are fairly knowledgeable. A common example often quoted to substantiate this point is the high economic development achieved by China (a non-democratic country) as compared to India (a democratic country).[citation needed]
Popular rule as a façade[edit]
The 20th-century Italian thinkers Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca (independently) argued that democracy was illusory, and served only to mask the reality of elite rule. Indeed, they argued that elite oligarchy is the unbendable law of human nature, due largely to the apathy and division of the masses (as opposed to the drive, initiative and unity of the elites), and that democratic institutions would do no more than shift the exercise of power from oppression to manipulation.[133] As Louis Brandeis once professed, "We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can't have both."[134]
Mob rule[edit]
Plato's The Republic presents a critical view of democracy through the narration of Socrates: "Democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequaled alike."[135] In his work, Plato lists 5 forms of government from best to worst. Assuming that the Republic was intended to be a serious critique of the political thought in Athens, Plato argues that only Kallipolis, an aristocracy led by the unwilling philosopher-kings (the wisest men), is a just form of government.[136]
James Madison critiqued direct democracy (which he referred to simply as "democracy") in Federalist No. 10, arguing that representative democracy—which he described using the term "republic"—is a preferable form of government, saying: "... democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." Madison offered that republics were superior to democracies because republics safeguarded against tyranny of the majority, stating in Federalist No. 10: "the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic".
Political instability[edit]
More recently, democracy is criticised for not offering enough political stability. As governments are frequently elected on and off there tends to be frequent changes in the policies of democratic countries both domestically and internationally. Even if a political party maintains power, vociferous, headline grabbing protests and harsh criticism from the mass media are often enough to force sudden, unexpected political change. Frequent policy changes with regard to business and immigration are likely to deter investment and so hinder economic growth. For this reason, many people have put forward the idea that democracy is undesirable for a developing country in which economic growth and the reduction of poverty are top priorities.[137]
This opportunist alliance not only has the handicap of having to cater to too many ideologically opposing factions, but it is usually short lived since any perceived or actual imbalance in the treatment of coalition partners, or changes to leadership in the coalition partners themselves, can very easily result in the coalition partner withdrawing its support from the government.
Fraudulent elections[edit]
In representative democracies, it may not benefit incumbents to conduct fair elections. A study showed that incumbents who rig elections stay in office 2.5 times as long as those who permit fair elections.[138] Democracies in countries with high per capita income have been found to be less prone to violence, but in countries with low incomes the tendency is the reverse.[138] Election misconduct is more likely in countries with low per capita incomes, small populations, rich in natural resources, and a lack of institutional checks and balances. Sub-Saharan countries, as well as Afghanistan, all tend to fall into that category.[138]
Governments that have frequent elections tend to have significantly more stable economic policies than those governments who have infrequent elections. However, this trend does not apply to governments where fraudulent elections are common.[138]
Opposition[edit]
Main article: Anti-democratic thought
Democracy in modern times has almost always faced opposition from the previously existing government, and many times it has faced opposition from social elites. The implementation of a democratic government within a non-democratic state is typically brought about by democratic revolution.
Post-Enlightenment ideologies such as fascism, nazism, and neo-fundamentalism oppose democracy on different grounds, generally citing that the concept of democracy as a constant process is flawed and detrimental to a preferable course of development.
Development[edit]
Main article: Democratisation
Several philosophers and researchers have outlined historical and social factors seen as supporting the evolution of democracy. Cultural factors like Protestantism influenced the development of democracy, rule of law, human rights and political liberty (the faithful elected priests, religious freedom and tolerance has been practiced).
Other commentators have mentioned the influence of wealth (e.g. S. M. Lipset, 1959). In a related theory, Ronald Inglehart suggests that improved living-standards can convince people that they can take their basic survival for granted, leading to increased emphasis on self-expression values, which is highly correlated to democracy.[139]
Carroll Quigley concludes that the characteristics of weapons are the main predictor of democracy:[140][141] Democracy tends to emerge only when the best weapons available are easy for individuals to buy and use.[142] By the 1800s, guns were the best personal weapons available, and in America, almost everyone could afford to buy a gun, and could learn how to use it fairly easily. Governments couldn't do any better: it became the age of mass armies of citizen soldiers with guns[142] Similarly, Periclean Greece was an age of the citizen soldier and democracy.[143]
Recent theories stress the relevance of education and of human capital - and within them of cognitive ability to increasing tolerance, rationality, political literacy and participation. Two effects of education and cognitive ability are distinguished: a cognitive effect (competence to make rational choices, better information-processing) and an ethical effect (support of democratic values, freedom, human rights etc.), which itself depends on intelligence.[144][145][146]
Evidence that is consistent with conventional theories of why democracy emerges and is sustained has been hard to come by. Recent statistical analyses have challenged modernisation theory by demonstrating that there is no reliable evidence for the claim that democracy is more likely to emerge when countries become wealthier, more educated, or less unequal.[147] Neither is there convincing evidence that increased reliance on oil revenues prevents democratisation, despite a vast theoretical literature on "the Resource Curse" that asserts that oil revenues sever the link between citizen taxation and government accountability, seen as the key to representative democracy.[148] The lack of evidence for these conventional theories of democratisation have led researchers to search for the "deep" determinants of contemporary political institutions, be they geographical or demographic.[149][150]
In the 21st century, democracy has become such a popular method of reaching decisions that its application beyond politics to other areas such as entertainment, food and fashion, consumerism, urban planning, education, art, literature, science and theology has been criticised as "the reigning dogma of our time".[151] The argument suggests that applying a populist or market-driven approach to art and literature (for example), means that innovative creative work goes unpublished or unproduced. In education, the argument is that essential but more difficult studies are not undertaken. Science, as a truth-based discipline, is particularly corrupted by the idea that the correct conclusion can be arrived at by popular vote. However, more recently, theorists have also advanced the concept epistemic democracy to assert that democracy actually does a good job tracking the truth.
Robert Michels asserts that although democracy can never be fully realised, democracy may be developed automatically in the act of striving for democracy: "The peasant in the fable, when on his death-bed, tells his sons that a treasure is buried in the field. After the old man's death the sons dig everywhere in order to discover the treasure. They do not find it. But their indefatigable labor improves the soil and secures for them a comparative well-being. The treasure in the fable may well symbolise democracy."[152]
Dr. Harald Wydra, in his book Communism and The Emergence of Democracy (2007), maintains that the development of democracy should not be viewed as a purely procedural or as a static concept but rather as an ongoing "process of meaning formation".[153] Drawing on Claude Lefort's idea of the empty place of power, that "power emanates from the people [...] but is the power of nobody", he remarks that democracy is reverence to a symbolic mythical authority as in reality, there is no such thing as the people or demos. Democratic political figures are not supreme rulers but rather temporary guardians of an empty place. Any claim to substance such as the collective good, the public interest or the will of the nation is subject to the competitive struggle and times of for[clarification needed] gaining the authority of office and government. The essence of the democratic system is an empty place, void of real people which can only be temporarily filled and never be appropriated. The seat of power is there, but remains open to constant change. As such, what "democracy" is or what is "democratic" progresses throughout history as a continual and potentially never ending process of social construction.[citation needed]
In 2010 a study by a German military think-tank analyzed how peak oil might change the global economy. The study raises fears for the survival of democracy itself. It suggests that parts of the population could perceive the upheaval triggered by peak oil as a general systemic crisis. This would create "room for ideological and extremist alternatives to existing forms of government".[154]
See also[edit]
iconPolitics portal
Constitutional liberalism
Democracy Ranking
Democratic peace theory
E-democracy
Empowered democracy
Foucault–Habermas debate
Good governance
Parliament in the Making
Shadow government (conspiracy)
Spatial Citizenship
Statism
References[edit]
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Further reading[edit]
This article's further reading may not follow Wikipedia's content policies or guidelines. Please improve this article by removing excessive, less relevant or many publications with the same point of view; or by incorporating the relevant publications into the body of the article through appropriate citations. (January 2016) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)
Appleby, Joyce. (1992). Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination. Harvard University Press.
Archibugi, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy, Princeton University Press ISBN 978-0-691-13490-1
Becker, Peter, Heideking, Juergen, & Henretta, James A. (2002). Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750–1850. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-80066-2
Benhabib, Seyla. (1996). Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-04478-1
Blattberg, Charles. (2000). From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting Practice First, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-829688-1.
Birch, Anthony H. (1993). The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-41463-0
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Copp, David, Jean Hampton, & John E. Roemer. (1993). The Idea of Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-43254-2
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Davenport, Christian. (2007). State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-86490-9
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Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner & Philip J. Costopoulos. (2005). World Religions and Democracy. JHU Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-8080-3
Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner & Daniel Brumberg. (2003). Islam and Democracy in the Middle East. JHU Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-7847-3
Elster, Jon. (1998). Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-59696-1
Emerson, Peter (2007) "Designing an All-Inclusive Democracy." Springer. ISBN 978-3-540-33163-6
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Fotopoulos, Takis. (2006). "Liberal and Socialist "Democracies" versus Inclusive Democracy", The International Journal Of Inclusive Democracy. 2(2)
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Willard, Charles Arthur. (1996). Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-89845-2
Wood, E. M. (1995). Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing historical materialism. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-47682-9
Wood, Gordon S. (1991). The Radicalism of the American Revolution. Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0-679-73688-2 examines democratic dimensions of republicanism
External links[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Democracy.
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Look up democracy in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.
Library resources about
Democracy
Resources in your library
Democracy at DMOZ
The Official Website of Democracy Foundation , Mumbai - INDIA
Centre for Democratic Network Governance
Democracy at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Democracy
The Economist Intelligence Unit's index of democracy
Ewbank, N. The Nature of Athenian Democracy, Clio History Journal, 2009.
"Democracy Conference". Innertemple.org.uk. Archived from the original on 2010-05-28.[dead link]
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America Full hypertext with critical essays on America in 1831–32 from American Studies at the University of Virginia
Democracy Watch (Canada) – Leading democracy monitoring organisation
Democratic Audit (UK) – Independent research organisation which produces evidence-based reports that assess democracy and human rights in the UK
Data visualizations of data on democratisation and list of data sources on political regimes on 'Our World in Data', by Max Roser.
[1] MaxRange Classifying political regime type and democracy level to all states and months 1789-2015
CritiqueErik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn: Liberty or Equality.
J.K. Baltzersen: Churchill on Democracy Revisited, (24 January 2005)
GegenStandpunkt: The Democratic State: Critique of Bourgeois Sovereignty
Frank Karsten: Democracy Can't Be Fixed. It's Inherently Broken[dead link], Lew Rockwell
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